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Introduction
In the early 1990s, the political battles of the 1970s seemed to be over, with
class struggle as a driving force supposedly rendered obsolete by the end of
the ColdWar. Certain aspects of these battles had shifted into the universities,
mainly thanks to teachers who themselves had participated in the political
movements of the 1970s. I was one of those teachers. As an art historian I
foundmyself within a discipline that I wanted to teach, but that in many ways
did not satisfy me.The 1980s had brought feminism into academia, reshaping
it into gender studies, a transformation I had tried to be part of. And in Britain
and the United States, not only women asserted themselves as new subjects
in academic discourse, but also those groups of individuals who were fighting
for visibility and a voice as the Other of dominant ethnic, cultural and sexual
categories. Visibility became a currency of social recognition, and a political
issue. From the late 1980s, it also became an academic issue. And from the
early 1990s in Britain and the United States it brought forth a new discipline,
visual culture studies, which in turn brought forth a new concept: visuality.
This book is about a particular intellectual struggle that originated in the 1970s
and continues today. Two disciplinary fields will be in play in my analysis: art
history and visual culture studies.
A hotly contested debate in the early 1990s unfolded between art history
and visual culture studies over the interpretation of contemporary visual cul-
ture, a dispute whose impact can still be felt today. Visual culture studies
declared art history incapable of responding to the specific problems result-
ing from global migration flows, identity politics in the conflict between the
global and the local, new media technologies and the media cultures emerg-
ing from them. In the view of visual culture studies, art history represented
elitist western traditions that manifested themselves in a hierarchical con-
cept of “high” art versus “low” popular culture, in a colonializing view of the
art of other cultures, in the mythologization of the (male) artist, in the per-
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petuation of a history of styles associated with national traditions, and in an
inability to respond to the revolution inmedia technology that has taken place
in recent decades. Where, in art history, were the voices of new, postcolonial
subjects?Where was the critique of the western canon?Where was the discus-
sion about the power and consumerist exploitation of the art market? Where
was the questioning of the elitist distinction between high and popular art?
Faced with this situation, art history in both the English- and German-
speaking worlds was put on the defensive. New political and ethical dimen-
sions had opened up that went beyond attempts by left-wing art historians
in the 1970s to add class struggle to the epistemic interests of the discipline.
Those wishing to take these new dimensions seriously had to call the existing
cognitive fundamentals of the discipline into question.
In Germany since the mid-1980s, it had been feminist art historians (a
marginal group within academia) who asked such questions, me among
them. With regular conferences and publications, we had tried to shake up
the heuristic status quo of the discipline, and we found ourselves obliged to
look beyond its boundaries for suitable theoretical tools.1 We read Michel
Foucault, Louis Althusser, Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Ju-
dith Butler, Teresa de Lauretis and Kaja Silverman. We also read our British
feminist colleagues Griselda Pollock, Marcia Pointon and Irit Rogoff, whose
academic context was very different to our own, shaped by the intellectual cli-
mate of universities like Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds where cultural
studies had become established in the 1970s, laying the theoretical basis for
visual culture studies.2 By comparison, the culture of art history in Germany
felt confined.
1 See publications resulting from the conferences of women art historians held from
1984, including: Ilsebill Barta, Zita Breu, Daniela Hammer-Tugendhat, Ulrike Jenny,
Irene Nierhaus, Judith Schöbel (eds.): Frauen. Bilder. Männer. Mythen. Kunsthistorische
Beiträge (Berlin 1987); Ines Lindner, Sigrid Schade, Silke Wenk, Gabriele Werner (eds.):
Blick-Wechsel. Konstruktionen von Männlichkeit und Weiblichkeit in Kunst und Kunstge-
schichte (Berlin 1989); Silvia Baumgart, Gotlind Birkle, Mechthild Fend, Bettina Götz,
Andrea Klier, Bettina Uppenkamp (eds.): Denkräume zwischen Kunst und Wissenschaft
(Berlin 1993); Susanne von Falkenhausen, Silke Förschler, IngeborgReichle, BettinaUp-
penkamp (eds.):Medien der Kunst. Geschlecht Metapher Code (Marburg 2004).
2 More on this in Chapter 6, and in Margaret Dikovitskaya, Visual Culture. The Study of the
Visual after the Cultural Turn (Cambridge, MA 2005).
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Some of our American colleagues, too, were clearly unhappy with art
history and “defected” to the new field of visual culture studies.3 In the
United States, the culture within art history was different, shaped by a
double legacy: on the one hand, the German strain of art history that Erwin
Panofsky brought with him to his American exile, a scholarly history of
ideas with its method of iconology; and on the other, a heightened formal-
ism that had gained new topicality thanks to America’s “high modernist”
painters (Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, Barnett Newman) and the critics
who supported them (Clement Greenberg, Michael Fried). Both of these
schools were now attacked by the representatives of visual culture studies –
including “defectors” from art history (e.g. Michael Ann Holly) and literary
criticism (e.g. Norman Bryson, Mieke Bal) – for being elitist, unpolitical and
western-white-male-dominated.
American art history responded with a series of articles in its journal of
record, The Art Bulletin, running from 1994 to 1997 under the title “A Range
of Critical Perspectives”, asking leading representatives of the discipline to
reflect on the need for new approaches, with topics directly related to these
issues: The Object of Art History; The Subject in/of Art History; Aesthetics,
Ethnicity, and the History of Art; Rethinking the Canon; Art History and its
Theories; Money, Power, and the History of Art.4 As I remember it, this series
went unnoticed by art history in Germany.
In 1996, a counterattack was mounted by October magazine in a survey
of art historians making a vehement appeal against extending the domain
of art history beyond art and in defence of the special position of art within
society – an energetic attempt to secure the discipline’s status and salvage it
as a specialist domain. Interviewed in 1997, the magazine’s co-editor Rosalind
Krauss clearly stated the motivation for this survey:
“RK: I hate visual culture.
SR: You hate visual culture?
RK: In fact,Octobermagazine, which I coedit and cofounded in 1976, recently
3 More on this in Part Two, 4.
4 The Art Bulletin, statements for the series “A Range of Critical Perspectives” in the years
1994 to 1997 under the following titles: 1994: “The Object of Art History”, “The Subject
in/of Art History”; 1995: “Art> <History”, “Inter/disciplinarity”, 1996: “Aesthetics, Ethnic-
ity, and the History of Art”, “Rethinking the Canon”, “Art History and its Theories”; 1997:
“Money, Power, and the History of Art”.
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did a special issue that was an attack on the visual culture project. Like cul-
tural studies, visual culture is aimed at what we could call pejoratively, abu-
sively, deskilling. Part of that project is to attack the very idea of disciplines
which are bound to knowing how to do something, certain skills.”5
From the mid-1990s onwards, then, hostility reigned between the old-
established discipline of art history and the young discipline of visual culture
studies. Portrayals of visual culture studies as anti-elitist, multicultural,
postcolonial and democratic depended on art history being described in
negative terms as elitist, formalist-cum-Hegelian, nationalistic and obsessed
with artistic genius. However, the rebuttals of these mutual accusations
remained within a close-up view that obstructed critical reflection on each
side’s own contexts and cognitive objectives.
This became very clear when I read the texts generated by this dispute
with my students, reinforcing my wish to overcome the mental and discur-
sive blockades of these increasingly clichéd debates by analysing selected texts
by the antagonists in terms of the history of academic discourse, seeking out
their inner motivations. In order to get away from the turf wars and bor-
der patrols between visual culture studies and art history, and to probe each
side’s epistemic interests for their theoretical and methodological implica-
tions, I developed a research project that was originally titled “Visuality as a
Paradigm: Art History and Visual Culture Studies”. The plan was to make a
comparative study of the concept of visuality in terms of its application and
effectiveness.
It soon became clear, however, that visuality would not work as the main
term for such a comparison since it did not feature in the methodological
vocabulary of art history – even if this hard-to-define concept from visual
culture studies certainly can also be related to the context and practice of
art history. As a specialized visual practice, art history could become subject
matter for visual culture studies with a focus on visuality, but the reverse
would not be possible. Using visuality as the key term of comparison would
have oriented my readings more strongly towards visual culture studies, thus
disturbing the desired balance. I needed to find a term that applied to both art
5 See theVisual CultureQuestionnaire, in:October 77 (Summer 1996): 25-70; for the inter-
view seehttp://www.thecrimson.com/article/1997/5/16/krauss-and-the-art-of-cultural/
(accessed 26 Sept 2016). See also Rosalind Krauss, “Der Tod der Fachkenntnisse und
Kunstfertigkeiten” in Texte zur Kunst 20 (1995), 61-67 (unpublished in English: “The De-
ath of Skills”).
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history and visual culture studies, if not in the same way then at least with the
same weight. This term is seeing: it structures the visuality of visual culture
studies as fundamentally as it does the modus operandi of art history.
Seeing and the concept of visuality
The concept of visuality is, I argue, closely associated with a specific politi-
cal agenda: visibility as a socio-political resource. The visual, or visuality, has
become a political category, and visibility has become a resource in struggles
for recognition by marginalized identities. This is the main basis for the ar-
guments used by visual culture studies against art history. But what status
does seeing have within this concept and within the resulting practice of vi-
sual culture studies as a discipline? Besides the huge implications in terms
of method, I began to ask myself whether this basic strategic interest might
actually limit the heuristic usefulness of the concept of visuality itself. On the
other hand, with its emphasis on relationality, communication and agency,
one can also ask whether the approach in which seeing is embedded here
might also be rendered productive for art history with its focus on objects.
In the course of my reading, I soon came across differences between art
history and visual culture studies which derived from their respective roots
in the history of academic disciplines: art history, developed as a discipline
devoted to the classification (by period, style, artist, region) of (art) objects,
encounters a new player whose agenda is anchored in a single core concept,
that of visuality. And in turn, rather than referring to definable objects, this
concept of visuality is itself both object and theory of a social, cultural and
political field insofar as it manifests itself visually: in objects, but also and
above all in practices and technologies of seeing and being seen, of seeing in
the sense of an exchange between people on all levels of culture and sociality.
Visuality describes events as well as actions, communication and symbolic
production; it is a concept that attempts to grasp the visual aspects of the
relationality and performativity of human life (or of subjects) in societies and
cultures.This is a significant structural difference to the genesis of art history
with its focus on objects (however much art history, too, may take the context
of its objects into account in its analyses). In a sense, then,we have nownamed
the elements of parallel but also conflicting structures, and thus several key
coordinates in the complex relationship between art history and visual culture
studies which will guide the close readings in this book:
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art history visual culture studies
art visuality
focus on objects focus on performativity/relationality
object/artwork visual
These elements are not identical with the concepts my readings will ex-
plore, such as culture, identity, the gaze, or representation.They offer a struc-
ture, albeit binary and simplified, for addressing the basic assumptions of
the two disciplines regarding their practices of scholarly seeing. It may seem
strange that visibility is not included here. Visibility as a political resource in
the struggle for recognition is central to identity politics. As such it is linked
to the political agenda of visual culture studies and has no counterpart in art
history. Visibility is vital to any understanding of the concept of visuality, but
it is not identical with it, being just one of its multiple aspects. Narrowing
visuality to this aspect alone would thus seriously impede the methodological
possibilities of this concept that I regard as the most important contribution
of visual culture studies to the humanities.
Trains of thought – readings
As mentioned above, I wanted to explore the complex relationship between
visual culture studies and art history beyond the usual barriers to thought
and dialogue, and beyond the increasingly abbreviated debates, by examining
exemplary texts from the perspective of the history of discourse and learn-
ing/science. This led to a research project and eventually to this book. Above
all, then, it is a project based on reading, rather than a synthesizing overview.
Large-scale syntheses tend towards distortions and a lack of transparency;
however easy they seem to make it for the reader, they can also be conde-
scending. I aim to be transparent, most importantly about the situatedness
of my readings, which aim not to be objective but to create and be part of
an open debate. The reader should be able to follow my reading closely and
grasp it in critical terms. This book, then, is neither an introduction nor a
grand narrative, but a kind of archaeology, an excavation of texts that ex-
poses and renders visible their various layers. Of course, the choice of texts
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is crucial here: they have influenced and continue to influence debates both
within and between disciplines. The texts chosen involve the history of the
two disciplines and their discursive links that focus on seeing as a key factor
determining their practice.
The book concentrates on the complex relationship between art history
and visual culture studies; what it does not deal with is their relationship to
the discipline of Bildwissenschaft (literally “picture studies”) that has emerged
in the German-speaking world.6 Today, Bildwissenschaft has developed a dif-
fuseness similar to that of visual culture studies, and some German speakers
mix the two terms to the point of indifference or use them as synonyms.7
This does not foster clarity when attempting to grasp the (not always evident)
epistemic interests involved or to reflect on the theoretical and methodolog-
ical conditions of one’s own academic activity, which is why I chose not to
broaden my focus here. This also bears on the question of my position as an
art historian: I am not interested in expanding the remit of art history; I also
remain committed to it as a discipline, since its object, art, is not just one
instance of visuality among others. The status of art, as well as the status of
individual art objects, is not a given; it is subject to discursive negotiation.
Nonetheless, or precisely for this reason, there is a need for skills informed
by art history that allow an engagement with the complexity that inheres in a
discrete object, the artwork, as the result of a specific differentiated cultural
6 I have commented on this relationship elsewhere: Susanne von Falkenhausen, “Ver-
zwickte Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse: Kunstgeschichte, Visual Culture, Bildwissen-
schaft”, in Philine Helas, Maren Polte, Claudia Rückert, Bettina Uppenkamp(eds.),
Bild/Geschichte. Festschrift für Horst Bredekamp (Berlin 2007), 3-13.
7 Recent publications: Marius Rimmele, Bernd Stiegler: Visuelle Kulturen/Visual Culture
(Hamburg 2012) trace a genealogy of visual culture outlining differences and similari-
ties between Bildwissenschaft and visual culture studies based on Gottfried Boehm and
W.J.T. Mitchell (see p 69ff.). On the current tendency to integrate visual culture studies
into Bildwissenschaft, see Gustav Frank, Barbara Lange, Einführung in die Bildwissenschaft
(Darmstadt 2010); Klaus Sachs-Hombach (ed.), Bildtheorien. Anthropologische und kul-
turelle Grundlagen des Visualistic Turn (Frankfurt 2009). By contrast, in their book Studi-
en zur visuellen Kultur. Einführung in ein transdisziplinäres Forschungsfeld (Bielefeld 2011),
Sigrid Schade and Silke Wenk give a differentiated view of the position of Bildwissen-
schaft in the German academic landscape (see p. 146ff.). In their view, the “research
field” of visual culture is founded on semiotics; in this they followMieke Bal (see chap-
ter 6). In their portrayal of this research field, they essentially follow the themes of
their own art historical practice; consequently, their book differs frommy project in its
orientation.
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practice and discursivity. But the discipline of art history can only retain its
vitality by constantly calling its epistemic interests into question and by com-
municating with other fields and disciplines to keep abreast of their activities.
My comparative survey of art history and visual culture studies is thus under-
taken from a position of a restless art historian who has been shaped by this
discipline but who does not unquestioningly identify with it.
Art history and seeing
Strangely, approaches that address the activity on which art history is based
have a hard time in art history today. In descriptions of art historical method
and theory, seeing remains underexposed. And the kind of seeing we were
encouraged to “practise” when I began studying in Vienna in 1970 struck me
as a tenuous affair. No one could tell me what it actually was and how it was
supposed to affect art historical practice.The same applied, incidentally, to the
“style analysis” that seemed at the time to be the ultimate heuristic exercise.
Taken together, these implicit notions of seeing plus style as a hermeneutic
benchmark constituted the mystifying and highly imprecise ideology of art
history at the time, which still followed the pattern of the post-war decades.
Years later, in 1977, Otto Pächt’sThe Practice of Art History: Reflections on Method8
was published, a collection of texts including the lecture which, unsuspecting
and with the beginner’s lack of understanding, I had heard in Vienna in 1970
and which, had I read it with the requisite concentration, could have helped
me understand better. Only today do I consider myself capable of reading this
text.
The status of the image is less fraught than that of seeing in German-lan-
guage art history. Although seeing has been explained physiologically to a cer-
tain degree, it remains hard to “grasp” in thoughts and words. And although
something similar applies to images, there is at least a seemingly ineluctable,
materially verifiable object for theorists to engage with – ineluctable insofar
as it ultimately has no analogue in language, in spite of all the various en-
deavours of art historical interpretation. This quality seems to be what fuels
the abiding fascination of Bildwissenschaft with a leading question like: “What
is an image?” My scepticism towards such leading questions focuses above
8 Otto Pächt, Methodisches zur kunsthistorischen Praxis. Ausgewählte Schriften, Jörg Ober-
haidacher, Artur Rosenauer, Gertraut Schikola eds., (1. Edition, München 1977).
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all on the desire for definitions that tend to act more as axioms. To quote
Gombrich, “there are no axioms, only agreements.”9 Definitions are figures
of thought which (at least when they represent an end in themselves) block
relational thinking. And thinking about seeing is necessarily relational.
As an art historian, one of the metaphors for which I envy visual culture
studies, and which I have appropriated, is that of the “visual field”. It covers
both the realm within which visuality operates and the realm of its theoriza-
tion. This opens up potential applications and intellectual spaces for art his-
tory that go beyond the simple duality of (art) object and context, rendering
this duality multiple and dynamic. So how can this visual field be conceived
of in relation to seeing in art history? In the practice of art historians, seeing
the object marks the beginning of any cognitive approach.We look at the art-
work because we want to analyse it. This seeing is an active kind that opens
up a field of relations: between the object, the viewing art historian and the
producer/artist. The metaphor of the visual field is very well suited to these
relations, making it possible to reflect on one’s actions as an art historian
in terms of interdependences. Moreover, the visual field can be extended to
include the framing of its protagonists: the historical and cultural factors re-
lating to the history of academic discourse that influence viewer, artist and
artwork. It configures the acts of seeing of all involved – the viewer, the artist,
and the artwork that “looks back”. This may sound simple, but it turns out to
be a theoretical minefield that art history has to date largely avoided. It is
symptomatic of the way art history takes the practice of seeing for granted
that this practice itself is barely subjected to theoretical scrutiny, giving the
impression that this key cognitive tool exists without presuppositions. Con-
sequently, my reading of texts from art history extrapolate the theoretical and
methodological presuppositions for this kind of knowledge-generating see-
ing.
The texts of art history
Art history does not make it easy to find out about its past and present think-
ing on the subject of its own acts of seeing. Inmost cases, it remains an unspo-
ken presupposition of the discipline’s practice. To coax it out of this latency
9 Ernst H. Gombrich, “‘Wenn’s euch Ernst ist, was zu sagen …’ –Wandlungen in der Kunst-
geschichtsbetrachtung”, inMartina Sitt (ed.),Kunsthistoriker in eigener Sache: 10 autobio-
graphische Skizzen (Berlin 1990), 87.
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into a more open, manifest form, it must be surgically extracted from the
methods and objectives of the discipline. As a relatively long-established dis-
cipline, art history possesses a differentiated structure of positions, methods
and practices – sediments laid down over two centuries. For a comparison
with the young discipline of visual culture studies, providing a full overview
of this period seemed as unhelpful as including every single historically de-
fined position.My choice of readingmatter was guided by two criteria: firstly,
the texts should deal explicitly or implicitly with the theme of seeing/looking,
and secondly they should be “canonical” texts that have been and continue to
be influential in the discipline’s internal discussions of objectives and meth-
ods. My readings include the reception history of these texts, as this history
often displays connections with visual culture studies, highlighting moments
of shared background.
Onemight think there is a contradiction with what I stated above: that art
history does not reflect on its own ways of seeing. In different ways, the texts
analyse how images are formed by viewing processes: of the painter (Panof-
sky, Gombrich), of the painter’s customer or the general public (Baxandall,
Alpers), or of the spectator (Pächt, Kemp). But I found only one text dealing
directly with the art historian’s own act of seeing: Otto Pächt’sThePractice of Art
History: Reflections onMethod.The positions on the activity of seeing underlying
art historical interpretation are structured by pairs of opposites: culturally in-
formed versus empirical seeing, interpretative versus scientifically verifying
seeing, historically evolving versus biologically/optically fixed seeing. Each of
these positions implies a specific relationship between subject and object, be-
tween interpreting present and historical alterity, or unfamiliarity, between
the object and its context. The questions I address to the texts of art history
are as follows: In which discourses are the positions of seeing embedded and
which metaphors are used to articulate them? Does seeing have to do, for ex-
ample, with authenticity or purity? Does it imply a concept of truth? How is
the threefold seeing that “surrounds” an artwork (making, viewing, interpret-
ing) dealt with? How is seeing (all three kinds) historicized? How is it (explic-
itly or implicitly) “constructed” as a presupposition of method and practice?
Does the concept of seeing in question bring context into its interpretation,
or does it view art in isolation? How is the act of seeing situated within the
basic assumptions of scholarly research? Which relationship between subject
(artist/viewer) and object do these assumptions imply? The six selected texts
are grouped under three headings indicating the motivations that informed
their authors’ acts of seeing: “Interpreting forms of representation” (Panof-
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sky and Gombrich), “Experience and the visual” (Baxandall and Alpers), and
“Through the eyes of the spectator” (Pächt and Kemp).
My readings begin with Panofsky’s essay on Perspective as Symbolic Form
(1927).This text, which remains hugely influential, is a good place to begin for
several reasons: for one thing, it received renewed attention in the context of
the New Art History of the 1990s,10 thus providing a bridge to the art history
immediately involved in debate with visual culture studies;11 for another, it
offers a macro-historical view of models of seeing as visualized in art. The
potential links to recent constructivist models of seeing are also clear. Like
Panofsky’s essay, Ernst Gombrich’s Art and Illusion. A Study in the Psychology of
Pictorial Representation (1960) has had a long and controversial reception, cen-
tred on the question of whether its model of seeing is empirical-scientistic
or constructivist-subjectivizing. The texts by Panofsky and Gombrich are not
about seeing as practised by those who interpret, but about the forms of rep-
resentation in which seeing the world appears in art, as a subject of art his-
tory. What their reflections on this subject reveal about their own mode of
seeing as an instrument of scholarly research has to be inferred from their
texts.
Michael Baxandall’s Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy (1972)
is associated with the concept of the “period eye”. With his reconstruction
of historically unfamiliar modes of seeing, Baxandall links empiricism and
constructivism in a way that prompted Clifford Geertz (in 1976) to formulate
ideas that became central to cultural anthropology. Here, the focus is nei-
ther on exploring the difference between the picture and the reality portrayed
(Gombrich), nor on the analytical gaze of the art historian (Pächt), but on
reconstructing the experiences of seeing that shaped both the painters and
those they painted for, thus also determining what the period expected from
artistic forms. For this reconstruction, painting is a historical source. With
The Art of Describing (1983) by Svetlana Alpers, we come to a position that is
often thought to have sparked the concept of visual culture studies. Based on
Dutch painting of the 17th century, she reconstructs a culture in which the
practice of visual observation was held in high esteem and which she refers
to as a visual culture. This clearly forms a bridge between the two disciplines,
10 See Jonathan Harris, The New Art History. A Critical Introduction (London, New York
2001).
11 See Christopher S.Wood, “Introduction”, in Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form,
translated and with an introduction by Christopher S. Wood (New York 1991), 7-24.
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but one that must be carefully contextualized in order to highlight its distinct
position as compared with the subsequent program of visual culture studies.
The final readings from art history are from the German-speaking world:
Otto Pächt’s The Practice of Art History: Reflections on Method,12 the only text re-
flecting on the discipline’s own modes of seeing, offers in its precision and
focus on concrete objects, paired with theoretical restraint, important in-
sights into the problems connected with overcoming the historical remote-
ness of the object via a hermeneutically empathetic gaze. Unlike Gombrich’s
book, Pächt’s text has been and continues to be little discussed, confirming
my impression that art history as a discipline tends to avoid reflecting on its
own (seeing) actions. For all its focus on the art historian’s practice, Pächt’s
book has made little concrete impact on the culture of the discipline. With
my reading, I therefore also want to strengthen his position within the dis-
cipline and examine its current relevance, following its introduction into the
Anglo-American debate by Christopher Wood in 1999.
Wolfgang Kemp’s Der Anteil des Betrachters (The Beholder’s Share, 1983) po-
sitions seeing within the framework of reception theory. With reference to
Diderot’s reviews of the Paris Salons and the reader response theory of Iser
and Jauss, seeing is conceived of here from a narratological perspective. Kemp
sees the viewer prefigured in the picture’s internal eye-directing structure.
Hence, although his approach has the viewer’s response in mind, this re-
sponse is seen as being determined by the picture and its narrative strategies.
The texts by Alpers and Kemp were published the same year. Although Alpers’
text could be read as a transitional position to visual culture studies, I discuss
Kemp after Alpers – firstly because Alpers’ reference to Baxandall’s concept
of “visual experience” from 1972 strikes me as more important than her sta-
tus as a conceptual precursor to visual culture studies, and secondly because
I see Kemp’s narratological approach as more closely related to the methods
of visual culture studies (especially Bal) than the descriptive approach taken
by Alpers. Moreover, Kemp links his position, among others, with those of
Bryson and Bal, who soon after became key figures in visual culture studies.
12 Otto Pächt, The Practice of Art History: Reflections on Method, trans. David Britt, with an
introduction by Christopher Wood (London 1999).
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Seeing in the visual field: visual culture studies
For visual culture studies, unlike for art history, seeing is a point of intense
theoretical debate on several levels. Reading the texts of visual culture studies,
one gains the impression that any analysis of an object must be preceded by
a clarification of the specific concept of seeing being applied. And since the
object is more often a starting point for such a positioning than an end point,
the object in question is often chosen from the viewpoint of the theoretical
model to be underpinned, and not the other way round. For visual culture
studies, then, the concept of visuality is not only an analytical tool but also
an object of study in its own right. The resulting interplay of (visual) object,
viewer and producer is thus entirely different to that found in art history.
The point of departure for the concepts of visuality found in visual culture
studies is the kind of seeing discussed in Anglo-American theory, via Sartre
and Lacan, as the gaze. It centres on a subject that sees and is seen. As well as
constituting the subject, this seeing and being seen also threatens it.13 Finally,
the subject figures here as both the starting and end point of the analytical
activity; this has far-reaching consequences for the structure of subject-object
relations, and it also represents a crucial difference between visual culture
studies and art history.
The texts of visual culture studies
As a young discipline, visual culture studies has yet to pass through a canon-
ization process comparable to that undergone by art history. Looking at its
short history, one is confronted with a flood of texts; typically for a young
player in the field of academic politics, there is a strong wish to give the dis-
cipline a solid theoretical foundation. In addition, a number of diverse dis-
ciplines were and still are involved in the emergence and evolution of this
discipline (or “indiscipline”,14 as W.J.T. Mitchell has termed it). As a result, a
very revealing internal debate is taking place over the key concept of visuality,
with direct implications for the theoretical basis, conceptual framework and
13 See chapters 5 and 7.
14 W.J.T. Mitchell, “Interdisciplinarity and Visual Culture” in Art Bulletin 77, no. 4 (1995):
541.
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stated focus of visual culture studies.Within this debate, there is considerable
potential for conflict between the different positions.15
The canonization of visual culture studies has, however, progressed far
enough for there to be a first history of its introduction into American uni-
versity teaching.16 This was preceded by several scholarly introductions fea-
turing American and British authors that offered canons both of methods and
of texts and theories.17 Such books included (and continue to include) names
from various different disciplines (sociology, anthropology, communications
studies, cultural studies, film studies, design, art history). In 2006, a new (to
me) genre appeared: ameta-reader, bringing together introductory texts from
a large number of introductions and readers on visual culture studies18 – of-
fering an overview of the superabundance of different attempts to define and
situate the discipline. Unlike in the case of art history, this sprawling diversity
prompted me to preface my readings with a brief genealogy of visual culture
studies. It is intended to illuminate what I consider to be the two key con-
texts in the emergence of the discipline19 (the political and the academic) and
outline its key categories (visuality and identity).The questions guiding my
reading of the texts of visual culture studies are: How is the field described
in which seeing is embedded? What is the relationship between seeing and
sociality? To what extent is seeing conceived of as an activity? How important
15 See for example the confrontation between Bal and Mirzoeff over Bal’s identification
and rejection of “visual essentialism”: Mieke Bal, “Visual Essentialism and the Object
of Visual Culture”, in: Journal of Visual Culture 2, no. 1 (2003), 5-32, and: “Responses to
Mieke Bal’s ‘Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture’, ibid., 229-268.
16 See Dikovitskaya, Visual Culture.
17 Lisa Bloom (ed.), With Other Eyes. Looking at Race and Gender in Visual Culture (Min-
neapolis 1999); Fiona Carson, Claire Pajaczkowska (eds.), Feminist Visual Culture (Lon-
don/New York 2001); Jessica Evans, Stuart Hall (eds.), Visual Culture: The Reader (Lon-
don 1999); Chris Jenks (ed.), Visual Culture (London/NewYork: Routledge, 1995); Amelia
Jones (ed.), The Feminism and Visual Culture Reader (London/New York 2003); Nicholas
Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture (London/New York 1999); Nicholas Mirzoeff
(ed.), The Visual Culture Reader (London/NewYork 2002) (first ed. 1998); Gillian Rose, Vi-
sualMethodologies. An Introduction to the Interpretation of VisualMaterials (London 2001);
Marita Sturken, Lisa Cartwright, Practices of Looking.An Introduction toVisual Culture (Ox-
ford 2001).
18 Joanne Morra, Marquard Smith (ed.), Visual Culture. Critical Concepts in Media and Cul-
tural Studies, 4 vols. (London/New York 2006).
19 On debate over whether visual culture studies should be called a discipline, seeW. J. T.
Mitchell, “Showing seeing: a critique of visual culture,” in Journal of Visual Culture 1, no.
2 (2002), 165-181; and Bal, Visual Essentialism.
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is the passive side of seeing (i.e. being seen), especially in connection with the
identity politics of visibility? What kind of subject-object (and subject-sub-
ject) relationship does this imply? What influence does the political agenda of
visual culture studies have on its understanding of seeing, and what impact
does this have on its interpretative practice?
The texts I have selected stand for the diversity of concepts of visuality
within visual culture studies. In spite of this variety, they have one thing on
common: they all build (in very different ways) on the above-mentioned the-
ories of the gaze developed by Sartre and Lacan. I have therefore grouped
the most influential variants into themed chapters with individual readings:
“Visual culture studies’ foundational concept: The Gaze - Looking and power”
uses two examples (Norman Bryson, Margaret Olin) to analyse reception of
the gaze as a regime of power; “Visual culture studies’ operational concept:
Visuality - Seeing in the cultural field” deals with attempts to define visual
culture and visuality that were particularly influential in discussions within
the discipline (W.J.T. Mitchell, Nicholas Mirzoeff, Mieke Bal); and “Seeing as a
political resource in visual culture studies” presents two extremely contrast-
ing examples of the use of the theory of the gaze in the register of visibility as
a political resource (Norman Bryson, bell hooks), plus a case study focussing
on the production of evidence on the basis of the model of the gaze (Martin
A. Berger). This chapter concludes with an analysis of two texts by Nicholas
Mirzoeff, from 1998 and 2011, that propose two models of the gaze as new
paradigms for visual culture studies.These models are an attempt to position
visual culture studies as a practice of political resistance via definitions of
utopian-subversive gazes. With the model of countervisuality, Mirzoeff em-
beds visual culture studies into a historical construction with an extensive
claim to validity, and he insists on the political relevance of the discipline.
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Seeing as an ethical question20
The final chapter, “Towards an ethics for the act of seeing”, draws conclusions
that have both a critical and a questioning dimension. The recognition of al-
terity, of that which is unfamiliar, in the act of seeing has emerged as a core
problem, a mode of seeing that perceives and accepts the otherness of what
it sees, be it an object or a subject. Art history and visual culture studies deal
very differently with this problem. Art history is mainly confronted with the
historical otherness of its objects, visual culture studies with the cultural oth-
erness of objects and subjects. This final chapter discusses the disciplinary
“scopic regimes” that shape approaches to the problem of alterity in terms
of their methodological impact on interpretative seeing: brief outlines of his-
torical and cultural otherness are followed by a critique of the reception of
Lacan’s model of the gaze in visual culture studies concerning its impact on
interpretative seeing (the narcissistic circle). I then bring approaches to inter-
pretative seeing in art history and visual culture studies together under the
headings “Attention and Recognition” and “Narration and Observation”, com-
paring them in terms of an ethics of seeing as an activity of scholarly research
that recognizes the otherness of what is seen. This raises an old theoretical
problem concerning the relationship between an object and the person in-
terpreting it, as reflected in strategies and concepts like objectification and
distance on the one hand and identification and subjectivity on the other.
Although at the time of its publication in 1988, Donna Haraway’s now some-
what forgotten text on “situated knowledges”21 was aimed at the natural sci-
ences and their objectivizing hegemonic gaze, it can be referenced today to
prompt an approach to this problem that preserves the tension between the
20 Susan Sontag (On Photography, first published New York 1977), Ivan Illich (“Guarding
the Eye in the Age of Show”, in RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics, 28, 1995, 47-61) and
Kaja Silverman (The Threshold of the Visible World, London, New York 1996) have spo-
ken of ethical implications of looking from very different viewpoints. The issue is also
raised in discussions of Georges Didi-Huberman’s book Images In Spite of All (Chicago
2008, originally published in French in 2003 as Imagesmalgré tout) on the photographs
from the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, andmore generally concerning the
representability of violence. I use it here only with reference to the ethical dimension
of seeing as a practice of scholarly research.
21 Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective,” in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (London, New York
1991), 183-201, first published in: Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988), 575-599.
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interpreting viewpoint and the otherness of what is being interpreted. Har-
away explains her critical model using metaphors of visuality (“self-identity
is a bad visual system”), and her aim is to uphold the tension between the
object under study and the studying subject (and their respective contexts),
between objectivity and subjectivity. Moreover, she clearly rejects a moraliza-
tion of academic rigor that demands identification with the victim based on
a logic of sympathetic concern, as such an approach resolves this tension in
a subjectivity based on morals. Where the tension between the interpreting
subject and the otherness of the object is preserved, on the other hand, it cre-
ates a destabilization that makes a key contribution to a capacity for critique
of the structures of power and discourse in which our subject matter has its
origins and within which we work.
One last point, dealt with in my concluding remarks, is the rapid techno-
logical change often referred to as the digital revolution. While the readings
in the book do not deal with this, I conclude with an outline of the prospective
consequences of this development, especially for the central notions of visual
culture studies (visibility as a political resource in the form of the visual rep-
resentation of identity) and art history (art as object and subject).

Part One: How do Art Historians See?

1. Interpreting Forms of Representation
Visual order as concretized worldview – Erwin Panofsky’s
Perspective as Symbolic Form
Described by W.J.T. Mitchell as an “epic of visuality”, Panofsky’s essay on per-
spective, originally published in 1927,1 is a concentrated synthesis of the his-
tory of perspective, as well as a history of visuality as cultural practice. The
text has received renewed critical attention during the founding phase of vi-
sual culture studies.2
Perspective – “seeing through” as Dürer, quoted by Panofsky, called it (27)3
– refers not to the process of seeing but to the method of translating what
is seen into a representation, with reference to the transfer of seen three-
dimensional space onto the two-dimensional picture plane. The best-known
technique of this kind is central or one-point perspective, an achievement at-
tributed to the Italian Renaissance that has shaped European painting in its
quest for accurate portrayal of objects in space ever since. Although it is just
one of the available options, one way among many to produce an image of the
world, central perspective has since become ametaphor for themodernway of
viewing the world. In recent decades it has faced criticism on several fronts.
Most interestingly in the context of this book, poststructuralist critiques of
the claim to truth made by Enlightenment rationality deployed perspective as
1 Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, trans. Christopher Wood (New York 1991).
2 Mitchell’s essay “The Pictorial Turn”, which announced the turn designed to dethrone
the “linguistic turn”, offers a very positive rereading of Panofsky’s essay on perspective:
“It aims at nothing less than a critical iconology, a self-theorizing account of visual
culture.” This is also Mitchell’s yardstick for Jonathan Crary’s Techniques of the Observer:
W.J.T. Mitchell, “The Pictorial Turn”, in Mitchell, Picture Theory (Chicago 1994), 11-34: 23.
3 For smoother reading, page numbers for quotes in Part One are placed in brackets in
the text rather than in footnotes.
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a metaphor for Cartesianism, logic and western reason’s hegemonic world-
view. This critique also played a part in the genesis of visual culture studies,
something I will return to in chapter 4.
As early as 1927, Panofsky attempted to historicize the changes under-
gone since antiquity by perspective as a “symbolic form” in the sense of Ernst
Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.4 From this viewpoint, one-point per-
spective, like the other techniques, is a phenomenon that can be explained in
historical and cultural terms, but it is not the only “correct”, objectively right
method of depicting the world with a unique claim to truth. According to a
quotation from Ernst Cassirer cited by Panofsky, in symbolic forms “spiritual
meaning is attached to a concrete material sign and intrinsically given to this
sign” (41). Perspective as a model for representing three-dimensional seeing
on the picture plane is thus the concrete material sign that Panofsky will link
back to the spiritual meanings which have been (and continue to be) “intrin-
sically given” to it. Although perspective can be seen, it is not simply “visible”,
needing instead to be extracted from its specific application in a given picture.
Panofsky carefully examines his prize witnesses (frescoes, vases and canvases
from antiquity to the Renaissance) in search of evidence pointing to their spe-
cific model for converting three dimensions into two.This raises the question
of whether Panofsky’s interpretation “proves” something that is undeniably
there, or whether he presupposes something that his seeing then detects or,
to put it more pointedly, constructs. By describing perspective not just as a
practical artistic technique, but as a “sign” linked with a “spiritual meaning”,
he also turns the artist’s seeing into a construction in the sense of something
culturally determined, a cultural practice, subject to historical change. This
construction even extends to the physiological conditions of seeing itself; the
eye is a creature of habit, so to speak, and not just an optical bio-mechanism.
As an example, Panofsky cites Kepler, who “fully recognized that he had origi-
nally overlooked or even denied these illusory curves only because he had been
schooled in linear perspective. He had been led by the rules of painterly per-
spective to believe that straight is always seen as straight, without stopping
to consider that the eye in fact projects not on to a plana tabella but onto the
inner surface of a sphere” (34).
From his own observations, combined with source texts and the results
of previous research, Panofsky extracts descriptions of three models of per-
4 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Vol. 1, Language, 1923; Vol. 2,Mythical Think-
ing, 1925; Vol. 3, Phenomenology of Knowledge, 1929.
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spective – for antiquity, the Middle Ages and the early modern era. He then
reads each model as a sign of basic intellectual dispositions specific to the
historical period in question. In the art of antiquity, for example, the render-
ing of bodies is persuasively illusionistic; it focuses on bodies and surfaces,
showing only what is tangible as well as visible (41). But these bodies remain
isolated, not inhabiting a homogenous overall space. Instead, space here is
“only that which remains, so to speak, between the bodies” (41); there is no
“continuum of a higher order” (41). At this point, Panofsky introduces the key
conceptual distinction between “aggregate space” and “systematic space”: the
space of antiquity is an “aggregate space; it never becomes that which moder-
nity demands and realizes, a systematic space” (42).This is then applied to the
worldview of ancient philosophy (43-44). Based on pictorial structure, then,
Panofsky draws a parallel between perspective, view of space and worldview
in which what is true of this pictorial structure is also claimed to be true of
the corresponding view of space and worldview. The heuristic advantage of
this approach lies in the elucidation of the uniform spiritual character of an
age via its individual components, as well as the integration of art into the
character of a historical period.The periods are in turn integrated into a telos
that transfers horizontal period-uniformity onto the vertical axis of histori-
cal time: modernity with its notion of homogenous and infinite mathemati-
cal space. However, when Panofsky postulates that modernity “demands” this
space (and, apparently, none other) then his logic of analogy, structural par-
allel and mutual elucidation begins to smack of circular reasoning.
The same paradigm of uniformity and development is used to explain
the apparent break with antiquity’s body-space illusionism in the art of the
Middle Ages. Panofsky’s argument is as surprising as it is brilliant: “If Ro-
manesque painting reduced bodies and space to surface, in the same way
and with the same decisiveness, by these very means it also managed for the
first time to confirm and establish the homogeneity of bodies and space.”
(51) Although Romanesque art abandoned the reproduction of physical three-
dimensionality, it overcame the additive structure of antique space in favour
of a unity, thus creating the basis for the systematic space of the early modern
period. Here, too, Panofsky draws parallels with the history of ideas, this time
to the theological worldview of the Middle Ages. But with Giotto, the “vista
or ‘looking through” that was blocked in the Middle Ages begins to open (56),
becoming a window–Alberti’s metaphor for painting.With van Eyck, the pic-
ture becomes a “slice of reality” (60-61) and with the invention of “costruzione
legittima” in 1420 the development from aggregate space to systematic space
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is complete (65). This systematic space is “nothing other than a concrete ex-
pression of a contemporary advance in epistemology or natural philosophy”:
the development of the concept of “an infinity not only prefigured in God,
but indeed actually embodied in empirical reality” (65). From the additive,
body-oriented worldview of antiquity, the path leads via the Christian postu-
late of unity – oneness in God – to the mathematically unifying abstraction
of empirical reality as infinite space.
Having reached the goal of his developmental history, with perspective
as a necessary concretion of the modern worldview, Panofsky opens up the
supposed closure of this model of seeing by highlighting its ambivalences.
Central perspective as an “objectification of the subjective” proves to be a “two-
edged sword” (67): “Perspective creates distance between human beings and
things […] but then in turn it abolishes this distance by, in a sense, draw-
ing this world of things, an autonomous world confronting the individual,
into the eye. Perspective subjects the artistic phenomenon to stable and even
mathematically exact rules, but on the other hand, makes the phenomenon
contingent upon human beings, indeed upon the individual: for these rules
refer to the psychological and physical conditions of the visual impression,
and the way [these rules] take effect is determined by the freely chosen po-
sition of a subjective ‘point of view.’” (67) The following sentences are worth
quoting in full: “The history of perspective may be understood with equal jus-
tice as a triumph of the distancing and objectifying sense of the real, and as
a triumph of the distance-denying human struggle for control; it is as much
a consolidation and systematization of the external world, as an extension
of the domain of the self. Artistic thinking must have found itself constantly
confronted with the problem of how to put this ambivalent method to use.”
(67) The telos of this history of development is thus, on the one hand, a “sense
of the real” whose mode of seeing combines distance and objectivity, and, on
the other, its opposite, described as a struggle for power expressed in the de-
nial of distance. For readers today, this is surprising insofar as recent decades
have produced a discourse on perspective that views objectivizing distance as
a function of control and power;5 a discourse that emerged, among others,
in feminist art history and which, interestingly, coincided with the perfection
of techniques of visual simulation aimed at negating distance between the
5 See also a more recent publication: Linda Hentschel, Pornotopische Techniken des Be-
trachtens. Raumwahrnehmung und Geschlechterordnung in visuellen Apparaten derModerne
(Marburg 2001).
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viewer and what is viewed (as for example in virtual reality and other immer-
sive image-technologies), a development that cannot be seen as an emanci-
patory counter-model to the controlling distance of the viewer. With regard
to seeing, distance and immersion constitute a pair of opposites that reflects
the old problem of the differentiation of subject and object in updated form,
with all the attendant consequences (e.g. for questions of power and control).
Panofsky clearly stands on the side of the Enlightenment model of distanced
and distancing looking, describing it as the “consolidation and systematiza-
tion of the external world”. Proximity or even merging of subject and object,
on the other hand, he finds suspect; denial of distance is human struggling
for power, something he describes as an “extension of the domain of the self”,
as if an undistanced gaze would result in the subject incorporating the object.
In such a scenario, the subject’s struggle for control would come at the cost of
the external world. Such rebellion against perspective is not a phenomenon
of recent decades, however: Panofsky refers to the “most modern aesthetic
thinking” that accuses perspective of being “the tool of a limited and lim-
iting rationalism” (71), and in a footnote he describes El Lissitzky’s critique
from 1925: perspective allegedly “limited space, made it finite, closed it off”,
conceiving of it as “rigid three-dimensionality” (154). The most recent art, he
claims, tries to break these bonds, “exploding the entire space” by “dispersing
the centre of vision” (154).
For Panofsky, perspective as an “ordering of the visual phenomenon” (71)
becomes an arena for conflicting forces: objectivity, distance, solidity and ra-
tionality face off against subjectivity, volatility and denial of distance. Per-
spective signals the end of antique theocracy and the emergence of “modern
anthropocracy” (72) – Panofsky’s scepticism towards this new ruler is unmis-
takeable. For Christopher Wood, Panofsky’s perspective is a metaphor for an-
other metaphor: “It is perspective, after all, that makes possible the metaphor
of a Weltanschauung, a worldview, in the first place.”6 Insofar as worldview is
criticized by theories of difference as a model tending to promote unity, the
same will apply to perspective. Panofsky’s analogy between perspective and
modern anthropocracy, on the other hand, at least opens up the criticized
unity of his model of progress to doubt.
Seeing, for Panofsky, is an activity whose psychophysical character can be
studied, but which only becomes visible in the depiction of something seen.
And this depiction, in turn, can only be the result of a cultural and in some
6 Wood, “Introduction” in Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, 13.
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cases symbolizing activity – making it an object of study for the iconologist.
Together with perspective, however, Panofsky also turns the visual order on
which it is based into a sign, a symbol in Cassirer’s sense. The ordering or
convention that governs depiction is just as open to interpretation as the de-
piction itself. What is not covered by this system of interpretation is the gaze
and act of seeing of the one doing the interpreting. It reveals itself implicitly
in the evidential power of those elements that are “extracted” from what is
seen (the artworks) by this gaze. Seeing in Panofsky’s essay is highly selective.
It looks for both similarity and difference, it compares and abstracts from
isolated cases to groupings of similarities oriented towards clearly defined
historical periods. It is a structural seeing, guided by the aims of inquiry,
but Panofsky does not specifically address it as such. One could refer here
to the well-known fundamental problem in the theory of science that struc-
tural interdependencies may exist between epistemological interest, research
method, interpretation and result, potentially leading to tautology. Far more
interesting, however, would be to ask how, if this is the case with Panofsky’s
essay, it is still possible to get so much out of reading it?
We could ask a different question: What does Panofsky actually see? One
criticism often levelled at iconologists is that they see not forms but only ob-
jects that mean something, that they look beyond or through the forms at an
object (such as the lily that symbolizes Mary’s innocence). In Panofsky’s case,
this wouldmean that if he wishes to study the visual order of spatial represen-
tation, he sees the surface and the forms that determine how the objects stand
on the surface and in relation to each other. But his descriptions show that he
deliberately abbreviates this moment of seeing to those formal elements that
provide evidence for his argument – as in the case of the floor tiles in 14th-
century painting7 that allow vanishing points to be more precisely identified.
In the unwieldy concept of the symbolic form, this tautological tendency is
already present: this form is actually an object, an object of symbolization.
Seeing as a psychophysical process only figures in Panofsky where it is a
matter of underlining its distinctness from constructed perspective.This cre-
ates a kind of base and superstructure model: the empirical process of seeing
as the base for the superstructure of perspective construction. Finally, it re-
mains uncertain how the relationship between base and superstructure is to
be conceived of. We are left with a dichotomy of nature (empirical seeing)
and culture that displays parallels with recent debates such as those between
7 One lovely example being that of Master Bertram of Minden (59).
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empiricist and constructivist positions. For Panofsky, this doesn’t seem to be
a problem: he addresses the phenomenon of seeing where it becomes visible
– in cultural practice. From today’s viewpoint, he reinforces the construc-
tivist position when he uses the example of Kepler to show how perspective
as a cultural convention dominates and transforms empirical seeing. This is
doubtless one of the reasons for the current renewed interest in his essay and
for its compatibility with today’s concepts of visuality. What is problematic
is the importance accorded to the authorial prerogative on interpretation – a
prerogative which includes, as both precondition and consequence, the fact
that the act of seeing itself remains undiscussed. The essay is also problem-
atic in terms of its macro-historical findings. Such aspects are criticized by
current constructivist-leaning readings like that of Christopher Wood.
Seeing as an approach to reality – Ernst Gombrich’s Art and Illusion8
The book’s cover shows Magritte’s painting Le Palais des Rideaux, III.9 Against
some wooden panelling, on bare floorboards, a small distance apart, stand
two identical, irregular seven-sided pictures in pale grey frames. On closer
inspection, the obviousness of the way the pictures are arranged in space
becomes less clear, causing a strange flickering of the visual effect: Are the
pictures resting against the wall? Their slight backwards inclination suggests
this, but the shadows on the floor and wall suggest not. On a pale grey-
blue ground, the picture on the right features the word “ciel” (sky) in cursive
script. The left-hand picture shows a slightly cloudy sky in blue-grey-white.
Magritte’s picture offers a pointed visual remark on the question of painterly
representation, but with a thrust that differs from Gombrich’s: the painting
points to the difference between text and picture, while Gombrich is inter-
ested in the difference between perception and picture.
Gombrich begins with a question: Why does pictorial representation have
a history? The backdrop against which this question makes sense is a pre-
supposition that he formulates as another question: Why did it take so long
8 Ernst H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion. A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation
(first published 1960), eleventh printing with a new preface (Princeton, Oxford 2000).
9 The Palace of Curtains III, 1928-1929, Museum of Modern Art, New York. This cover was
used for the eleventh edition, published in 2000 (Princeton Paperbacks). Other edi-
tions have had different covers.
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for humanity to develop the means for plausible rendering of visual effects, to
create the illusion of “lifelikeness”? (291)This implies a kind of historical deter-
minism: the history of the picture or, more narrowly, the history of painting,
is placed under the necessity, the telos, the unwavering goal of achieving such
“lifelikeness”. Illusionism becomes an anthropological constant, or at least a
dimension welcomed by all people. This opens up the problem also posed in
a certain way by Panofsky in his perspective essay: How to explain the fact
that there have been periods in the history of (European) art when painting
did not look at all as if it was concerned with a plausible rendering of reality?
Panofsky locates these differences in the field of historically changing ideas
about the world; for him, the various ways of portraying figure and space are
symbolic forms of the specific worldview in question. Gombrich constructs
a different model to explain the differences between representation and re-
ality: In a first step he tries to understand perception with the help of ex-
perimental psychology (very popular in the 1950s) and gestalt psychology.10
By referring to disciplines that have the status of natural sciences capable of
generating falsifiable results, he wishes to show that art history, too, is able to
bring forth such results. He assembles a series of arguments around seeing
that show him in a fundamental dilemma: On the one hand, he writes against
the myth of the “innocent eye” according to which seeing is understood as a
purely passive registering of the outside world, uninfluenced by any knowl-
edge, unformatted (to use a fitting metaphor from computer culture), and
against painting as a faithful reproduction of the image on the retina. Here,
he follows psychology in assuming that seeing takes place on the basis of sub-
jective “schemata” that format perception (to stick with that metaphor), thus
opening up his construction to the subjectivity and relativity of what is seen
and depicted. On the other hand, he insists on an objectivity not subject to hu-
man influence that must remain a benchmark for the representation of what
is seen. And this benchmark can only be the outside world – that which is
represented. Gombrich’s dilemma is essentially the elementary conflict that
runs through western attempts to explain the relationship between individ-
ual and world – the conflict (in very simplified terms) between constructivism
and positivism.
10 He refers, for example, to: Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception (1954); Edwin
G. Boring, Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (1942); F.A.
Hayek, The Sensory Order (1952); Charles E. Osgood, Method and Theory in Experimental
Psychology (1953).
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To my mind, experimental psychology seems to reflect this conflict rather
than bridging it,when it attempts to render the processes of perception them-
selves objectively understandable by means of experiments. Here, too, the
question is: is seeing purely passive (with the objectively existing world en-
countering “empty” perceptive organs) or is it subjectively shaped and focused
by pre-existing knowledge? The psychology of perception assumes the latter,
while attempting to generalize this subjective element in terms of objectifi-
able patterns (“schemata”). These patterns are considered not as individually
unique, and thus subjective, but as common to all people. And if these pat-
terns and schemata are assumed to be universal, then perception, located
within the subject and its pre-knowledge, can be objectified.
Gombrich takes these insights from psychology and applies them to his
thinking about the kind of seeing that is relevant to art history: the seeing of
painters and viewers. As mentioned above, he believes painting to be driven
by the desire to achieve a plausible representation of the illusion of “lifelike-
ness”. He thus considers seeing under this premise.What does this have to do
with historically changing ways of representing reality in art? Art shows itself
as historical precisely by these changes, be it a development towards a specific
endpoint (for Gombrich: the perfect illusion of three-dimensional space on a
flat surface) or not. Gombrich calls this historical quality “style” or “manner”.
Measured against what he sees as the endpoint of the development, style is
what deviates from the perfect illusion, and thus also what confounds the
viewer attempting to reconcile what she sees in the picture with external re-
ality. Style is convention (291), the share of seeing based on patterns which the
viewer (referred to by Gombrich always as the “beholder”) brings with her, pat-
terns that guide seeing and make it an active process; conventions, schemata,
prior knowledge are modified and corrected in seeing via a comparison with
reality. At this point in my very brief account it becomes clearer that linking
Magritte’s Palace of Curtains with Gombrich’s agenda brings forth a strange
reading of the painting – as if Magritte’s aim had been to highlight this dif-
ference between perception and objective reality, between image and reality,
between innocent seeing and convention. But Magritte seems to have placed
enough clues in the picture that constantly lead the viewer back only into the
picture’s own reality, also blocking the path into another parallel world, that
of text.
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In his review of Art and Illusion, Nelson Goodman gave a brief account of
its basic questions that can be summarized as follows:11 To say that we know
what we see is no more true than to say that we see what we know. Perception
depends on conceptual patterns; there is no innocent eye.The “rawmaterial of
seeing” cannot be extracted from the “finished product”. Representation can-
not consist in simply rendering the world as it is or as it is “correctly” seen.
Differences in style are not explained by differences in eyesight or dexter-
ity; what is to be represented depends on the schemata within which things
are seen. Conversely, one cannot say that the painter reproduces what s/he
knows rather than what s/he sees. A painterly representation transfers some-
thing into two dimensions; it does not duplicate, but describes in painterly
language. Gombrich explains the evolution of representation in terms of the
development of such a language. By trial and error, via ongoing experimen-
tation and modification of our perception and our methods of transferring
what we see, we gradually realize increasingly effective representations.
For Gombrich, this activity based on trial and error resembles a scientific
approach, both on the side of the painter and on that of the viewer: “… the
very process of perception is based on the same rhythm that we found gov-
erning the process of representation: the rhythm of schema and correction.
It is a rhythm which presupposes constant activity on our part in making
guesses and modifying them in the light of our experience. Wherever this
test meets with an obstacle, we abandon the guess and try again, much in
the way we proceeded in reading such complex pictures as Piranesi’s Carceri.”
(271/272) Seeing is equated with the acquisition of knowledge, as described by
Karl Popper, whom Gombrich cites: “In this emphasis on elimination of false
guesses, on trial and error in all acquisition of knowledge ‘from the amoeba
to Einstein,’ I am following K. R. Popper.” (272)
The problem to be solved by painter and viewer is described by Gombrich
as follows: the painter transforms the visible world into a piece of painted
canvas. But he cannot simply copy what he sees, since “the successful trompe
l’œil no less than the striking caricature are not only the results of careful look-
ing but also the fruit of experimentation with pictorial effects. The invention
of these effects, as I have tried to show, was stimulated by the dissatisfaction
which certain periods of Western civilization felt with images that failed to
look convincing.” (xli) This “gradual modification of the traditional schematic
11 In The Journal of Philosophy 57, no. 18 (1960), 595-599.
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conventions of imagemaking under the pressure of novel demands” (xlii) con-
stitutes the history of art.
By analogy, the same applies to the viewer, whose “reading” of the picture
means “to collaborate with the artist and to transform a piece of coloured
canvas into a likeness of the visible world”. In the case of Piranesi’s Carceri
with their baffling spatial structures, this is especially problematic, as Gom-
brich explains, since it proves impossible to understand the illusion of three-
dimensionality based on the logic of strict perspective. Gombrich is sure: “We
enjoy nothing more than the demand made on us to exercise our own ‘imi-
tative faculty’, our imagination, and thus to share in the creative adventure
of the artist.” In this context, rather than creating fantasy worlds, the imag-
ination reconstructs the reality whose illusion is created by the picture: the
pleasure we derive from illusion lies in the intellectual effort of bridging the
difference between art and reality, as Gombrich says, quoting Quatremère
de Quincy (278/279). As a result, his suggested approach to an interpretation
of the Carceri involves imagining the stage set that could have served as the
model for the illusions in Piranesi’s etchings (245/246).
This brings to mind the concept of narrative: the viewer is called on to
develop the narrative of a plausible spatial continuum for the picture. When
Gombrich uses this construction to resolve the conflict between the subjectiv-
ity of seeing and the “objective standards of representational accuracy” (xli),
he is basically fulfilling a need of his own, though one that remains latent:
Just as he claims that the “beholder” (who, for all the historicization of his
schemata, remains abstract) desires to perceive a plausible illusory space, he
himself clearly follows his desire for a logical correlation between imagina-
tion and picture. There must, then, be an explanation for the unfathomable
interweavings of space in Piranesi’s work; faced with such resistance to inter-
pretation, the creativity of the viewer’s imagination lies in devising a seman-
tics that secures the picture as a (spatial) unity. For the Carceri, this would be
the construction of a stage set. Similar to words forming a plausible sentence
or the sequence of film images forming a narrative continuum, the focus in
Gombrich’s model (plausibility, matching with reality, picture making) seems
to be on perceiving logical units rather than fragments or, rather, on cogni-
tively shaping perceived fragments into units. It is in these activities that the
psychological element he refers to in connectionwith painterly representation
resides.
Any engagement with Art and Illusion must itself remain fragmentary.
Even examining the different readings of Gombrich’s book since its pub-
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lication, in various disciplines from philosophy to art history, would be a
worthwhile large-scale project – and a contribution to the history of science.
Criticism of Gombrich’s ideas has been diverse: the earliest andmost theoret-
ically rigorous critique came not from art history but from Anglo-American
philosophy, the main focus here being the confrontation between objectivity
and relativity of cognition.12 In recent decades, with changing paradigms in
the humanities, the character of the critiques has shifted. In art history since
the 1980s, Gombrich’s aim to establish a history of style in scientific terms
(for him this means falsifiable in terms of Popper’s critical empiricism) has
been resisted on several grounds: on account of his Popperian rationalism,
his emphasis on a biological basis for perception, his clinging to objective
standards of representation and what would now (from a poststructural-
ist viewpoint) be called the “grand narrative” of naturalism as the telos of
western art history – resulting in Gombrich’s inability to integrate the art
of the 20th century into his historical model. The fact that this critique was
formulated primarily within Anglo-American art history can be linked to
the key influence exerted by Gombrich (and Panofsky) on the whole field of
art history in Britain and the United States – so that the so-called New Art
12 One example of a relativist critique is Dominic Lopes, “Pictures, Styles and Purposes”
in British Journal of Aesthetics 32, no. 4 (1992), 330-341. In his review of Gombrich’s The
Image and the Eye (The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42, no.1 (1983), 85-89) David
Blinder gives an instructive insight into the debates between objectivist and relativist
positions onGombrich’s psychology of perception. This debate involves primarily Gom-
brich himself, Nelson Goodman and J.J. Gibson. In this book (The Image and the Eye:
Further Studies in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, Oxford 1982) Gombrich un-
derpins his theory of “innate” schemata from Art and Illusion, originally based on psy-
chology, with more recent findings from neurology and information science. Among
others, he claims (in Blinder’s paraphrase) that we are “biologically programmed to
react to certain configurations” (Blinder, 86). According to Blinder, Gombrich shifts his
argument from physiological mechanisms towards “information-processing systems”
(ibid., 87). A very different and essentially uncritical review came from Leslie Cunliffe,
“Gombrich on Art: A Social-Constructivist Interpretation of HisWork and Its Relevance
to Education” in Journal of Aesthetic Education 32, no. 4 (1998), 61-77. The philosopher
David Carrier was highly critical: “Gombrich on Art Historical Explanations” in Leonardo
16, no. 2 (1983), 91-96. Carrier also raises the question of whether geometric perspec-
tive is a convention (Goodman) or whether it possesses objective status (Gombrich),
highlighting the conflict between the constructivist-relativist approach (Goodman)
and Gombrich’s objectivization of perception in a concrete example: “Perspective as
a Convention: On the Views of Nelson Goodman and Ernst Gombrich” in Leonardo 13
(1980), 283-287.
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History couldn’t help but adopt a critical position with regard to these father
figures.
At this point, it is useful to recall what Gombrich’s attempted scientifi-
cation of art history was directed against, which involves shedding light on
the historical situation from which he was arguing, eleven years after the end
of World War II, when he delivered the lectures that formed the basis for Art
and Illusion. Gombrich was turning against the post-Hegelian historical deter-
minism in German art history that spoke of zeitgeist and Kunstwollen (the will
to form), the latter a metaphor used by Riegl which Gombrich calls a “ghost in
the machine, driving the wheels of artistic developments according to ‘inex-
orable laws’” (19). Be it Kunstwollen, the spirit of an age, race or period, he saw
such “mythological explanations” as a danger because “the habit of talking in
terms of collectives, of ‘mankind’, ‘races’, or ‘ages’, … weakens resistance to to-
talitarian habits of mind” (20). His main witness on this point is a compatriot
of his own generation, the former Nazi acolyte Hans Sedlmayr, against whose
“meaningful self-movement of the Spirit which results in genuine historical
totalities of events” (20) he quotes Popper, who considered such “spirits” to
be nothing more than symptoms of a vacuum that was meant to fill sociology
with something more sensible such as the analysis of problems arising within
a tradition. For Gombrich, styles are elements of such traditions that cannot
be explained in terms of supraindividual “spirit” (21). Instead, their history
is one of “preferences, of various acts of choice between given alternatives”
(21). As pragmatic as this may sound, however, Gombrich’s concept of scien-
tificity ultimately requires a considerable degree of normativity. By founding
the universality of his model of perception on the scientifically obtained in-
sights of experimental psychology, he believes he is able to replace totalizing
mythology with falsifiable results.
This has been argued against not only by constructivist philosophers like
Goodman, but also by a younger generation of aesthetic theorists and art his-
torians who criticize determinisms found in Gombrich’s approach, be they
methodological (borrowing scientific falsifiability for fine art) or theoretical
(the holism inherent in a teleological view of attaining painterly life-likeness).
In 1981, Alan Woods argued energetically against equating scientific and
artistic problems.13 More influential was the critique formulated by Norman
13 Alan Woods, “Gombrich’s Art and Illusion” in The Cambridge Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1981),
130-166.
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Bryson in his 1983 book Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze.14 Bryson rep-
resented a poststructuralist-semiotic school of art history that shared at least
one concern with Gombrich: a critique of the totalizations and great myths of
traditional art history, such as the cult of genius. Bryson also disagreed with
biological explanations of perception. His position was one of sociocultural
constructivism that viewed perception as dependent on culture. Compared to
Goodman’s ideas, this was a further shift, this time towards a cultural semi-
oticization of perception and representation. In this way, Bryson also shaped
the later (rather simplified, one-dimensional) reception of Art and Illusion that
accused Gombrich of understanding visual representation as being based ex-
clusively on biologically determined perception, i.e. without taking cultural
influences into account. But this would be precisely the “innocent eye” that
Gombrich specifically opposed – although Art and Illusion remains relatively
unclear on whether the “schemata” that format seeing might be explainable
not only as patterns in the sense of experimental psychology but also as cul-
tural constructions.
In 2000, Christopher Wood edited an anthology of texts by art historians
of the Vienna School (Riegl, Sedlmayr, Pächt, Kaschnitz von Weinberg,
Novotny).15 In his extensive introduction, an interesting reading from the
viewpoint of the “new” Anglo-American art history, he comments on the
“structural analysis” practised by these writers, which he says robs artworks
not only of their mimetic reference but of meaning altogether. In contrast
to this, he argues, Panofsky and Gombrich tried to “heal” the instability they
found in the artworks of the past by injecting them, wherever possible, with
some “redeeming universal or humanist content.”16 For Wood, both positions
give rise to problems – on which I cannot go into more detail here.
Finally, Gombrich addressed a phenomenon of art history (changes in the
pictorial style of representation) not through an art-historical but a scientific
approach. Seeing interested him only insofar as it was relevant to the search
14 Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (New Haven 1983).
15 Christopher S. Wood (ed.), The Vienna School Reader. Politics and Art Historical Method in
the 1930s (New York 2000). Nine years later, Wood widened his overview of the recep-
tion of Gombrich’s Art and Illusion, including not only art historians and philosophers
but also the literary critic Wolfgang Iser with his narratological approach: see Christo-
pher S. Wood, “Art History Reviewed VI: E.H. Gombrich’s ‘Art and Illusion: A Study in
the Psychology of Pictorial Representation’, 1960” in The BurlingtonMagazine 151 (2009),
836-839.
16 Christopher S. Wood, “Introduction” in The Vienna School Reader, 9-72: 51.
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for “an explanation for the phenomenon of style. […] Style became one of my
worries, one of my problems, because the idea that style is simply the ex-
pression of an age seemed to me not only to say very little, but to be rather
vacuous in every respect.”17 There is another thing Gombrich shares with the
“New Art History” – his low opinion of connoisseurship. But his reasons were
different: rather than accusing connoisseurial art history of being partly re-
sponsible for the art market, he simply wasn’t interested in it at all. History
as a factor of change, which had been the main focus of previous art history,
was of secondary importance to Gombrich – because history as a discursive
practice had often enough been guilty of politically suspect forms of mythol-
ogization. As the academic discipline of history in the tradition of the 19th
century offered no way out of this dilemma, he looked for one in the “hard”
sciences. This in turn meant that in contrast to Panofsky’s iconology, his fun-
damental research gained little influence in art-historical practice.
17 Ernst H. Gombrich, “An Autobiographical Sketch and Discussion” in Rutgers Art Review
8 (1987), 123-141.

2. Experience and the Visual
The “Period Eye” – Michael Baxandall’s Painting and Experience1
The notion of the “period eye” was put forward by Michael Baxandall, an
approach exemplified by his book Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century
Italy. A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style, which has been through
several editions since it first appeared in 1972. Baxandall’s first sentence – “A
fifteenth-century painting is the deposit of a social relationship” – reveals his
specific approach: for Baxandall, the artwork does not depict such a deposit,
it is a deposit. In other words, the point of departure, centre and task here
is not an artwork but a social relationship. In this view, the artwork is the
visual materialization of this relationship. Baxandall develops his model
using the painting of the Quattrocento in Florence – more precisely: using
his description of the social relationships that determined the production
of this painting. The painters’ “clients” dictated the framework within which
artists produced their commissions; individual talent or even genius played
a marginal role. As Baxandall writes with typical dryness: “In the fifteenth
century, painting was still too important to be left to the painters.The picture
trade was a quite different thing from that in our own romantic tradition, in
which painters paint what they think best and then look around for a buyer.
… The fifteenth century was a period of bespoke painting, however, and this
book is about the customer’s participation in it.” (3) Reviewing the book’s
second edition in 1988, a sociologist made a telling link to her own discipline:
for her, the “period eye” is “a deep account of the ideological congruence
between the habitus of a class of men, as Bourdieu would say, and meaningful
1 Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy.A Primer in the Social
History of Pictorial Style (1972), 2nd edition (Oxford 1988).
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cultural forms”.2 Rather than being static, however, this habitus is a cognitive
style, rooted in the visual practice of the client that became the raw material
for the painter. So much for the sociological recasting of Baxandall’s project.
This brings us to the subjects of the “period eye” – the clients. It is their
seeing that Baxandall attempts to reconstruct. He develops a method to make
the eye of the historical client accessible to today’s viewers and readers. This
takes place not via a process of seeing today, but by reconstructing the context
of seeing at the time in question – from an outside, so to speak.This seeing is
a skill, a learned ability that arises not primarily from dealing with art but as
an everyday visual practice that in turn impacts on what clients expect from
painting.
For the Florentine art of the 15th century, Baxandall locates his historical
point of departure in the practices of art trading (and other kinds of trade),
because the social group commissioning the works consisted essentially of
the patrician merchant class. He thus begins by giving a vivid picture of the
customs of this clientele when dealing with art, in particular the modalities
of contracts between customer and artist – an unusual choice of subject mat-
ter to get readers in the mood for the painting of the Quattrocento. These
modalities are of interest above all insofar as they show how the value of art
was perceived: gradually, for example, the use of precious materials became
less important than the personal involvement of the master of a given artist’s
workshop; rather than buying a specific amount of gold and lapis lazuli in the
picture, then, the customer now paid for themaster’s particular skill, a shift in
values for which Baxandall supplies documentary evidence. Apart from stat-
ing what should be done by the master and not by his assistants, however,
these contracts provide no further description of the skills in question, and
other sources on the painting of the time use qualitative linguistic metaphors
that can no longer be translated into a visual-painterly equivalent, prompting
Baxandall to inquire into “how Quattrocento people, painters and public, at-
tended to visual experience in distinctively Quattrocento ways, and how the
quality of this attention became a part of their pictorial style” (27). This intro-
duces the key concept of experience. We are not talking about a hypothetical,
abstract viewer like the one assumed in themathematical construction of one-
point perspective (where this viewer is even reduced to a single eye), nor about
the similarly hypothetical viewer of experimental psychology as presupposed
2 Magali Sarfatti Larson, review of Painting and Experience in Contemporary Sociology 25,
no. 4 (1996), 454.
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by Gombrich. Baxandall’s viewer is a historical and social variable; his/her eye,
or rather his/her seeing as a cognitive activity, is shaped by experience and by
the physical, mental and emotional skills, habits and activities required by
everyday life in the art-consuming social groups in Florence at the time. This
shares certain implications with the metaphor of the “embodied eye”3 as used
since the late 1980s within art and cultural studies in discussions of the body
as a focus of social, media, technological and cultural processes.
The “period eye” begins at the point of transition between the physiological
process of seeing and the interpretation of the optical data in the brain (29).
This interpretation is based on “innate skills” (29) and skills developed through
experience. Baxandall groups these acquired interpretative skills, “the cate-
gories, the model patterns and the habits of inference and analogy” (30), un-
der the concept of “cognitive style” (30).4 In this way, he turns “style” from a
category for describing art into a category for describing the way art is seen.
This cognitive style, on which the period eye is based, consists of “a stock of
patterns, categories and methods of inference; training in a range of repre-
sentational conventions; and experience, drawn from the environment”. The
process within which these factors take effect is “indescribably complex and
still obscure in its physiological detail” (32). To illustrate what is described here
in brief, abstract terms, Baxandall offers practical examples relating to tech-
nical issues of artistic practice in contemporary Florence (the arrangement of
figures, the construction of three-dimensionality on a flat surface, colour, the
figures’ body language).
Baxandall’s seeing is practical and physical, for example translating expe-
rience with dance as a social practice among the educated classes into an abil-
ity to interpret patterns of figures. Baxandall sees this as a visual skill and a set
of expectations shared by the painters and their clients, forming the context
and background for the arrangements and gestures of figures in Botticelli,
a claim he backs up with treatises on dance and other written sources that
link Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus, the group of persons involved, and a dance
composition (78-81). Another specifically Florentine context cited by Baxan-
dall for the visual expectations of customers and the visual habits of artists
3 Christopher S. Wood, “When Attitudes Became Form. Christopher S. Wood onMichael
Baxandall (1933-2008)” in Artforum 47, no. 5 (2009), 43-44.
4 “Cognitive style” is a concept from anthropology and psychology. See Allan Langdale,
“Aspects of the Critical Reception and Intellectual History of Baxandall’s Concept of
the Period Eye” in Art History 21, no. 4 (1998), 479-497: 486. In Baxandall’s work, the
background of this concept (and of some others) remains unexplained.
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is religious drama which, as he shows, features constellations of figures and
narrative strategies similar to those found in painting (71-76). A highly prac-
tical skill possessed by merchants that influenced the way they perceived art
is the calculation of the capacity of barrels using geometry and mathematics
(86/7); such three-dimensional seeing aided comprehension of the volumes
portrayed in the painting of artists like Piero della Francesca or Pisanello.
Here, too, Baxandall cites sources that convincingly link context and painting,
including a mathematical handbook for merchants by Piero della Francesca
(87).
Themetaphor of the “period eye” does what figures of speech are supposed
to do: it blurs categorical boundaries of the kind that hinder comprehension
of historically “unfamiliar” phenomena (as Pächt would say, see chapter three)
but that accompany most debates on method in art history: the line between
art and context, between historical and present-day reception; between artist
and consumer; between the optical-physiological basis of seeing andwhat one
would now call its cultural construction; between physicality and sociality; but
also, and this is a difficult point in methodological terms, between historically
specific but not reconstructable individuals (in this case artist and client) and
what can be said in general terms about these individuals in the sense of a
typical viewer of a specific place or time. This last point drew criticism from
Gombrich, for example, concerning the use of totalizing concepts like zeit-
geist, national style or Kunstwollen.5 Sociologists like Pierre Bourdieu and an-
thropologists like Clifford Geertz, who were interested in insights into social
groups, and thus in the generalizability of individual observations within spe-
cific limits, were significantly more sympathetic to the “period eye” than their
art historian colleagues. For Bourdieu, who in 1981 published the chapter of
Painting and Experience dedicated to the period eye in French with a foreword
of his own,6 it offered the methodology for a sociology of perception; in his
1976 article Art as a Cultural System, Geertz took it as his point of departure
5 On Gombrich’s critique of Baxandall’s “period eye”, see Langdale, “Aspects”, 480. Unfor-
tunately, Langdale gives nomore specific details, except for a reference to an interview
with Baxandall conducted for his unpublished dissertation (see ibid., footnote 21).
6 Michael Baxandall, “L’Œil du quattrocento” in Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 4
(1981), 10-49; Pierre Bourdieu and Yvette Desault, “Pour une sociologie de la percep-
tion”, ibid., 3-9.
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for an analysis of the visual culture of a society, providing one of the most
important stimuli for the subsequent emergence of visual culture studies.7
What progress did Baxandall’s method offer in cognitive terms? He takes
art as his starting point; he treats style as an important concept. However for
Baxandall art is the starting point but not the end of his endeavours. He has
a concept of painting, at least in the specific case of the Quattrocento, which
leads away from painting itself towards an epistemic interest that lies beyond
it – to the “social relationship” of which painting is the “deposit”. This sounds
like a social history of art of the kind we have known since Arnold Hauser
– an approach that offers no answer to the question of the inner connection
between the manifestations of art and sociality, working instead with mostly
suggestive, non-verifiable analogies between stylistic periods and forms of so-
ciety.With his period eye, on the other hand, Baxandall inquires, with a preci-
sion based on historical evidence, into the verifiable relationship between the
manifestations of art and the visual conditions dictated by the society where
its production and reception take place. In this way, he finishes by bringing
the way we see today into play: based on the assumption that forms and styles
of painting respond to social conditions, a knowledge of social practices and
conventions may “sharpen our perception of the pictures” just as, conversely,
the forms and styles of painting can sharpen our perception of society (151).
According to Baxandall, the possibilities within social history for
reconstructing past societies are limited to written sources, imposing a
crucial limitation on attempts to reconstruct experience. And this is where
painterly style becomes important: “a pictorial style gives access to the visual
skills and habits and, through these, to the distinctive social experience”
(152). This implies that a painting can be read like a written source, and the
period eye is Baxandall’s proposal for such a method of reading. This makes
it possible to avoid both the mistakes of an “illustrated social history” and
“facile equations” between social milieus and painterly styles – his negative
examples being the equations of bourgeois milieu with realistic style and
aristocratic milieu with idealizing style (152). At the end of his book, Baxan-
dall clearly states the essence of what he wants to achieve with the “period
eye”: For the “students of charters and parish rolls”, the visual facts may
appear “hopelessly lightweight”; “They are certainly a distinct kind of fact:
what they offer is an insight into what it was like, intellectually and sensibly,
7 Clifford Geertz, “Art as a Cultural System” in Modern Language Notes 91, no. 6 (1976),
1473-1499. Cf., Langdale, “Aspects”.
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to be a Quattrocento person. Such insights are necessary if the historical
imagination is to be fed, and the visual is here the proper complementary
to the verbal.” (152-153) The path of an empathy that overcomes historical
time thus leads not back to art but through art to the historical individual;
however, and this is important, this historical individual is typified and
generalized at the level of relatively homogeneous social groups – like the
“church-going business man, with a taste for dancing” (109).
Experience is joined here by twomore concepts that are just as impossible
to reduce to language: insight and imagination. Here, then, Baxandall takes
his metaphors for the process of scholarly learning from the field of the vi-
sual, deploying them against the supposed facticity and objectivity of a form
of historiography reduced to written sources; herein lies their significance
and their methodological weight. Baxandall tries to introduce visuality into
the academic discipline of history as a fact. In subsequent decades, however,
as mentioned above, his proposal was taken up mainly by other disciplines
with more of a focus on the present, in particular sociology and anthropol-
ogy – disciplines that later came to occupy places at the core of visual culture
studies. Such uptake of the period eye has increased especially since the 1980s,
always with the same motivation: an analysis and critique of culture based on
the relations of the social – and not, for example, on the isolated specifics of
an object or a genre of cultural production.
These readings are exemplified by Clifford Geertz’s article “Art as a Cul-
tural System”. Geertz is often named as being partly to blame for two of the
“turns” of recent decades: the cultural and the linguistic turn. It is true that
his text combines culture and semiotics, but it specifically opposes a brand
of semiotics that views signs merely as a means of communication, a code to
be deciphered. He calls on the analytical forces of semiotic theory, “whether
Peirce’s, Saussure’s, Lévi-Strauss’s, or Goodman’s”, to turn their attention
away from an “investigation of signs in abstraction toward an investigation of
them in their natural habitat – the common world in which men look, name,
listen, and make”.8 This embedding of experience into semiotics is his adap-
tation of the period eye: as his chief witness for experience as the site where
art, seeing, everyday practices and society meet, he cites Baxandall’s example
of the Florentinemerchant. In his book, Baxandall himself never argues in the
sense of semiotics; he sticks with experience as the concept that brings the
8 Geertz, “Art as a Cultural System”, 1498, (my italics).
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various fields together. The reason for this, presumably, is that he is not in-
terested in interpreting the pictures he cites as examples.9 This in turn means
that the horizon of experience shared by painter and viewer, which he defines
as the medium of art (40), is not something he wishes to apply to the pictures
as an interpretative tool. Baxandall does not establish a system, not even a sys-
tem of signs; in contrast to the comprehensive, emphatic definition of culture
put forth by Geertz,10 he uses the concept of culture very pragmatically and
very sparingly.
Today, “experience” is making a comeback in cultural studies; evidence for
this includes Christopher Wood’s reading of the period eye, published in his
obituary for Baxandall.11 He describes Baxandall’s approach in Painting and
Experience in a way that is characteristic of the altered perspectives of recent
years: Baxandall, Wood writes, called on the reader “to occupy the body of
the fifteenth-century Florentine patron of altarpieces and frescoes, typically
a ‘church-going business man, with a taste for dancing’”. This is where the
metaphor of the “embodied eye” comes into play; the embodied eye belongs
to the body of this businessman. The reader, Wood argues, is invited to par-
ticipate in the historically remote everyday life by a “process of bodily trian-
gulation: We would feel with our bodies, and see with our embodied eyes,
what the beholders of Masaccio and Filippo Lippi saw.”This body metaphor is
one of his adaptations of the category of “experience”; another is to be found
in the time-oriented concept of “process”. In Wood’s view, Baxandall demys-
tified the art of the Renaissance, releasing it from the grip of iconological
expertise and references to antiquity, recasting it as “process art, whose very
content ismaterials, labour, themass of the body, the force of gestures”.Wood
then makes an astonishing link to When Attitudes Become Form, an exhibition
of contemporary art shown in Bern and London in 1969 featuring concep-
tual, performance and installation art – currents within the neo-avant-garde
that sought to revolutionize the concept, genres, spaces and institutions of
contemporary art. For Wood, the parallel between the painters of the Quat-
trocento as described by Baxandall and the artists of the neo-avant-garde lies
9 He addressed the problem of interpretation in a later book, Patterns of Intention: On the
Historical Explanation of Pictures (NewHaven, London 1985), a series of “fiercely antime-
thodical lectures”, as Wood remarks in his obituary: Wood, “When Attitudes Became
Form”.
10 For Geertz, culture is “the general system of symbolic forms” (Geertz, “Art as a Cultural
System”, 1488), a position that echoes Cassirer’s philosophy of culture.
11 Wood, “When Attitudes Became Form”. All quotes in this paragraph, ibid., 44.
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in the interaction of work and materials, in the emotional commitment of
the artists, and in their direct link with the audience. Baxandall’s readers in
the 1970s,Wood writes, would have appreciated the description of an art con-
text where painters and audience escaped the control of the church and which
had not yet withdrawn into the cabinets of the collectors, taking place instead
“in the piazza, in public, where they listened side by side to the mendicant
preacher who coordinated the biblical tales with the affections of the heart,
and where all practical men, susceptible to the beauty of things, could openly
share their intimacy with materials, tools, and craft. In this way, inside the
scholarly treatise, art and life find their way back to each other.” Baxandall’s
Quattrocento was attractive to the 1970s, then, because it spoke to the utopia
of a unity of art and life in a harmonious society – for asWood critically adds,
Baxandall’s “social history” is not dynamic, knowing no diachrony, conflicts
or breaks.This contrasts strongly with early cultural studies and John Berger’s
approach based on a Marxist critique of ideology in Ways of Seeing.12
Wood’s description of Baxandall’s “scholarly treatise” is so lively that one
forgets that Baxandall meticulously backed up every one of his links between
lived reality and pictorial form with references to written sources – sources
that had previously gone largely unnoticed by art history because they did
not belong to the canon of iconology. Since the 1970s, this in turn marked
Baxandall out not only as a contemporary of recent ethnology, but also of
recent academic history with its interest in everyday life and mentalities.
Although his approach did meet with interest in the context of Anglo-
American adaptations of structuralism, it is not easy, however, to describe
Baxandall’s linking of everyday life and cognitive style as structural. The cat-
egory of experience, with its refusal of a structurally fixed outline, strikes
me as a more fitting one to describe his approach with its pragmatic restric-
tion of its methods’ scope and a refusal to construct closed theoretical frame-
works. His method implies an appeal to today’s viewers: in order to be able
to comprehend the life and art of a given historical period, they must learn
something that is historically unfamiliar and that goes beyond what has been
reproduced in language. Baxandall calls for an understanding of unfamiliar
cognitive skills in order to recognize historical habits of seeing.
12 With Sven Blomberg, Chris Fox, Michael Dibb, Richard Hollis, 1972 BBC TV series, book
published the same year.
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Between presence and representation – Svetlana Alpers’
The Art of Describing13
In her 1977 article “Is Art History?”, Svetlana Alpers reviewed the main ten-
dencies of the New Art History in terms of method.14 This new current first
announced itself in a series of studies of individual artworks under the ti-
tle Art in Context, published from 1972 by John Fleming and Hugh Honour as a
counter-model to the traditional art-history-by-period of the “Pelican History
of Art” series. For Alpers, the main concerns of this “new” art history lay in a
shift of attention to the context and reception of art; as its most interesting
proponents she named T.J. Clark with Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and
the 1848 Revolution15 and Baxandall with Painting and Experience. For Alpers, as
her title suggests, the key here was that the individual artwork was treated
as a piece of history. One might say that the question of art’s context (who
commissioned it, who was the audience, where was it shown, etc.) made such
a focus on individual works necessary. Alpers describes the New Art History
as a movement to democratize the discipline: Clark uses context to demystify
the concept of solitary artistic creativity by embedding it in its social setting;
and Baxandall does the same to seeing by situating it as a social practice.16
Alpers’ thoughts on whether art is history then take an unexpected turn:
inquiring after the epistemic interests of the “new” art historians, she ac-
cuses them of having neither a subjective standpoint nor a shared position.
Instead, she argues, their project of reconstructing context pursues a “notion
of objective historical research”.17 What Alpers demands is, firstly, clarifica-
tion of individual art historians’ own subjective positions as a precondition for
research, and secondly, going beyond this, a moral humanist commitment
to research of the kind advocated by Panofsky and Warburg, and by Gom-
brich with his harsh critique of totalizing zeitgeist concepts. Alpers criticizes
Baxandall as “a most sophisticated spokesman” of this supposed objectivity
and quotes a phrase from Painting and Experience (151): “quattrocento inten-
tions happened in quattrocento terms, not in ours”. For Alpers, “Baxandall’s
13 SvetlanaAlpers, TheArt ofDescribing.DutchArt in the SeventeenthCentury (Chicago 1983).
14 Svetlana Alpers, “Is Art History?” in Daedalus 106 (1977), 1-13.
15 T.J. Clark, Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution (Berkeley, Los An-
geles, London 1973).
16 Alpers, “Is Art History”, 2.
17 Ibid., 9.
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disembodied desire – one shared by many art historians today – to see quattro-
cento art in quattrocento terms is as much an intellectual structuring of our
times as the others. This too is knowledge we make.”18
Why mention this debate? One reason is the metaphor of the disembod-
ied desire for objectivity, which matches that of the disembodied eye in the
later debate surrounding the critique of perspective as logocentric and ab-
stract. Interestingly, Baxandall’s “objective historicization” of visual practices
was meant to combat precisely this abstraction of seeing – contrasting it with
the seeing body of a quattrocento businessman “with a taste for dancing”.
For Alpers, however, the assumption of having reconstructed this body as an
objective historical reality implies the elimination of another seeing body,
i.e., that of the viewer who erroneously believes it is possible to disregard
his/her own condition of seeing as a situated practice. Pächt did not pursue
this strategy: like Baxandall, although he spoke of the unfamiliarity of histor-
ical modes of seeing, he tried to integrate the stylistic preferences from the
viewer’s present into his analysis as factors influencing his/her perception
and choice of historical image structures. We might also note that Pächt’s
view did not take the artwork purely as its starting point, but also returned
to it. In other words, he looked back and forth between artworks as a way
of accessing historical formal structures, both synchronously and diachroni-
cally – an operation that might be theoretically linked with today’s concept of
interpictoriality.19 Baxandall takes a different approach, viewing artworks as
“lenses bearing on their own circumstances”, as something through which to
view history. “The suggestion is not that one must know about Renaissance
Germany to enjoy the sculpture, but that the sculpture can offer a fresh focus
on the cultural history of Renaissance Germany.”20
This view is what gave rise to the concept of visual culture, sometime be-
tween 1977 and 1983. It came into the centre of art historical debate with the
publication of Alpers’ The Art of Describing. Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century
18 Ibid., 10, my italics.
19 Several “inter”-concepts are in circulation in the field of visual culture studies and me-
dia studies, inspired by the poststructuralist concept of intertextuality (see, for ex-
ample, Ralf Adelmann, Andreas Fahr, Ines Katenhusen, Nic Leonhardt, Dimitri Lieb-
sch (eds.), Visual Culture Revisited. German and American Perspectives on Visual Culture,
Cologne 2007) which rebutted the notion of authorship, arguing that texts arise from
interaction with other texts.
20 Michael Baxandall, The Limewood Sculptors of Renaissance Germany (NewHaven, London
1981), vii.
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(1983): “What I propose to study then is not the history of Dutch art, but the
Dutch visual culture – to use a term that I owe to Michael Baxandall.”21 Alpers
does not provide a reference for this; surprisingly, the term is not used in
Painting and Experience, first appearing in Baxandall’s book on German Re-
naissance sculpture. This work has a similar structure to Painting and Experi-
ence: here, too, there is a chapter entitled “The Period Eye”, but since Germany,
unlike Italy, lacks treatises on art that give a primary insight into the visual
habits and aesthetic judgements of the time, it is necessary to look elsewhere,
“in the wider visual culture”.22 This is intended to provide insights into cat-
egories that might be authentic for the “general visual experience” of the pe-
riod in order to get closer to its sculptures, and it is also meant to offer a view
“through and beyond the sculpture” to the culture that influenced the “artistic
manipulation of visual experience”. I quote these passages at such length be-
cause they illustrate the links installed by Baxandall via the concepts of visual
culture and visual experience.
With his concept of “visual culture”, then, Baxandall almost incidentally
brings into play a bridging concept that links conditions of seeing and culture.
The concept’s “right of primogeniture” lies with art history, inspired by input
from other disciplines, primarily the cultural ethnology of Clifford Geertz and
new approaches in the humanities dealing with the history of mentalities and
everyday life. In the years that followed, rather than systematically pursuing
this approach, Baxandall turned to other methodological problems,23 which
explains the pragmatically limited reach of his concept.
Alpers, on the other hand, is less pragmatic than programmatic in her use
of the concept when she proposes to study not the history of Dutch art but
Dutch visual culture (xxv). How can this programmatic aspect be described
more specifically? InTheArt of Describing, concrete application, theoretical con-
siderations and engagement with art history as a discipline are so tightly in-
terwoven that it is hard to focus on a single aspect. Instead, a look back to
an article published in 1976, Describe or Narrate? A Problem in Realistic Represen-
21 Alpers, The Art of Describing, xxv, my italics.
22 Baxandall, The Limewood Sculptors, 145.
23 See in particular Michael Baxandall, Patterns of Intention.
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tation,24 will help to shed light on the context in which she first encountered
this problem to which she would go on to devote her book.
Alpers’ article is an appeal for a new focus on painting that is not narrative
but descriptive.The major theme of her book is already fully formulated here:
she “rebels” against the dominance of iconographic readings of art, a domi-
nancewhose historical roots lie in the fact that European art history as awhole
is assessed using criteria derived from the position of high esteem occupied
by the art of the Italian Renaissance. Narrative, idea and history (the inherent
textual quality of Italian painting since the Renaissance which, with Alberti’s
“istoria” and “costruzione legittima”, links storytelling with the pictorial space
of one-point perspective as a narrative space) have, according to Alpers, been
the benchmark of success in the history of European art since Giotto, just
as interpreting this content has been the benchmark in art history. This em-
phasis,which also implies amethodological restriction, is countered by Alpers
with something she refers to inTheArt of Describing (1983) as “descriptive paint-
ing”. In “Describe or Narrate?” she speaks of the “dazzling descriptive surface
of Dutch painting” and confronts “the Renaissance commitment to narrative
art … which continued to challenge ambitious artists well into the nineteenth
century” (16) with those descriptive tendencies in art, especially the art of the
17th and 19th centuries, that were discussed in the 1970s under the heading
of realism. With a wealth of source material from art theory and art descrip-
tion since the early Renaissance, she shows that in the traditional hierarchy
placing the intellect over the senses, the argument in favour of a legible, nar-
rative art goes hand in hand with an attack on art that “delights the eyes of
the ignorant”.25
This is the basic agenda that also motivates The Art of Describing: Alpers
wants to revise this hierarchy by focussing her work on painting that (also)
describes rather than (only) narrating. But is it “merely” a question here of
24 Svetlana Alpers, “Describe or Narrate? A Problem in Realistic Representation”, in New
Literary History (8:1, 1976), 15-41. Interestingly, this issue of New Literary History was
subtitled Readers and Spectators: Some Views and Review, and the contributors included
Gérard Genette, the poststructuralist literary theorist and proponent of narratology,
and the film semiologist Christian Metz. The focus was on the reception of art, on leg-
ibility and visibility, an approach pursued by literary theory since the late 1960s that
was only gradually becoming established in art history.
25 Alpers, “Describe or Narrate?”, 17, translation of a quotation from Boccaccio about
Giotto, who he praises because his art “addresses the intelligent with recognizable fig-
ures”.
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stepping into the academic breach to defend undervalued works? Several
metaphors in “Describe or Narrate?” offer clues to additional, implicit mo-
tives. Discussing Caravaggio’s Conversion of St. Paul, she claims that the light
interpreted by scholars as heavenly “illuminates and thus involves us in the
material things of this world rather than in the miracle of another”. However
much the light is meant to point to the miracle of conversion, in worldly
terms it also makes the viewer “physically part of the event that took place on
the road to Damascus”. For Alpers, it is thus entirely clear that for Caravaggio,
“the road to salvation is through immersing oneself in this world” (19, my
italics). What is appealing about Caravaggio’s art, she argues, is the direct,
immediate quality of his description. The life imitated in intense painterly
description breaks through the art into “our” space (19/20). “We are party to
the undoing of art as the tables are turned by life.” (20) Caravaggio’s painting
plays with the possibility of tearing down the barrier between “artifice and
life, between the fictive world and the actual world of the beholder” (19). This
is surprisingly similar to the metaphors of a blending of art and life in the
avant-garde discourse of the 20th century: immediacy, immersion, presence
without (narrative) representation. And indeed, Alpers cites Michael Fried
here (18), a writer associated with New Art History who has argued along
these lines concerning the art of the 1960s and in his studies of the art of the
18th and 19th centuries. In his now-famous polemic against the large objects
of Minimal Art published in 1967,26 Fried called for a “pure” presence of art
that does not distract the beholder from his/her equally pure contemplative
state by asking him/her to read – that does not destroy the asemantically pure
presence of art in favour of inherently narrative structures of representation.
Alpers’ agenda can thus be summed up by terms like authenticity, pres-
ence, directness and anti-narrativity. It is an approach that finds itself con-
fronted (like the artists of the neo-avant-garde)27 with the problem that the
status of pictures is caught in an irresolvable (and unavoidable) tension be-
tween presence and representation. In her introduction toTheArt of Describing,
Alpers speaks of the “pleasurable effect of the suspension of narrative action
26 Michael Fried, “Art and Objecthood”, Artforum 5 (1967), reprinted in Gregory Battcock
(ed.):Minimal Art. A Critical Anthology, introduction by Anne M. Wagner (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, London 1995), 116-147.
27 This is why I would say that in historical terms, her discourse belongs more in the con-
text of the art-life discussion of the neo-avant-garde of the late 1960s than in that of a
structural or structuralist renewal of art history.
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in the name of delight in representational presence” (my italics) in order to crit-
icize the polarization between narrative and descriptive pictures in the work
of writers like Louis Marin, Roland Barthes and Leo Bersani.28 This polariza-
tion and what Alpers says about it are interesting in the context of this book
insofar as the equation of action with narrative and of passivity with descrip-
tion, which she criticizes, addresses types of seeing. For Dutch painting, at
least, Alpers rejects this dichotomy: “far from being the ideal suspension of
a restless narrative mode, descriptive images, in the seventeenth century at
least, were central to the society’s active comprehension of the world”.29 For
Alpers, both descriptive seeing (by the painter) and the viewer’s seeing what
is depicted as such (and not as something else, e.g. as part of a narrative),
are active attitudes towards the world. In order to make her claim suitably
incisive, however, she dramatizes the narrative mode as “restless”, implying
hyperactivity.
The polarization between narration and description in literature and fine
art raises complex theoretical and methodological problems. Alpers picks up
on the connotations of the two poles and harnesses them to her position. Nar-
ration is associated with action, activity, active reading/seeing, with a mean-
ing “behind” the surface of pictures, with the iconography that interprets this
meaning.There follows the denial or dismissal of the painterly surface and of
the forms and materiality of painting. To Wollheim this denial constitutes a
“transparent view of art” because it looks “through” the surface at the mean-
ing that lies behind.30 Narration also implies a hierarchy of pictures and how
they are dealt with - history painting then being the highest in the hierar-
chy of genres - and a narrative space based on perspective. All this for Alpers
is incorporated in the Italian model of fine art. On the other hand she links
description with passivity since no action is narrated. In her account descrip-
tion is linked with the surface and materiality of the pictures, with show-
ing only what is, 31 and with a perceptually pragmatic approach to a pictorial
space that deviates from the mathematical model. Her approach concerns
itself with seeing pictures rather than reading them. Alpers’ aim is to reval-
uate the descriptive mode, one that is not exclusive to Dutch painting, and
28 Alpers, TheArt ofDescribing, 235f. The associated theoretical problems anddebates con-
cerning the status of the picture cannot be gone into in more detail here.
29 Ibid., 236.
30 See ibid., xxiv, where she quotes Wollheim.
31 Often known as realism, although Alpers does not wholly agree with this, Alpers dis-
cusses this in detail in “Describe or Narrate?”.
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to render it productive. And she feels justified in this by reference to an art-
historical tradition that is interested in art beyond the norms of Italian art.
She names Riegl for Dutch group portraits, Pächt for the art of Northern Eu-
rope, Baxandall for German limewood sculpture and Fried for “absorptive or
anti-theatrical (for which we may read anti-Albertian)” French painting (xx).
Alpers asserts: “The Dutch present their pictures as describing the world seen
rather than as imitations of significant human actions.” (xxv) However simple
this characterization of Dutch painting may appear, it should be clear by now
that the consequences are less straightforward. We can see this in The Art of
Describing, which opposes the “recent rash of emblematic interpretations of
Dutch Art” (xxiv).32 In his Early Netherlandish Painting, Panofsky had already
examined this painting in terms of its “disguised symbolism” by which (to
use Alpers’ terminology) he meant that painting concealed meaning under its
realistic surfaces (xxiv).
If there is no hidden meaning in Dutch painting, Alpers asks, how should
we view it? (xxiv) This is a revealing question as it implies that for Alpers,
too, there is a fundamental link between the act of viewing and the search for
meaning. Any form of seeing without this search is alien to her, or at least
hard to justify, as well as being hard to structure in methodological terms – a
gaze into the void, so to speak. And what does Alpers do? Instead of turning
firmly towards the surface, towards the painterly appearance of things – as
Pächt does, for example, in his description of the miniatures in the Admont Gi-
ant Bible – she refocuses her attention from the picture to its circumstances:
“My answer has been to view [Dutch art] circumstantially” (xxiv, my italics).
What she refers to here as “circumstances” is what we already know as con-
text: “I mean not only to see art as a social manifestation but also to gain
access to images through a consideration of their place, role, and presence in
the broader culture.” (xxiv) What I assume she is doing here is avoiding the
potential accusations of formalism that make focussing one’s attention on the
formal appearance of things in painting so risky.
In various guises, the dichotomy of form and content has always been a
part of German art history, and it also touches on the status of art-historical
seeing. The problem may be suppressed in Anglo-American art history of the
32 The drastic choice of the word “rash” and an epilogue that tries once again to specif-
ically refute this approach may explain why Alpers’ book received such a polemic re-
view fromE. de Jongh, themain practitioner of this kind of interpretation (see Simiolus,
Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art 14, no. 1, 1984, 51-59).
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Gombrich-Baxandall-Alpers line in a way that can be felt in the “emptiness”
of the image beyond meaning (as suggested in the above-quoted question by
Alpers) and in the way she redirects attention away from pictures towards
context. Whereas Baxandall’s pragmatic reserve (diagnosed by Alpers as ob-
jectivization) leaves little scope for attack on this count, Alpers’ struggle for a
position and method is far more openly symptomatic. To put it concisely, one
could say that the attention she devotes to the context of painting is intended
to cover up the self-reflexivity (or “emptiness”) of its surface, but also to open
it up to the outside. Where iconography scans painting for symbolic-textual
prefigurations, a context-based approach looks at the sociocultural conditions
of its production.
To return to Alpers’ characterizations of Dutch painting, whose descrip-
tive character she sees as being based on active seeing aimed at a knowledge
of the world: “Already established pictorial and craft traditions, broadly rein-
forced by the new experimental science and technology, confirmed pictures
as the way to new and certain knowledge of the world.” (xxv) She names and
interprets qualities that she attributes to this orientation: departures from a
viewer position determined by one-point perspective (“positioned viewer”) in
Dutch painting give the impression that the world is more important than
the viewer; the use of major contrasts in proportion shows that man is not
the measure of all things; the absence of a frame within the frame implied
by the composition (framing groups of trees in landscapes, for example, or
the order of figures in a space determined by perspective) makes the picture
appear a random segment of the world that continues beyond the arbitrary
limits of the frame. Also notable is a marked sense of the picture as surface,
resembling a mirror or a map but not the Albertian window, and an emphasis
on craft skills in the painterly rendering of objects (xxv).
All of these attributes, then, have to do with the status of painting as a site
of knowledge about the world. Visual culture, discussed here prominently for
the first time, is thus a culture of knowledge. Alpers even claims that it played
a key role in society: “One might say that the eye was a central means of self-
representation and visual experience a central mode of self-consciousness.”
(xxv) This goes far beyond the role of everyday skill attributed to seeing by
Baxandall; its elevation of visual culture to the status of a paradigm of so-
ciality comes closer to the later basic assumptions of visual culture studies
– with one crucial difference, specifically with reference to Dutch painting
and culture. “In Holland,” Baxandall states, “if we look beyond what is nor-
mally considered to be art, we find that images proliferate everywhere.” (xxv)
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This resembles the self-legitimization of today’s visual culture studies when
it diagnoses a new age of relentless, omnipresent images.33 Images are not
only everywhere – in books, on fabrics and carpets, on tiles and in frames on
the wall – they also show everything, from insects and flowers to Brazilian
tribespeople to the interiors of houses and churches. Central examples of the
importance of visuality in the Dutch culture of the 17th century are maps and
atlases that describe “the world and Europe to itself” (my italics). Knowledge
about the world, articulated and communicated in seeing and visual descrip-
tion, is thus also a factor of self-consciousness.
InTheArt of Describing, Alpers builds up context (which she suggests should
be studied in dealing with non-narrative painting) in layers: she begins with
Constantijn Huygens who as a leading figure in the country’s cultural life tes-
tifies for Dutch visual culture as a contemporary witness to the intellectual,
cultural and scientific currents of the period, as well as its taste in art. Huy-
gens enthuses about new optical instruments like the camera obscura, the
microscope and the telescope, and his writings provide detailed support for
Alpers’ theory of a visual culture of knowledge via observation of the world.
The next layer deals with a specific quality of the pictures in this culture: their
“lifelike appearance” (26).This lifelikeness is not to be taken for granted, it goes
beyond the usual standard of mimesis in painting since the Renaissance and
needs to be explained. To this end, Alpers introduces Kepler’s model of the eye
and seeing as a factor of the cultural milieu, providing her with a workable
model for dealing with Dutch painting.This is followed by a contextualization
of painting as a highly skilled craft of the kind required for lifelike portrayals.
As well as a steady hand, this also depends, even more crucially, on an atten-
tive eye. Here, then, a culture of knowledge based on observation (layer 1) is
linked with a school of painting whose “model” Alpers bases on Kepler (layer
2).
This layered structure culminates in the theory of a “mapping impulse
in Dutch art” (119ff). Here, the map as a pictorial genre brings visually rep-
resented knowledge about the world together with the mode of the picture
itself. With this strategy, Alpers means to escape from the argumentative
structure of analogy (e.g., the analogy between Kepler’s model of seeing and
descriptive painting) into the concretion of an object. Her main example is
Vermeer’s The Art of Painting (1666), a picture whose theme is painting itself
33 One example amongmany: NicholasMirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture (London
1999).
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and which features a map in a prominent position as a picture within the pic-
ture. At this point, then, the path leads away from context into the picture –
and back out again towards the Dutch love of cartography.
From this broad but detailed spectrum of historical contextualizations, I
take a closer look at the analogy between Kepler’s model of the eye and paint-
ing. “Where is the art?” Alpers asks when pictures show something that looks
like a copy of reality without telling a story: “When images are situated at the
threshold between the world and our perception of it how can they be consid-
ered as art?” Vermeer’s View of Delft, for example, “is just there for the looking”
(27). In this painting, Alpers argues, the world (not the painter!) stains the sur-
face of pictures with colour and light, “impressing itself on it” (27) – a use of
metaphor that recalls William Talbot’s description of photography inThe Pen-
cil of Nature.34 And Alpers really does view Dutch painting as a historical pre-
cursor to photography; the Nordic descriptive mode of painting shares many
qualities with photography (43) – its fragmentariness, the arbitrariness of its
framing, the immediacy of its contact with reality.This immediacy refers both
to seeing and to the transfer of seeing into painting; it is also guaranteed by
the camera obscura, the microscope, the telescope and other lenses that acted
as optical aids at the time, ensuring maximum analogue transfer of what was
seen into the image. In Alpers’ model, this mode forms the historical equiva-
lent of photography, understood as the indexical transfer of the world into the
image. What Alpers’ argument does not take into account is that right from
the start, photography was never a “purely” descriptive medium. In other
words: the photographic image, too, is not merely a media transcription of
the world; instead it involves a selecting and composing authorial eye that
orients itself towards the aesthetic norms of its time.
As a metaphor, immediacy must be read here against a mediatedness
like that introduced by the narrative function of Italian painting between the
world “as it is” and the picture/viewer. This gives rise to a chain of signifiers
of world, description, immediacy, northern painting and photography that
seems to lack what its counterpart (narrative, mediatedness, southern paint-
ing) brings with it in and of itself: meaning and with it the possibility of in-
tegrating the picture into the broader context of interpreting the world. The
series of polarizations could thus be continued: meaning versus “the world
is as it is”; painting as a function of narrative versus painting as tautology:
34 William Henry Fox Talbot, The Pencil of Nature (London 1844-1846).
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“What you see is what you see”, as Frank Stella remarked in 1964 on the self-
referentiality of his pictures.35
To counter this danger of the tautology of world and lifelike image, I would
argue, Alpers introduces Kepler’s model of seeing as a historical context, but
also as a model that structures both seeing and image production in 17th-
century Dutch culture. Kepler’s definition of the human eye as a “mechanical
maker of pictures” and his formulation that seeing creates a painting (pictura)
of what is seen on the surface of the retina (34) form the basis for Alpers’ ar-
gument. Kepler views the eye in isolation as a seeing mechanism and he also
accepts its distortions as optical facts (35). This lends seeing a new, emanci-
pated status; the sense of sight is relieved of the usual charge of deception;
seeing including its naturally inherent distortions is accepted and isolated as
scientific fact – and it is in this sense that Alpers uses it as the context for
Dutch painting. This signals another contrast to Baxandall’s “period eye”: the
period eye is not a natural mechanism, but a “skill”, a socially and culturally
conditioned and trained eye that brings forth corresponding forms such as
the creation of volumes in the quattrocento or the floral forms of German late
Gothic – forms that have to do with learned habits of the eye that lead to the
objects of the world being seen and painted in a particular way.
Kepler equates seeing with “picturing” (33). “Visual perception is itself an
act of representation in Kepler’s analysis.” (36) This is the bridge established
by Alpers between seeing and the painting of pictures: the “artifice” then lies
not in the invention of a picture, but in the coincidence of nature and art. Ver-
meer’s View of Delft, which Kenneth Clark called “the nearest which painting
has ever come to a coloured photograph” (27), could thus be seen as a display of
this artifice. “A claim is made on us that this picture is at the meeting-place of
theworld seen and theworld pictured.” (35) In theNetherlands,Kepler’smath-
ematically defined line between nature and “artifice” is a matter for painting,
and not just since Kepler, but beginning with van Eyck. With her analogy
between the models of mechanical seeing and descriptive painting, Alpers
secures a further bridge: that between the world and its representation. Just
as a trompe-l’oeil is an optical fact, the deception in painting (of which it is
accused) is not a moral problem but an epistemological one: “there is no es-
cape from representation” (35). If the eye sees not “what is” but what the eye’s
optical mechanism makes out of what is, then this divergence contains the
35 Bruce Glaser, “Questions to Stella and Judd” (1964) in Battcock (ed.):Minimal Art, 148-
164: 158.
62 Beyond the Mirror
unavoidable fact of representation – because seeing is already representation.
In this way, representation in descriptive painting is marshalled on the side
of nature.
Now the difference between the narrative, Italian norm and the descrip-
tive Dutch mode of painting becomes clearer: on the one hand, the framed
picture as an object in the world, the Albertian window through which we
look, from a position defined by perspective, at a narrated world; and on the
other, the picture that takes the place of the eye itself, leaving the frame and the
viewer-position undefined (45). The latter also applies to the position of the
painter: according to Alpers, it is dissolved within the picture; the painter, ab-
sorbed in attentive observation of the details of the world, “merges” with the
picture, anonymizing him-/herself in this kind of “selflessness” (83). In Ver-
meer’s The Art of Painting this manifests itself in the back view of the painter:
“Like a surveyor, the painter is within the very world he represents. He disap-
pears into his task, … Observation is not distinguished from the notation of
what is observed.” (168)
The image of the painter disappearing into the painted world would be a
good place to link Alpers’ model with the critical theories of the subject and
authorship proposed by Foucault and Barthes. Apart from a cursory refer-
ence to Foucault’s The Order of Things, however, Alpers herself does not situate
her approach within a structuralist or poststructuralist context. Interesting
here is Louis Marin’s review of her book, under the ambiguous title “In Praise
of Appearance”. Marin sees parallels and differences between Alpers’ model
and structuralism. As one key difference he cites the fact that Alpers does
not abstractly deduce her fundamental oppositions (e.g., narrative versus de-
scriptive) from a “basic structure of signification; rather, they are discovered
in history”.36 Conversely, he credits Alpers with “magnificent appreciation of
appearance and surface”, culminating in her critique of the “Albertian” subject,
which she counters with a multiple, fragmented subject, even a “nonsubject,
at once everywhere and nowhere” – a verdict in which Marin gathers together
all of the motifs of poststructuralist critiques of the subject that have since
become common currency. And Marin’s reading gains something else from
Alpers’ version of the disappearance of the author, arguing that it paradox-
ically brings forth an animation of the objects themselves in their representa-
tion, a kind of “visual autorepresentation, a kind of ‘object-consciousness’”37 –
36 Louis Marin, “In Praise of Appearance” in October 37 (1986), 98-112: 100.
37 Ibid., 112.
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which brings us back to the void around which Alpers’ book revolves: the tau-
tology of an “unmediated” representation of things. It is this tautology that
makes her less a structuralist and more a contemporary of the neo-avant-
garde of the 1960s with its call for a “pure” presence of objects beyondmeaning
and interpretation. I am thinking, for example, of Carl Andre with his brick
works, about which the critic Peter Schjeldahl wrote, on first encountering
them: “The bricks were. … Here, at last, was the purely and clearly existing
heart of the matter.”38
In the avant-garde discourse of presence, a central role is played by
Michael Fried’s engagement with Minimalism. For Fried, Minimalist objects
have no presence because they are theatrical. This suggests an analogy in
which the stage is a context that determines meaning, deflecting attention
from the non-functional absorbed state of seeing and rendering presence
as an effect of perception impossible – comparable with Alpers’ critique of
emblematic readings of Dutch art. Fried’s “tautology of presence” certainly
bears similarities with Alpers’ argument: “It is this continuous and entire
presentness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation of itself, that
one experiences as a kind of instantaneousness: … it is by virtue of their
presentness and instantaneousness that modernist painting and sculpture
defeat theatre.”39 The “perpetual creation of itself” and the “instantaneous-
ness” both recall Alpers’ take on Vermeer’s View of Delft: it is “just here for the
looking”. In this reading, the non-interpretative seeing of the Dutch painters
is a historical equivalent to the avant-garde discourse of presence. Both
focus on an “object-consciousness” that creates an “immediate” link between
viewer/artist and art/world. But Alpers leaves a certain tension between
object and seeing: she situates seeing in a historically determined field – the
field of visual culture as a culture of knowledge.
The question of what art might be, beyond meaningfulness, is also ad-
dressed by both Fried and Alpers. For both of them, the key to the answer lies
in the type of perception dictated by the artwork, and for both of them what
characterizes art is the “absorption” of the gaze of an isolated eye, the eye of
both producer and recipient: in its aesthetic make-up, art shows that the eye
of both artist and viewer is absorbed in its seeing, isolated in the sense of
an independence from the surroundings in the moment of seeing – a gaze
38 Peter Schjeldahl, “Minimalism” in Malin Wilson (ed.), The Hydrogen Jukebox, Selected
Writings of Peter Schjeldahl 1978-1990 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1991), 204-205.
39 Fried, “Art and Objecthood”, 146.
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that is not “pure” in the sense of a biologically fixed predisposition, but that
is extremely focused on what it perceives.
3. Through the Eyes of the Spectator
Seeing the Other – Otto Pächt’s The Practice of Art History:
Reflections on Method
While Gombrich views art history from outside, Otto Pächt adopts a dif-
ferent position: Pächt, who, like Gombrich, studied in Vienna,1 argues from
within the discipline. Or, more precisely: from within its practice. The above-
mentioned lectures from 1970/71, first published in German 1977, systemati-
cally describe what remained vague to me as a beginner: seeing in art history
as an analytical activity. In my conversations with fellow students and staff at
the Vienna Institute of Art History at the time, there was much talk of “style
analysis”, a term no one was able to adequately explain to me and which, in-
terestingly, Pächt does not use. Pächt’s lectures have also been translated into
English and published 1999 as The Practice of Art History: Reflections on Method,
with an introduction by Christopher Wood, revealing that Wood’s reserva-
tions concerning Pächt are considerably less serious than the reservations
harboured by recent Anglo-American art history with regard to Panofsky and
Gombrich. One reason for this may be that Pächt’s influence in the English-
speaking world never reached a level that would have called for distancing
gestures in the sense of a “rebellion against the father figure”. Another aspect
also strikes me as important. Pächt did not claim to offer a complete the-
oretical framework. Rather he was interested in: “finding initial approaches
to a method that is not devised speculatively but obtained by developing an
awareness for the processes of perception that take place when we are ‘getting
1 Gombrich, born in 1909, studied from 1928 to 1934 and emigrated to England in 1936,
like Pächt. Pächt, born in 1902, obtained his doctorate in Vienna in 1925.
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our eye in’ with artworks.”2 Any accusation of a holistic or determinist basic
position, as formulated by Wood against Gombrich, Panofsky, and the struc-
tural analysts of the Vienna School, can thus not be levelled at Pächt – who
systematically examines practice without subjecting it to a unified theoreti-
cal model. Rather than offering closed answers to questions such as the value
of an artwork or the telos of art history, he addresses these issues as open
problems for which there are no pertinent solutions – although he is also at
pains not to abandon art history as an academic discipline to unrestricted
relativism. This preserves the processual openness of research itself, which
is far closer to the critical thinking of New Art History than the universal or
scientistic models of people like Sedlmayr and Gombrich.
Pächt’s art historical practice also differs from that of Panofsky and Gom-
brich in the place it accords to seeing as the central heuristic operation of the
discipline, defining its methods and objectives in processual terms. In par-
ticular, this approach problematizes the heuristic trap of seeing what one is
looking for, what one wants to see. Hence Pächt’s attempts to describe how it
might be possible, via a form of “analytical” seeing (my term, not Pächt’s), to
set aside what one is looking for and then, by comparing it with the results of
this other seeing, to check and if necessary revise it. Attendant questions here
include: What can be seen by seeing an artwork? How does seeing an individ-
ual artwork and reaching specific conclusions relate to arriving at conclusions
that apply to a group of works? How does today’s seeing relate to the unfamil-
iarity of a historically remote culture whose artistic legacy one is looking at?
What is the situation concerning the verifiability of such findings and their
claim to scholarly rigor? What does such analytic seeing focus on? As these
questions show, Pächt’s attempt to frame seeing as a heuristic activity gives
rise to conflicts that are usually either not addressed at all (as was the case
when I was studying in Vienna) or compensated for by models that are super-
imposed over the empirical practice of visual knowledge production (mod-
els that Pächt criticizes in emphatic terms): the conflict between “innocent”
and pre-informed seeing, between individual findings and the generalizabil-
ity required by scholarly method, between the cultural and visual influences
on interpreters today and their historically “foreign” object, between seeing
and the transfer of its results into language, between form and content (this
2 From Pächt’s forword to the third, revised edition of the book: Otto Pächt,Methodisches
zur kunsthistorische Praxis. Ausgewählte Schriften (Munich 1995). (trans. NG). All other
quotations are taken from the English edition.
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latter being a basic conflict within art historical tradition, especially in Ger-
many). All of these conflicts have genealogies and effects both theoretical and
methodological.
In the following I will subject Pächt’s text, which fills a small book, to a
selective reading, concentrating on his discussion of the art-historical act of
seeing. As he says in his introduction, he is interested in Arbeitshygiene (work
hygiene), stressing the importance of a clear-cut approach “to the practical
exercise of our craft as art historians.” For him, this means developing both
the “mental and sensory receptive organs” and the “conceptual apparatus”, in
turn calling for “introspection: wemust look both at ourselves, the viewer, and
at our object, the work of art” (19). Here, then, attention is focused for the first
time on the viewer as a practicing art historian, for only via historical scrutiny
is it possible “to transform object into work, the material substrate into the
artistic phenomenon” (20). It should be added that this relationship between
artwork and viewer is being discussed here with specific reference to art his-
tory. I emphasize this because the history of 20th-century art is marked by
a similar view whose influence is felt not only in interpretation but also in
the production of art itself – the view that an artwork is only realized in the
eye of the beholder/viewer. Pächt, by contrast, does not deny art material-
ity or reality beyond its perception. Instead, he is interested in the character
of art history as a historical discipline and the resulting problem of the un-
familiarity of the “art objects” under study that are to be released from this
unfamiliarity by a specifically trained mode of seeing, rendering them visible
as aesthetic phenomena to today’s eyes. In a single sentence, Pächt thenman-
ages to make a fundamental critique of Gombrich in passing, without men-
tioning him by name: “The danger of mistaking the art object for the work
of art is greater with naturalistic representations than with non-naturalistic
ones.” (20) We recall: Gombrich’s narrative of progress in fine art turns on
the problem of imitating nature. As deviations from this narrative, styles like
that of the Middle Ages require complex explanations. For Pächt, by contrast,
rather than being special cases, they actually justify the practice of historical
seeing on account of their specific “unfamiliarity” to today’s viewers.
This “unfamiliarity” is Pächt’s way of rephrasing a central problem in art-
historical research; on the one hand, it brings the necessity of interpretation
into play (how else can today’s viewer attend to an art object from a bygone
period?), while at the same time implying the relativity of interpretation and
the embeddedness of art object and viewer in a network of relationships. If
something is unfamiliar, why, and from which viewpoint? Assuming artist
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and viewer to be in possession of an “innocent eye” would be quite wrong.
This unfamiliarity refers not only to the content of the work in the sense of
conventions, symbols, gestures, objects and customs that would have been
known to viewers at the time (and that are deciphered within art history as
material culture and iconography), but also to the “habits of seeing and think-
ing, modes of the pictorial imagination. The question, therefore, is this: how
are we to make ourselves familiar with these idiosyncrasies of vision?” (23)
While Baxandall develops a method to make the eye of the historical client
accessible to today’s viewers and readers, based on its reconstruction through
written sources, Pächt wishes to historicize the eye of today’s viewer by em-
bedding his/her seeing in a process of learning historically unfamiliar visual
habits. He calls on the viewer to pay attention to him-/herself, his/her own
habitual ways of seeing; he cites examples of the rediscovery of art from the
past in which a significant role is played by an “affinity with the prevalent
stylistic fashion of the age when the rediscovery takes place” (24), as in the
love of the Impressionists for the painting of late antiquity. But he finds such
dependence on fashions of taste problematic: he is interested in insights that
can be rendered objective: “When we think we have finally managed to see the
work of art correctly, how do we know that this is really so?” (29) – that we are
not taking a subjective interpretation for the correct one? This is where the
above-mentioned “work hygiene” comes into play, requiring hypotheses to be
verified. Art history does this by viewing the individual artwork in “genealog-
ical perspective”, which for Pächt means situating it within a development.
“If we can manage to locate the work within a genealogical sequence – that is
to say, if the properties that we discover in it turn out to follow logically from
something outside it – then we can safely regard our findings as verified.”
(61) This frees the individual work from its isolation, thus “eliminat[ing] the
open-endedness that lays it wide open to subjective interpretation” (30). For
readers today, it may seem strange that the artwork is to be stripped of so
much open-endedness (elsewhere, Pächt writes that “artistic phenomena are
notoriously open to multiple interpretations” (73)). After all, it has since been
widely agreed that the artwork is something “open” and polysemic,3 a con-
sensus based primarily on contributions from the field of semiotics. But for
Panofsky, Gombrich and Pächt, this would not fulfil the conditions for schol-
arly rigour that prevailed when they were writing. The way Pächt deals with
3 This refers, of course, to Umberto Eco, Opera aperta, 1962 (The Open Work, Cambridge
MA 1989).
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this, however, is remarkable: he sets the bar for objectivity pragmatically low;
subjective interpretations undergo thorough scrutiny via comparisons with
earlier, later and contemporary works, and via the conclusions drawn – but
not within the framework of a metahistorical interpretative model.
Pächt describes the process of seeing in diverse, eloquent terms, for
example with the colloquialism “getting one’s eye in” (87), sometimes with
metaphors drawn from work with texts, with pictures also being “read” (23).
For Pächt, interpretation involves both “seeing-with-understanding”, which
he also calls “adapting our vision” (100), and “enunciating the vision once
correctly seen” (100), by which he means description. He demonstrates this
using examples of painting, sculpture and architecture from the medieval
and early modern periods, each of which highlights one basic problem of
“getting one’s eye in”. Two miniatures from the Admont Giant Bible with
Moses receiving the laws on Mount Sinai (31-40) show how an “unfamiliar
conception of space” (41) is translated into two dimensions; the Holy Sepulchre
in the Minster at Freiburg im Breisgau shows how “an unfamiliar attitude to
time” creates an “obstacle to access” (41-45); unlike the initial unfamiliarity of
medieval renderings, Donatello’s Judith und Holofernes initially appears easily
comprehensible on account of its naturalistic “visual logic” (46), but on closer
inspection it becomes increasingly puzzling (46-52); at first glance, the Pazzi
Chapel by Filippo Brunelleschi (53-61) seems to be accessible via a purely
factual description, but this impression is short-lived.
In his introduction, Christopher Wood focuses primarily on Pächt’s treat-
ment of the miniatures from the Admont Giant Bible, doing so for reasons that
are interesting in terms of a history of reception: Pächt describes the minia-
tures not as deviations from the standards of illusionist rendering of space,
but via the formal peculiarities of a system of representation thatmust appear
unfamiliar to our eyes accustomed to naturalism. He describes a layering of
zones separated by bands of colour; there is a “definite indication of behind
and before, and therefore a rudimentary space; but everything constantly re-
verts to the picture plane” (36). The logic here is not one of space but of the
picture plane, causing this system of representation to resemble ornament.
To enable himself to see this, Pächt begins by suppressing his prior knowl-
edge on the subject and avoids an object-based reading: “Of course, such an
inhibition is rather artificial. In practice, our eyes react quite differently. Led
on by our own prior knowledge, they see what they expect to see: […] For this
very reason, it is often a useful corrective to experiment with an object-blind
vision.” (32) According to Wood, Pächt rewrites the story of Moses receiving
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the laws as a “formal narrative. He flattens the representation into a pulsat-
ing, mesmerizing pattern of interlacing bands of colour. By the end he has
in effect created a new work that looks more like one of Kandinsky’s Compo-
sitions from the early 1910s.” He describes Pächt’s approach as the “extraction
of formal dramas out of non-classical … or even ugly pictures” (16-18).
By identifying formal structures in their specific and unique character,
Pächt can interpret modes of portrayal and systems of representation from
different periods and styles in a way that is free from the allegiances and
preferences of someone like Gombrich (illusionism) or Panofsky (renaissance
humanism). In this phase of analysis, forms are viewed neither in terms of
their references to reality nor in terms of their correspondence with an iden-
tifiable object, but in relative autonomy as a formal event, before they are
historicized by means of comparison; for, as mentioned above, the individual
work of art must be “released” from its isolation (60) and embedded within a
genealogical perspective. The aim of such a perspective is “a new attribution
– to period, place or artist” in order to establish “whether or not the work fits
organically into a particular slot in a particular historical context” (62).
One possible product of this approach is the bringing together of artworks
that have previously resisted attribution, creating a consistent œuvre whose
supposed author is then given a name. This search for an author-subject is
particularly characteristic of research into the late Middle Ages as practised
from the late 19th century. For this practice, too, Pächt offers a prominent
example, the Master of Flémalle, discussing the ways this “case” bears on the
history of science (63-65). What is at stake here is not merely attribution, as
that depends on the existence of a reliably identified œuvre with which the
authorless works might be compared; here, by contrast, the comparability of
the “formal opportunities” for the authorless works is what makes it possible
to deduce and create an author. At the end of the 19th century, the “Flémalle
question” (64) was still dominated by the “idea of personal styles”, a param-
eter that was later replaced by the concept of a period style. Pächt describes
the historical development of research into “the Master of Flémalle” as an in-
creasing differentiation of seeing: “The process of seeing – of visually grasping
the identity of a work of art or of an artist – is a process of growing differ-
entiation. When we first encounter a work of art, what we perceive is not its
specificity but its analogies with what we already know.… In a gradual process
of visual differentiation, the specific crystallises out of the general. This is a
fact that has still to be properly faced. Indeed, it stands in blatant contradic-
tion to everything in the literature of the subject. Far from being abstracted
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from many individual cases, the generalised impression is the primary expe-
rience that affects us when we confront the individual work of art.” (65) What
does this mean? Pächt offers a very basic explanation of his view of seeing
as a research activity. This implies a constant switching between individual
observation and reference to a more general position.The one feeds the other
as possibility: we see individual works by Rogier van der Weyden and other
works from his period and milieu, among them those later grouped together
into the œuvre of a newly identified master. Out of this singular seeing of
individual works arises a background of visual knowledge that leads to new
results when the individual works are looked at again.This seeing is “primary”
not in the sense of purely optical registering; it is a seeing-with-thinking for
which the “dismissal of normative aesthetics” (70), the relativization of aes-
thetic standards, is of crucial heuristic importance.4 In this model, it is only
once aesthetics is relativized that art-historical seeing can be rendered objec-
tive. This makes it clear that Pächt is interested not in recognizing the situ-
atedness of seeing, but in overcoming it. Although the art historian sees sub-
jectively, using Pächt’s method of seeing s/he is able to check his/her insights,
to generalize them, and thus to objectivize them.
I return now to the generalised impression of seeing an artwork for the
first time. With this approach, Pächt opposes another method of seeing that
aims to isolate small details with the smallest possible meaning as a way
of obtaining objectivizable results when attributing artworks: the so-called
“Morellian method”, developed in the late 19th century by the medic and art
connoisseur Giovanni Morelli. For Pächt, the matching of small details like
the shape of earlobes or fingernails “affords no valid evidence unless they [the
details] can be made to harmonise with the overall design principle of the
work in question” (66-67).
We recall: this “overall design principle” can only be seen by first acknowl-
edging the unfamiliarity of what is to be looked at, rather than judging it by
an aesthetic norm. In practice, this means that the viewer must overcome
his/her visual “prejudices”, such as the influence of the fashions of the mo-
ment. This in turn happens, secondly, by “getting one’s eye in” with the unfa-
miliar, learning the visual language that brought forth this work.The fact that
this learning process might itself be effected by fashions and the viewer’s own
4 Pächt considers this problem of normative seeing (such as Burckhardt’s dismissal of
the Baroque as a “Renaissance gone to seed”) to have been overcome by Riegl; see
Pächt, The Practice of Art History, 69-70.
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preferences (as Wood suspects is the case with Pächt’s analysis of the Admont
Bible, in my opinion correctly) is clearly of no importance to Pächt, as this
can be neutralized by the verification techniques of comparative art history.
In any case, this temporal fixedness of the viewer can offer new perspectives
on historically “unfamiliar” aesthetics, although this is something Pächt him-
self does not discuss; in his view, the changing fortunes of specific styles and
periods can only be identified retrospectively by studying reception history.
Only by overcoming a normative way of seeing the art of past eras does it
become possible to use the interplay between artwork and seeing and to turn
art-historical seeing into a heuristic tool. Pächt describes this process using
metaphors from optics: “The instructions that works of art give us are like an
invitation to try out different lenses. Initially, many aspects of the object may
seem tomake no sense.…Through one lens,much is clear, but some things are
distorted or blurred; through another, this may be reversed. Clearly we want
a lens through which as much as possible, and indeed everything, is clearly in
focus.”5 It is a matter, then, of finding the right approach, one that “succeeds
in eliminating all contradictions, anomalies and inconsistencies: an approach
that makes a thing that might be otherwise into a thing that has to be just
the way it is. That is an approach that turns chaos into order … an approach
that allows as many details as possible to be understood in terms of a small
number of design ideas or principles; an approach that reveals a maximum
of referentiality” (69). The artwork should be assessed “not by inappropriate,
alien criteria” but by “its own, inherent criteria” (69). The problem Pächt tries
to solve here in a series of formulations recalls more recent debates, in fields
including ethnology, on how to deal with the Other and the challenge of un-
derstanding it without annexing it, thus rendering it newly unrecognizable.
Pächt’s concern here is to avoid absolutizing ways of thinking that result in
dichotomies, like those he finds in Sedlmayr – whose approach of gestaltetes
Sehen (configured seeing) he otherwise approves of (67-68).
What later generations would refer to as function, Pächt calls a “formal
opportunity” (52). Discussing the wellhead for which Donatello made Judith
and Holofernes, he makes a significant distinction with regard to the concept
of function: “The sculpture or the painted image must subordinate itself to
an overall structure: a structure with an artistic organisation with its own,
infinitely variable but always tied to function. The sculpture or painting thus
5 Published translation (from page 69) altered for meaning.
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becomes part of a whole – which means that it will possess a number of char-
acteristics that cannot be deduced from its essential nature as art.” (52) In
this way, Pächt insists specifically on the historically immanent relativity of
the forms as we see them, and he does so in a way that describes form and
function within a tension between aesthetic autonomy and functional depen-
dence, but without submitting to the temptation to resolve this tension. This
strikes me as a very typical example of Pächt’s thinking.6
Pächt’s system does have a centre: the artwork in its historicity. But in the
process of art-historical seeing, he tries to (re-)activate the relations embed-
ded in and accreted to this centre without bringing a meta-history or other
totalizing model into play that would isolate one of these elements (artistic
genius, the autonomy of form, meaning, etc.) and allow it to prevail over the
“uncertainties of the visual dimension” (73).
Let us once again inquire into Pächt’s aims of inquiry: according to what
we have described so far, one might gain the impression that Pächt adhered
to the conventional “ways of art historians” (65) with their focus on attribution
and dating. He was clearly aware of this, and he asked himself and his reader:
“Why do we take such a burning interest in the attribution of works of art,
the determination of date and authorship? Is there not something obsessive
about the way in which … art historians, when they see an object, know no
peace until they think they have found the right pigeonhole for it?” Could
they not be interested solely in the content of an artwork, leaving aside the
“historical classification that leads to a museum label”? His answer: “a correct
attribution defines the view that alone reveals the true essence of the work
… Attribution is … ultimately … a matter of content.” (65-66) Pächt does not
state the exact nature of this content.The key basis for all that follows involves
6 Though I will not reproduce it in all its complexity and incisiveness here, Pächt’s cri-
tique of iconology is similar. He criticizes its monopoly on the interpretation of art,
instead assigning it a clearly circumscribed task: “What was once a living visual expe-
rience may well have vanished long since – or, where the civilisation concerned is an
alien one, it may never have belonged to our store of notions at all. Here, then, some
artificial help is required. And this is where iconography comes in. I would define its
primary task as that of teaching us what knowledge we need to have in our minds
when we look at historic works of art. We need iconography to reactivate whatever
was spontaneously known at the relevant historical moment.” (81) Iconography should
thus help to reconstruct the historical act of seeing in its spontaneity, but it should not
reduce the artwork to a pictograph or hieroglyph. See especially Pächt, The Practice of
Art History, 77-83.
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ascertaining the historical peculiarity of the object under study. Art-historical
seeing involves finding out the situatedness of the object in historical terms
by taking into account the situatedness of the art historian’s gaze. This gives
the relationship between the situatedness of the object and its viewer, the
relationship present in the act of seeing and interpreting, a specific weight.
This relationship between the art historian and his/her “Other”, the art object,
is built on the recognition of the (historical) otherness or “unfamiliarity” of
the object. Pächt is the only scholar in art history to thoroughly investigate
this relationship and to reflect on the methodological consequences of it. The
recognition and acceptance of the object’s otherness is of central concern also
for the discussion of the modes of seeing in visual culture studies later in this
book.
Focus on reception - Wolfgang Kemp’s Der Anteil des Betrachters7
Wolfgang Kemp’s contribution to art history’s engagement with hitherto un-
derexposed elements of the triad “artist – artwork – audience”,8 differs from
that proposed by Baxandall and Alpers. Kemp’s approach is via literary the-
ory, from which he borrows the concept of reception aesthetics for his project
of finding a theory and method for the share of art that is addressed to the
viewer. With the concept of reception aesthetics, Kemp situates his approach
in the field of theory, more precisely in the sub-discipline of philosophy deal-
ing with art: Aesthetics. At the same time, he also wishes to develop a method
and apply it in practice. A third important point is typical for art history as
a discipline: its focus on objects. Kemp’s reception aesthetics sticks close to
the artwork.9 In order to get from this to a theory and model of reception, he
7 Wolfgang Kemp, Der Anteil des Betrachters. Rezeptionsästhetische Studien zur Malerei des
19. Jahrhunderts (Munich 1983). Not published in English; all quotations here translated
by NG. The title refers to Gombrich’s concept of “the beholder’s share”, see Gombrich,
Art and Illusion, Section 3.
8 Wolfgang Kemp (ed.),Der Betrachter ist imBild. Kunstwissenschaft und Rezeptionsästhetik
(1985), new edition (Berlin 1992), 9.
9 By referring to the object as art, I make clear that here, unlike in visual culture studies,
it is not (yet) about abolishing the special status of art with regard to other artefacts.
The context of art, which in thework of Alpers, for example, is central to reconstructing
the visual culture of the viewer, is only taken into account by Kemp to the extent that it
determines structureswithin the picture. This also sets his approach apart fromBaxan-
dall’s model of the “period eye” that reconstructs the culturally and historically deter-
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looks to literary theory where he finds an approach dealing with the reading
of literature and adopts it for the viewing of art. Kemp’s viewer is an implied
viewer, he is quite literally in the picture.
As with Alpers, it is worth taking a look at the specific object of Kemp’s
analysis. What 17th-century Dutch painting was for Alpers, the painting of
the 19th century is for Kemp in Der Anteil des Betrachters. While Alpers focuses
on the “immediacy” of descriptive non-narrative, Kemp deals with painting
that is narrative in the broadest sense: the 19th century offers him an ani-
mated field between the tradition of history painting, as it continued to be
celebrated in the Paris Salons, and the emergence of modernist painting that
paid less and less heed to conventions of pictorial narrative like perspective
and framing. The roots of his approach actually lie in the 18th century, in the
“picture of the crowd”10 of the French Revolution, whose programmatic pic-
tures “demanded participation” (7), and in Diderot’s ideas on the relationship
between viewer and picture.
Participation is a good keyword for Diderot’s aesthetics, whose driving
paradox Kemp sums up in his opening sentence: “The viewer enters the sphere
of art theory in the 18th century only to be told he is not to enter the sphere of
art.” (10) Strictly speaking, Diderot’s ideas aim not to keep the viewer out of
the sphere of art, but to keep art from intervening in the realm of the viewer,
as this would disturb the viewer’s communication with the picture. For his
model of how a painting should be in order to allow viewers to connect with
its contents, Diderot turned to the theatre. Contrary to the then common
practice of actors addressing the audience directly, Diderot thought that the
action on stage should be presented as if the viewer were not there: “When
speeches are directly addressed to the audience, then the playwright has de-
parted from his subject, and the actor has stepped out of his role. To me it is
as if they had both left the stage and come down into the audience. As long
as the monologue continues, the action is suspended for me and the stage is
empty.”11 The stage and the auditorium should remain strictly separate spaces;
only then does the “action” acquire the unity and plausibility that allows the
mined preconditions for seeing on the part of both artist and viewer as a “medium” for
the painting of the Quattrocento.
10 See Wolfgang Kemp, Das Bild der Menge (1789-1830), in Städel-Jahrbuch 4 (1973), 249ff.
11 Denis Diderot, “Conversations on The Natural Son” (1757) in Sources of Dramatic Theory,
Vol. 2, Voltaire to Hugo (Cambridge 1991), 44.
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viewer to project him-/herself into it; only an intact fourth wall makes identi-
fication with the protagonist possible. Modern narrative cinema is based on
the same conditions. Both resemble a (moving) painting.
In narrative painting, too, it had been common practice into the 18th cen-
tury to make figures in the picture communicate with the viewer via glances
and gestures. Around 1760, Diderot still experienced this technique as pleas-
ant, as long as the figures did not “step out of the scene”,12 but he later rejected
it on the grounds that “the canvas encloses the whole space and there is no
one beyond it.”13 Only when the action portrayed in the picture “knows noth-
ing” of the viewer can s/he become wholly absorbed in these events. Kemp
describes this as follows: the “picture should make an impact, but if it is to
make an impact, it must do so via the stringency of its inner action and all
of the strength of the figures and all of the artistic means must be invested
in this procedure, any reference to the outside would weaken the unity of ac-
tion.” (11) Kemp, too, is referring to theatre when he speaks of the “unity of
action”.
There is an element in Kemp’s take on Diderot that modifies the exclu-
sive anchoring of a painting’s impact in the picture by making the viewer not
only implicit but also active: Diderot does not allow his absorption in a pic-
ture to be disturbed by small formats and heavy frames of a kind that would
prevent a viewer accustomed to today’s standards of immersive visual expe-
rience from forgetting that s/he is looking at a picture rather than a reality.
What is important is the viewer’s imagination, enabled by the picture’s in-
ner dramaturgy to experience the painted scene as something happening in
time and space, even with sound – as in a small painting of a shipwreck by
Vernet described by Diderot in The Salon of 1767: “I saw or believed I saw, as
you prefer, a vast expanse of sea opening before me. I was distraught in the
shore, having discerned a burning ship … I saw the unfortunates … run along
the deck, start screaming.”14 Vernet had clearly done a good job, then, even
12 Diderot, “Salon de 1761” in Œuvres Complètes X (Paris 1876), 143. “J’aime assez dans un
tableau un personnage qui parle au spectateur sans sortir du sujet.”
13 Diderot, “Pensées détachées sur la peinture” (1776). inŒuvres Complètes XII (Paris 1876),
101. “La toile renferme tout l’espace, et il n’y a personne au delà.”
14 Diderot, “The Salon of 1767”, in Diderot On Art II (New Haven, London 1995), 124. See al-
so Susanne von Falkenhausen, Kugelbauvisionen. Kulturgeschichte einer Bauform von der
Französischen Revolution bis zum Medienzeitalter (Bielefeld 2008), 150f. In this book, I
address the dynamic of immersion and viewer distance in connection with new tech-
nologies of visual immersion.
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though the figures are so small as to make facial expressions, for example,
all but indistinguishable. Diderot’s “I saw or believed I saw” refers to a fac-
tor of his reception that Kemp does not discuss: the imagination that is the
driving force behind the viewer’s absorption in the painted action. Immersive
experience of a picture depends on an obliging, willing viewer with an active
imagination.
Kemp takes Diderot’s paradox of the independence of the action in the
painting from the viewer and makes it the precondition for reception, estab-
lishing it as the basis for his question about the “share of the beholder”. In
so doing, he also solves a key methodological problem of historical reception
studies: it may be hard to research the reception behaviour of today’s audi-
ences, but for a historical audience it ismore or less impossible, since there are
few historical sources documenting responses to paintings (apart from texts
by professional critics, who follow the laws of their literary genre and thus
barely qualify as “authentic” sources of visual experience). From what I call
Diderot’s paradox – the picture’s autonomy from the viewer as a precondition
for the viewer’s communication with that picture – it follows that reception
can be deduced from the picture’s inner structure.
Before discussing the consequences Kemp draws from this, I want to take
a brief look at his historical review of reception aesthetics, whose roots he
traces from Diderot to the end of the 19th century in the work of John Stuart
Mill, Hegel, Ruskin and Riegl. For the 20th century, on the other hand, he
notes a limited interest in the question of the relationship between viewer
and work. “The already flimsy and vulnerable tradition running from Diderot
via Hegel to Riegl breaks off with [Riegl’s]The Group Portraiture of Holland,” the
reason being art history’s now dominant interest in “questions of formal and
stylistic analysis, in the analysis of content and structure” (24). We might add
that the 20th century also saw a golden age of “autonomous art”: the self-
referential painting of abstraction that refuses any kind of “legibility” (in the
sense of structures of reference to anything outside the painting) in order
to achieve the kind of pure being and pure presence that Michael Fried, for
example, had in mind. Concerning the decision in favour of an exclusively
immanent meaning of the aesthetic object, art history and art occupied the
same discursive field, especially in the early post-war decades.
According to Kemp, it was literary theory that caused the aesthetics of re-
ception to regain currency in the 1970s. From literary theory he borrows the
model of an aesthetics of reception and applies it to art history. We might
add that here, too, art was a precursor: new practices of the neo-avant-gardes
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since the late 1950s, such as happenings, and their new media, such as closed
circuit television and video,15 aimed to address the audience directly, to en-
courage audience participation, and to break out of the isolating “autonomy”
of modernist art. Artists often referred to theories and academic disciplines
beyond art, above all phenomenology, cybernetics, sociology and psychology,
in order to develop and explain their approaches. At the time, especially in
the German-speaking world, as well as having no answer to this, art history
actively excluded contemporary art from its remit, leaving it to art criticism.
Kemp’s project of applying the model of reception aesthetics to art history can
thus also be understood as a contribution to overcoming this methodological
stagnation.
Let us briefly follow Kemp’s systematic account of this approach: “An aes-
thetics of reception aims to take into the account the simple fact that a text is
read, a picture looked at, a piece of music listened to. That every work is part
of a process of communication that cannot be broken down into the active and
passive roles of transmitter and receiver, but which instead can only be un-
derstood as a dialogical process.The work is made to be received, it possesses
certain means of creating, shaping and maintaining a relationship with the
recipient. And rather than being a pure medium in which the intentions of
the artwork are fully realized, the recipient is configured for reception by aes-
thetic and non-aesthetic norms and forms of behaviour.” (28) In the light of
our previous readings, links, analogies and differences emerge.We start with
the activity of the recipient, in this case the act of viewing; this act meets
with a work that is already “waiting” to be viewed. This resembles the posi-
tions of Baxandall and Alpers. Both work and viewer actively participate in
a dialogue, meaning that there can be no “pure” or passive seeing. This, too,
matches Baxandall and Alpers, as well as Gombrich. The last sentence of the
passage quoted implicitly brings an interesting factor into play: if no identity
is established between the intention and the reception of the artwork because
the viewer is not a pure medium, shaped instead by norms and behaviours,
this can only mean that the factors shaping the viewer are different to those
shaping the artwork (Baxandall would have spoken here of factors shaping the
artist). Kemp does not go into the implications of this difference here. Only
later does it become clear what he might mean by it: the historical difference
between artwork and today’s viewer that is not discussed by Alpers or Baxan-
dall, but is seriously addressed by Pächt. While in the studies of Alpers and
15 Exemplified by the work of Nam June Paik, Dan Graham and Vito Acconci.
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Baxandall the historical context is identical for viewer and art (17th-century
Holland and 15th-century Florence respectively) Pächt is interested in over-
coming the hermeneutic divide between the historically unfamiliar and to-
day’s viewer – the art historian.
Kemp’s motivation is hermeneutic: the artwork is to be interpreted. This
contrasts significantly with Alpers and Baxandall, but not with Panofsky or
Pächt.16 One fundamental problem addressed by Kemp in connection with
interpreting art is already familiar from our readings of Gombrich and Pächt:
the conflict between a totalizing impetus and a limitation of the claim to valid-
ity of method and interpretation/cognition. Here, Kemp relates this problem
only to method. He insists that reception theory makes no claim “to be able
to interpret the artwork in all its referential complexity” (28) and in this he
follows Hans Robert Jauss who described it as “a methodical reflection that is
partial, extendable and dependent on collaboration”.17 In spite of this, Kemp
seems reluctant to relinquish his method’s claim to a broader competence:
“Admitting the ‘partiality’ of an aesthetics of reception [my italics] does not
free oneself from the task of maintaining an open view of the whole.” One
must thus examine “the extent to which reception aesthetics, as a perspective
at least, represents the whole” – only this seems to ensure the hermeneutic
value of the procedure. “Perspective” here refers to the interpretative horizon;
it should not be too narrow, thus remaining immanent, as Kemp observes in
formal analysis, and it should not be too broad, thus “losing itself in the non-
aesthetic”, as in the case of iconology. Instead, the “reception structure of the
artwork brings a sufficiently immanent and a sufficiently externally defined
category of the aesthetic into the focus of attention …: in the image of the
16 This feeds suspicions that precisely this motivation, regardless of which method is
used, is specific to the German-speaking tradition in art history, and that it is so self-
evident in that context that the notion that there might be other motivations for the
discipline and for dealing with art is not even raised. By analogy with psychoanalysis,
the need for meaning and interpretation could thus be situated on the level of the
discipline’s unconscious. In this light, it comes as no surprise that until 1992, when Os-
kar Bätschmann published his Einführung in die kunstgeschichtliche Hermeneutik (Intro-
duction to Art-Historical Hermeneutics), a theoretical approach to hermeneutics was
found in philosophy and literary criticism, but not in art history.
17 Hans Robert Jauss, “Racines und Goethes Iphigenie. Mit einemNachwort über die Par-
tialität der rezeptionsästhetischen Methode,” in Neue Hefte für Philologie 4 (1973), 1ff.,
quoted from Kemp, Anteil des Betrachters, 28.
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dialogue between viewer and work, we grasp the tense balance between art
and society.” (29)
It is interesting how Kemp tries here to overcome the problem of ten-
sion between “inside” (artwork) and “outside” (viewer): he uses the image of
a dialogue in which the duality of work and viewer remains present, the two
sides relating to one another. But this figure of relation does not seem to
be enough: he needs a figure of unity – the picture as which this relation is
grasped. In other words, when thinking of reception, we are always dealing
with a relation – between the recipient and what is being received. So far, so
simple. As with desire for meaning and interpretation, however, the desire
for unity seems to belong to the unconscious of the practice of art history; in
Freudian terms this desire produces considerable repressive energy when it
comes to thinking in relational terms. If we now viewmeaning/interpretation
and unity as mutually dependent figures of thought (meaning/interpretation
must be true, which is why there can only be one, and it is true because it
refers to a unity) then we soon arrive at claims to truth as a tradition of Ger-
man idealism, which in turn “encodes” the claim to objectivity made by re-
ception aesthetics. In methodological terms, this manifests itself, though not
uniquely, in the need to establish a priority in the work/recipient relationship.
“For centuries, the premise has been upheld that in the relationship between
work and recipient, the work was the most influential, its intentions merely
being fulfilled by the viewer. This was certainly wrong, but it would be just as
wrong to assert the opposite by attributing all authority to the recipient.” (my
italics) Here Kemp now proposes the model of a dialogue as a solution, but
this, too, is clearly not enough: “Furthermore, it seems not unreasonable to
call for the initiator of an interaction – and this is and remains the work –
to be granted a certain methodological precedence.” In this model, too, then,
the work retains its authority, as it is “recognizably involved in shaping the
reception procedure”. This argument brings to a close Kemp’s explanation of
“reception aesthetics applied to the artwork” (31).
My questions are: where in this model is it possible to situate seeing or
visuality more broadly? How is it conceived of: as a process, as an activity, as
a relationship? As his point of departure, Kemp borrows the figure of the “im-
plied reader” from the literary theory of Wolfgang Iser, replacing the reader
with a viewer but otherwise following Iser’s definition word-for-word. This
makes it possible to reintroduce the recipient into the work as “the way the
work relates to the reader” (29): the implied viewer “embodies all those predis-
positions that a work offers to its potential viewers as conditions of reception.
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The implied viewer is thus anchored not in an empirical outside reality, but in
the structure of the work itself. … Assuming that works take on their reality
by being seen, works must already contain certain conditions of actualization
that will allow their meaning to be assembled in the responsive mind of the
recipient.The concept of the implied viewer is therefore a structure within the
work anticipating the presence of a recipient, and this holds true even when
works deliberately appear to ignore their possible recipient or use strategies
to actively exclude him.”18 The last sentence of this quotation can be directly
linked back to Kemp’s discussion of Diderot’s notions of pictorial and theatri-
cal dramaturgy. After all, it would be hard to imagine a better explanation
of the viewer implicit within the picture than his/her exclusion from the events
portrayed.
Kemp distinguishes a picture’s immanent “response-inviting structures”
from the external “conditions of access” (33), what is now usually referred to as
context. Among the latter he names material conditions of access such as lo-
cation, sociological factors such as ritual, liturgy and art contemplation, and
human factors by which he means the viewer’s “individual and social pre-
dispositions” (34). Kemp’s interest, however, focuses not on this context but
on the picture’s immanent response-inviting structures, because “everything
that ‘happens’ here [in the artwork] has meaning for a viewer, it also happens
as a fulfilment of being viewed” (36). He quotes Gadamer: “The way the spec-
tator belongs to it [art] makes it apparent why it is meaningful to figure art
as play.”19 (my italics) In other words: the viewer is prefigured in the man-
ifest form of the picture, which Kemp also calls presentation and which he
sets apart from representation as its subject. The presentation “involves the
viewer in the work by drawing him into a second communicative procedure
in which he himself is not involved: representation” (35). Unlike the voyeur,
then, who looks at events that are not performed for him, that do not reckon
with him, the artwork reckons with its viewer. Art is always already there for
the viewer.
The heuristic status of reception aesthetics is now clearer: it is a tool,
a method of interpreting instances of meaningfulness. Its genesis can thus
be traced back not only to Diderot (who was interested less in interpreta-
tion than in visual empathy in the form of imagined immersion in a scene),
18 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading (Baltimore 1978), 34, quoted here as rewritten by
Kemp, Anteil des Betrachters, 32.
19 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (1965) (London, New York, 2013), 131.
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but also, within more recent academic history, to hermeneutics in the spirit
of Gadamer, to whom Jauss, too, refers. We are thus far removed from the
Anglo-American positions of Baxandall and Alpers who stand for a pragmatic
approach to visual culture oriented towards a history of experience, an ap-
proach that can be traced back, among others, to Gombrich’s scientistic study
of perception.
Let us return to the prefigured, implied viewer: In Der Anteil des Betrachters
Kemp deals above all with perspective, frames and framing in 19th-century
painting. In his final chapter on “Art Reception and Reception Art” he dis-
cusses the reasons for this choice, and it is the conditions of external recep-
tion of art in the 19th century that explain his focus on the work’s internal
conditions of reception: the pictures can no longer rely on a fixed place of re-
ception as they could in churches or at court; artists must reckon with an un-
predictable mobility of pictures and thus with unforeseeable visual exchanges
between the actual viewers and the painting. At the annual Paris Salon, thou-
sands of paintings were hung close together and with no logic in terms of
format or composition. Kemp recounts Géricault’s outrage over the hanging
of his monumental Raft of the Medusa in the Salon of 1819. He successfully in-
sisted on a rehang, but only once the picture had been moved did he realize
that this solution made the reception situation worse still (104) – in other
words, even the artist, having made the work himself, was not able to know
where and how it should hang. The problem is that even “a painting measur-
ing 4.90 x 7.16 metres … is conceived without a concrete notion of its future
purpose” (106). The work becomes “placeless” (106), resulting in considerable
uncertainty: “If a picture’s first appearance, and thus its future existence,were
unpredictable, then one could just as well paint to be viewed from close-up
or far away, one could emphasize the foreground or treat it vaguely (which
was then happening for the first time, in the work of Turner), one’s com-
position could be closed or open.” (111) Artists must devise their pictures for
an unknown reception situation and this brings into play Diderot’s call for a
pictorial dramaturgy that seems to be independent of the viewer, which an-
ticipates him without addressing him, behaving instead as if he didn’t exist.
The painting on which Kemp bases his theory of reception aesthetics thus
features historically determined predispositions that support this theory: the
autonomy of events within these pictures constitutes the implicit viewer.
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In 1989, in the third edition of an introduction to art history,20 Kemp was
given the opportunity to add reception aesthetics to the discipline’s canon
of methods. In a section on the precepts for reception, he lists the principle
“means of structuring” the “inner orientations” by which the viewer becomes
“the function of the work”: firstly, the connections between objects and people
in the picture, their distribution in the pictorial space, “the position that they
take toward one another and toward the beholder, their gestures and visual
contact”; secondly, the so-called “personal perspective” by which he means
those figures who orient the viewer towards the action in the picture; thirdly
and fourthly the way the scene is framed, and perspective “in all of its mani-
festations”;21 and, fifthly, as a new addition, blanks, a term from literary theory
coined by Wolfgang Iser.22 Blanks are areas where the picture is incomplete,
to be completed within the viewer. Such blanks are intentional, constituting
a narrative strategy. By signalling “the absence of a connection”23 they make
space for the viewer’s imagination to fill this absence and establish the con-
nection. According to Iser, blanks are “an elementary matrix for the interac-
tion between text and reader”,24 in this case between painting and viewer. In
1985, Kemp applied this model to the example of 19th-century painting.25
Let us take a brief look at this case study to see how the transfer works in
practice. His approach here is based on the premise “that every work of art is
left incomplete, in a precisely focused manner by its maker, in order that it
might be brought to completion in and through the beholder.” The emphasis
here lies on the work’s incompleteness being “precisely focused, program-
matic or constructive” in character, for only when it is intentional can the
blank acquire heuristic significance, meaning in turn that great importance
is attached to artistic intention, assuming a causal connection between the
20 Hans Belting, Heinrich Dilly, Wolfgang Kemp, Willibald Sauerländer, Martin Warn-
ke(eds.), Kunstgeschichte. Eine Einführung (1985), third revised and expanded edition
(Berlin 1989).
21 Wolfgang Kemp, “Kunstwerk und Betrachter: Der rezeptionsästhetische Ansatz” in:
ibid., 240-257: 246-247. Published in English as “TheWork of Art and Its Beholder: The
Methodology of the Aesthetic of Reception” in Mark A. Cheetham (ed.), The Subjects
of Art History: Historical Objects in Contemporary Perspectives (Cambridge 1998), 180-196:
187-188.
22 See Iser, Act of Reading.
23 Ibid., 183.
24 Ibid.
25 Wolfgang Kemp: “Death at Work: A Case Study on Constitutive Blanks in Nineteenth-
Century Painting”, in Representations 10 (Spring 1985), 102-123.
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understanding of artistic intention and the truth of interpretation resulting
from the recipient’s analysis of the blank. Kemp conducts such an analysis of
a history painting that is extraordinarily untypical in character: The Death of
Marshall Ney by Léon Gérôme from 1868. It shows a dead man in dark civilian
clothing, lying on his stomach, his head turned towards the viewer, his top hat
next to him on a street that runs diagonally from the foreground at the right
into the background on the left, lined by a high wall. A group of soldiers is
moving away to the left, the officer looks back towards the deadman; between
the soldiers disappearing off towards the left-hand edge and the corpse in the
foreground to the right lies an unusually wide empty space showing only the
street and the raw surface of the wall with its crumbling plaster and graffiti
– an area within the picture plane which, against the conventions of history
painting at the time, contains no persons involved in the events depicted.The
centre of the picture, then, usually the figurative focus of a pictorial narrative,
remains empty. Kemp defines this area as a blank that signals the absence of
a connection, as Iser defines it, thus obliging the viewer to make the link. In
this way, the blank complicates the establishment of a narrative continuum
in the picture, thus also making it harder to understand the scene as a whole.
The empty area is the blank; from here, our gaze slides “into the picture’s
depth, or down to the prostrate dead man, and from him onward … into the
perspectival depth of the composition, where a squad of uniformed soldiers
is leaving the scene of the action and the picture. Our regard is not, however,
pulled into the picture’s depth and lost there. Instead it is halted and redi-
rected by the figure of a backward-looking man clothed in black, presumably
the adjutant in command of the execution.”26 After a first consideration of the
painting, Kemp finds “a compositional schema consisting of three elements
presented as ideal types: a blank [the wall]; a participant in the action, more
accurately an object of the action [the dead man]; and an element helping to
create the picture’s perspective and that is the representative of the group of
participants in the action [the man looking back]”. In the German version of
the essay, Kemp refers to the man looking back as a Perspektivträger (bearer of
perspective), denoting his function of redirecting the viewer’s gaze; the man
looking back is “an aid to the reception of the picture that has taken the form
of a person; he confirms and helps us to grasp the significance of two large
blanks.”27 These blanks, the empty space of the wall in the picture and the
26 Kemp, “Death at Work”, 110.
27 Ibid., 112.
3. Through the Eyes of the Spectator 85
space occupied by the viewer in front of the picture, are closely linked via the
picture’s diagonal axis.
Kemp analyses the construction of this pictorial narrative, whose blank
paradoxically brings the action to a standstill.The above-mentioned elements
of Gérôme’s picture connect “space and time, the area before the picture and
the area shown in the picture, the beholder and the depicted scene, blank
and intelligible facts”.28 As a precondition for interpretation, Kemp’s analy-
sis, which I have only outlined here, follows the movements of the viewer’s
gaze that are unavoidably directed by aspects of the picture – blank, figures,
perspective. These movements do not compare existing reality with the pic-
ture as in Gombrich, nor do they primarily register formal structures as in
Pächt, and the focus is also not on sociocultural influences as in Baxandall. In
Kemp’s model, the movements of the viewer’s gaze correspond to reading: as
they scan the visual data in the painting, they make narrative links and estab-
lish plausibilities, just as reading generates coherent sentences and narrative
logic.
The way Kemp looks at The Death of Marshall Ney is grounded in his visual
experience with other contemporary painting; only in this way is he able to
identify the peculiarities of this “case” and to decide how to classify the ele-
ments of the picture, such as defining the painted wall as a blank. He then
uses these specific qualities to arrive at a more general qualification that sees
this blank as a symptomof a historical process: for Kemp, thewall, rendered in
great detail, is not just a blank in the sense of reception aesthetics, but also “a
large fragment of pure painting”.29 It anticipates modernism: “The extensive
and effective utilization of blanks by nineteenth-century realism can reach
a point where these acquire an autonomy and can thus lead over into mod-
ernist art, which interrupts or misdirects communications both within and
with the work.”30 This calls for more work than the kind of history painting
that puts all of the narrative facts on the table without gaps; here the viewer
must “bring together what is unconnected; endure the tensions; determine
what is indeterminate”.31
This added work is measured against the yardstick of a plausible narra-
tive logic. As well as recalling the legacy of Diderot, this begs the question of
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 110.
30 Ibid., 116.
31 Ibid., 117.
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whether the method of the implied viewer might be restricted in its applica-
tion to precisely the kind of narrative painting on which its definition is based
– a type of painting which, significantly, is already in crisis as a narrative
genre. The blank as one of the models of immanent structuring of reception
is a symptom of this crisis. One indication of this is the outlook with which
Kemp concludes his analysis in 1988: moving away from painting, he finishes
with the art that perpetuates the tradition of identificatory narrative in the
twentieth century: cinema.
Somuch for the state of affairs in 1988. By 1994, the situation in art history
had already changed.This is made clear by Kemp’s review of John Shearman’s
Only Connect: Art and the Spectator in the Italian Renaissance.32 Here, Kemp re-
acts to the shift from artwork to viewer widely seen in the practice of Anglo-
American art history since the 1980s. The review focuses primarily on recep-
tion studies – both on Shearman’s practice and on Kemp’s own approach,
which he aggressively tries to position within Anglo-American discourse via
this critique.
What, for Kemp, had changed since 1983, 1985 or 1988? With the spread
of viewer-oriented studies, the nature of the conflict had shifted. From for-
malism and iconography, the old rivals within German art history, the focus
had switched to the figure of the viewer – in other words, the dispute was
now taking placewithin reception studies as a methodologically differentiated
sub-discipline. In his review,Kemp argues against Shearman’s proposal of the
viewer as external to the picture. Shearman’s viewer is the “more engaged spec-
tator”, referring to a growing involvement of the Renaissance viewer with the
picture’s subject and narrative, and to the “complicity of the spectator in the
very function of the work of art” on which the artist could count. This sounds
32 Wolfgang Kemp, “Only Connect: Art and the Spectator in the Italian Renaissance by John
Shearman” in The Art Bulletin 76, no. 2 (1994), 364-367. Shearman offers a version of
this practice that is applied pragmatically to a central field of the discipline, the art
of the Italia Renaissance, clearly setting itself apart from the more recent influences
from social history, feminism, psychoanalysis and semiotics, which Shearman refers to
as “pseudo-iconography”. This distinction is interesting insofar as it turns against the
very influences that laid the ground within art history for a rapprochement with visual
culture studies. Surprisingly these influences are associated with the discipline’s “en-
emywithin” against which Shearman’s viewer focus is directed, i.e. iconography; this is
interesting because visual culture studies, that was in the process of establishing itself
as an academic discipline when the book was published, was by definition oriented
towards visuality and against iconography as an outdated approach of art history.
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like an extension of Baxandall’s concept of visual skills shared by artist and
viewer and which are considered as the medium of the picture. Shearman’s
aim is to particularize this viewer, leading to a clear shift within the reception
situation (as modelled by Kemp) towards the external viewer and the subjec-
tive factors shaping her reception.
Kemp accuses Shearman of failing to distinguish between the two strands
of reception theory, i.e. the implied viewer on the one hand and, on the other,
the external viewer and the external conditions of reception within which art-
work and viewer face each other (although it remains unclear whether this
distinction is also valid in the Anglo-American context). Kemp makes it clear
that for him, the problem lies in the shift to the external viewer. His reason-
ing is revelatory concerning the subsequent relationship between German art
historians and visual culture studies: the external viewer is the “new” subject
of art history. Or rather, the many new subjects of art history and above all
of visual culture studies, as they had emerged from the critical and political
discourses of difference in the 1970s and ‘80s.33 Or, in Kemp’s more polemical
version: “… the recipient as woman, as man, as child, as native, as alien”.With
this last item on his list, he refers to the then high-profile “ethnically other”
subjects, doing so discretely and with no racist implications; gay-lesbian sub-
jects are also treated discretely, not being mentioned at all. Here, I cannot but
voice my suspicion that, faced with the growing diversity of viewer subjects
and subjectivities, Kemp pre-emptively advanced (or retreated, depending on
one’s position and viewpoint) into the picture, where the implied viewer is
supposed to be at home and where his reception aesthetics, guided by the
European Enlightenment model of Diderot, has its source.
In this way, Kemp also links the issue of the gender of the “more engaged
spectator” back to the implied viewer, helped by the semiotic model of Mieke
Bal and Norman Bryson who classify the relationship between viewer and
33 In the years 1994-1997, The Art Bulletin hosted a broad debate on the fundamentals of
the discipline under the series title A Range of Critical Perspectives. These texts on the
new subjects of art history included: Lowery Stokes Sims, “Subject/Subjectivity and
Agency in the Art of African Americans” in The Art Bulletin 76, no. 4 (1994), 587-590,
and Ikem Stanley Okoye, “Tribe and Art History” in The Art Bulletin 78, no. 4 (1996), 610-
615. On this discussion, see also: Mark A. Cheetham, Michael Ann Holly, Keith Moxey
(ed.), The Subjects of ArtHistory.HistoricalObjects in Contemporary Perspective (Cambridge
1998).
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work in terms of “degrees of access to codes”34 – which can also be read as a
version of the implied viewer, since the “codes” in question are found by the
viewer in the work. Kemp deploys this model against the two conventional
approaches commonly used in art-historical gender studies, both of which he
considers inadequate: one seeks gender in the content (his example here: the
female nude), the other in the addressee (his example here: a convent).
Kemp also criticizes Shearman’s treatment of the external conditions of
access to art as too undifferentiated, before finding a way of linking these,
too, with the immanence of the artwork: works were conceived with a mind
to these conditions. Ultimately, then, the work provides information about all
external conditions of reception, both viewer and context, by, I would say, “in-
corporating” them. What Kemp doesn’t mention here is what Bal and Bryson
call the institutionalized “narratives”35 of art history. These narratives also
form the basis of Kemp’s reception aesthetics: the insistence with which he re-
peatedly links the art/viewer relationship back to the artwork itself may avoid
the fiction of an “ideal viewer”, but it does lead to a figure that nonetheless on-
tologizes the artwork by incorporating the viewer into the work.This is made
clear by another “symptom” in Kemp’s model of the implied viewer, as men-
tioned above, namely its omission of the situatedness of the viewer herself. At
this key point, then, the hermeneutic circle (and Kemp bases his approach not
only on Diderot’s model of the theatre but also on Gadamer’s hermeneutics)
is broken.
The way Kemp positions it, this reception aesthetics is part of (and some-
times the only instrument in) the toolkit of art history as interpretative ap-
paratus.36 Its roots in Diderot’s aesthetics of narrative imagination and in
the literary theory of narratology also point to a significant limitation of its
field of application: fine art as narrative in the broadest sense. Anyone deal-
ing with the art of the 20th century, on the other hand, will often find this
toolkit unfit for use. And, as Svetlana Alpers has shown, the same is true of
the art of the 17th century, whenever the focus is not on a picture’s narra-
tive structures. Finally, the implied reader/viewer remains a deictic function
34 Here Kemp quotes Mieke Bal, Norman Bryson, “Semiotics and Art History” in The Art
Bulletin 73, no. 2 (1991), 174-208: 186; under the heading “Receivers”, Bal and Bryson
also devote a section to Kemp’s reception aesthetics (184f.).
35 For example, the “totalized narrative of the-man-and-his-work”, ibid., 182.
36 In Der Anteil des Betrachters (1983) and Der Betrachter ist im Bild (1985), Kemp systemat-
ically demonstrates its reach with a Hegelian totalising claim, while his own specific
interests remain strangely unarticulated.
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pointing to narrative and thus to the creation of a narrative continuum, but
not to breaking/interrupting it, or to any of the other strategies of irony,mon-
tage or tautology encountered in the arts of the 20th century. Paradoxically,
reception aesthetics emerged at the same time as these artistic practices, in
fact only becoming possible as a result of their reflexive turn. But this art
in particular, especially that of the 1960s and ‘70s, reflects its own reception,
integrating it conceptually into its practice; and this is what leads to radical
strategies of breaking with narrative continuum and of anti-narrative tautol-
ogy. One can thus ask whether Kemp would still uphold his own verdict that
the art of modernism interrupts communication in and with the work. For
this verdict implies that communication is synonymous with narrative co-
herence within the object – a very narrow definition of communicability. In
addition, it ignores the field of association within the viewer’s imagination
which is capable of linking each detail of perception with a story.

Part Two: Visual Culture Studies – Looking
at the Visual

4. Visual Culture Studies – Concepts and Agendas
Culture, the political, and visual culture
Whereas art history is a discipline in the classical sense, with a history of
its own, visual culture studies is the product of a series of “turns” (linguistic,
cultural, visual, pictorial) since the 1960s. This makes itself felt in the way
visual culture studies has taken over concepts from various disciplines and
theoretical fields. The following chapter therefore draws a map of the main
concepts involved in framing visual culture studies’ ways of seeing: identity,
culture, visuality, and visibility.These in turn are framed by a political agenda
whose lines are also drawn into this map.
Visual culture studies is a child of the present, of a reflexive movement
in academia where paradigm shifts are proclaimed and institutionalized al-
most as soon as they occur (instead of this happening retrospectively, with a
historicizing distance, as ismore usual).This reflexivity has not, however, pro-
duced consensus on a definition of the discipline’s name: the field is diffuse,
the implications limitless, and there are as many genealogies of visual culture
studies as there have been attempts to canonize this “indiscipline” (Mitchell),
mainly in the form of readers and introductions published since the 1990s.
Each of these books has a specific focus, shaped by the respective “native” dis-
cipline of the authors, by their critique of that discipline and, in some cases,
by their hopes for the new field of visual culture studies. 2006 even saw the
publication of a first “meta-reader” which brought together the introductory
texts from the most important visual culture studies readers.1
1 Morra, Smith, Visual Culture, Vol. I-IV. The first volume brings together introductions
from other readers on visual culture studies, pre-faced with the editors’ own version of
a genealogy.
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My approach to this sprawling situation is guided by the question of epis-
temic interests and their implications for the related concepts of visuality. My
discussion of these concepts will trace two distinct developments, one aca-
demic and the other non-academic, the latter being, in my opinion, the fun-
damental one (in terms of both epistemic interests and models of visuality)
and, chronologically speaking, predating the academic development by sev-
eral years. The non-academic nexus joins politics and art, and my examina-
tion of it focuses mainly on Britain and the United States, beginning in the
1980s when the social and cultural tensions of the Reagan and Bush years
culminated in the so-called “culture wars”. Artists like Robert Mapplethorpe,
Andres Serrano, Jenny Holzer or Barbara Kruger and activist groups of artists
against AIDS, racism and sexism provoked the censors with their works, lead-
ing to withdrawals of public funding, in turn triggering fierce debates about
artistic freedom and political activism in the struggle for social recognition of
marginalized identities.2 The paths of politics and art crossed here with un-
usual intensity, as the artistic strategies of the works deliberately involved im-
ages from non-art archives, subcultures and media, often using the methods
of quotation and montage to highlight the social wounds of discrimination
and a lack of recognition for specific ethnic and sexual identities.
After decades when political struggle and subversion had been associated
with other things, above all equality before the law and access to education
and economic resources (from class struggle to feminism to the independence
struggles of former colonies) how did visual culture become a political battle-
ground? This question of a concept of culture as a political resource brings
us to the second development, beginning with the emergence of British cul-
tural studies. In a 1990 essay, Stuart Hall, who founded Birmingham’s Centre
for Contemporary Cultural Studies in the 1970s and became one of the most
important figures in the field, described how cultural studies formulated the
concept of “culture as a social problem and a political task” against the back-
ground of a British class-dominated society plunged into profound crisis by
the loss of empire.3 “For me, cultural studies really begins with the debate
about the nature of social and cultural change in post-war Britain.” (12) The
2 For an in-depth account, see Brian Wallis, Marianne Weems, Philip Yenawine (eds.),
Art Matters. How the Culture Wars Changed America (New York 1999).
3 Stuart Hall, “The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis of the Humanities”, in
October 53 (1990), 11-23.
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hierarchical structure of British society was shaped by traditional class struc-
tures which were now being shaken up by the new forces of mass culture
and consumerism. Previously, “culture” had been the highbrow culture of the
elites, only being considered culture if it stayed away from politics. In this
crisis, the representatives of highbrow culture reacted with pressure and a
restrictive, conservative definition of culture. There was increased insistence
on preserving canonical national cultural assets, and this extended to knowl-
edge policy in the humanities. In response, the New Left launched a debate
on a new concept of culture in which it was less a matter of definitions and
more about opening culture up to politics and sociality. What was new here
was precisely this linking of culture with socio-political structures and issues
– “the dirty outside world”, as Hall called it – an approach for which a theo-
retical basis had first to be created. “Contemporary cultural forms”, he wrote,
“did not constitute a serious object of contemplation in the academic world.”
(15)TheCentre for Cultural Studies therefore developed a strategy of “raids” on
other disciplines “in order to construct what we called cultural studies or cul-
tural theory”. (16) This was joined by reading matter “from traditions that had
had no real presence in English intellectual life” (16): since the 1960s, Gramsci,
Benjamin and the Frankfurt School had been translated into English, pub-
lished and discussed in the context of the New Left Review.
The key to Hall’s account is that this linking of the concept of culture with
politics was new in Britain at the time, resulting from upheavals in society
after 1945. A further decisive novelty was the appearance of new social sub-
jects in the ossified hierarchies of British society with the start of postcolonial
migration. This marked the beginning of the “postcolonial, posthegemonic
crisis” (17) which, according to Hall, still marked the late Thatcher era. It is
here that we must look for the basic factors influencing the question of how
culture was able to replace the previous key concepts in the political struggle:
access to legislative and economic power was replaced by cultural recognition.
Culture thus became a central arena of political battles, and the political was
understood as highly symbolic: following Levi-Strauss, culture was defined
as “the categories and frameworks in thought and language through which
different societies classified out their conditions of existence…”; the way these
categories are produced and transformed was conceived of by analogy with
language, as an operation of producing meaning, as “signifying practices”.4
4 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms”, in Media, Culture and Society 2, no. 1
(1980), 57-72: 65. I do not deal here with the two paradigms discussed by Hall, the cul-
96 Beyond the Mirror
These concepts from the theories of structuralist linguistics and anthropology
were to shape the interpretations of visual culture studies: here, too, the focus
is on the production of “meaning” by “signifying” as a practice which forms
both collective and individual identity constructions. Their medium consists
of (visual) representations which now move into the centre of the struggle for
political and societal recognition – and this not only and certainly not pri-
marily in (academic) theory, but eminently in the political practice of activist
groups since the late 1960s, including groups formed by artists. The best ex-
ample of this paradigm shift towards strategies of symbolic visibility is probably
the slogan of the Black Pride movement of the 1960s, “Black is beautiful”.
In 2001, the success of this signifying practice was summed up by some-
one in the fashion scene as follows: “I absolutely think people are embracing
the notion of ‘Black is beautiful’ – and I think we’re better able to embrace
it today than at any other time in this country. The ‘60s started the notion,
but today I think we are truly living it.”5 Since racism operates with visual
metaphors of colour, this paradigm shift which turns visibility into a resource
for social presence is an especially fitting political strategy. At this point poli-
tics and visual culture become intensely interconnected.Three terms are cen-
tral for a theoretical approach to this constellation of culture, visuality and
politics: identity, signifying practice, and representation. Of fundamental im-
portance to an in-depth understanding of concepts of visuality in visual cul-
ture studies is the concept of identity as it was discussed earlier in cultural
studies.
turalist and the structuralist. In the Anglo-American world, the structuralist approach
has dominated which, as Hall shows, helps to avoid the dangers of essentializing ten-
dencies. In German-language Bildwissenschaften, on the other hand, especially in Hans
Belting’s Bildanthropologie. Entwürfe für eine Bildwissenschaft (Munich 2001), the conse-
quences of culturalist essentialism are clear. See Hanne Loreck, “Bild-Andropologie?
Kritik einer Theorie des Visuellen” in Susanne von Falkenhausen, Silke Förschler, Inge-
borg Reichle, Bettina Uppenkamp (eds.), Medien der Kunst, 12-26, and von Falkenhau-
sen, “Verzwickte Verwandschaftsverhältnisse”.
5 Mikki Taylor, beauty director und cover editor of the magazine Essence, quoted in
Kendra Hamilton, “Embracing ‘BLACK IS BEAUTIFUL’ – African American involvement
in fashion industry, and consumer spending on apparel and beauty care products –
Statistical Data Included”, in Black Issues in Higher Education 17, no. 23 (2001).
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Identity as a cultural and political concept
In 1986, Jacqueline Rose, whose book Sexuality in the Field of Vision combined
feminist and psychoanalytical theory with visuality,6 built a bridge between
feminist approaches to identity as a political concept and psychoanalysis: “The
question of identity – how it is constituted and maintained – is … the cen-
tral issue through which psychoanalysis enters the political field. This is one
reason why Lacanian psychoanalysis came into English intellectual life, via Al-
thusser’s concept of ideology, through the two paths of feminism and the anal-
ysis of film.”7 The same year, she took part in a symposium at the Common-
wealth Institute in London that introduced a further difference/identity as a
position within the field of seeing: cultural identities.8 Theorists and filmmak-
ers came together to talk about the possibilities for political avant-garde film.
Cultural identity in the visual field was discussed in the context of tension be-
tween political activism and deconstruction. Films were shown by artists like
Trinh T. Minh-ha, Chris Marker, Isaac Julien and by groups like the Black Au-
dio Film Collective founded in 1982, that dealt with political and social aspects
of postcolonial life under Thatcher: the position of immigrants from former
British colonies and their hybrid identities as Black British citizens.9
The reader Identity. Community, Culture, Difference, edited by Jonathan
Rutherford, was published in 1990; Questions of Cultural Identity, edited by
Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, appeared in 1996 with an introduction by Hall
provocatively titled “Who needs ‘Identity’?”10 And in 2007, in his book After
Identity,Rutherford noted: “By entangling identity in market transactions and
6 See for example Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (Bloomin-
gton 1984), the first book on the subject, and Kaja Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror: The
Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema (Bloomington 1988).
7 Jacqueline Rose, “Feminism and the Psychic”, in Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London
1986), 1-25: 5.
8 Thepapers anddiscussions from the conferencewere published in a special issue of the
magazine Undercut (17/1988) and republished in Nina Danino, Michael Mazière (eds.),
The Undercut Reader: Critical Writings on Artists’ Film and Video (London 2003), 130-162.
9 I mention this here because reviews of the debates on race, class, sexual orientation,
and gender mostly centre on discussions in America; however, as has already become
clear concerning the genealogy of cultural studies, the postcolonial aspects of this de-
bate were particularly acute in the former British Empire, recast as the commonwealth
of sovereign states, in turn influencing debate in the United States.
10 JonathanRutherford (ed.), Identity: Community,Culture,Difference (London 1990); Stuart
Hall, Paul du Gay (eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity (London 1996).
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commodification, consumer culture has turned it against the individual.”11
This had already been stated in similar but far more political terms in 1992
by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who calls herself a “decolonized subconti-
nental”. In Acting Bits/Identity Talk, she discusses the identity politics of the
(de-)colonialized in terms of their complicity in current forms of imperial-
ism, prompted by the Gulf War: “Our own complicity in our production [of
identity] is another kind of translation of cultures, access to a ‘museumized’
identity, roots in aspic. … Identity as commodity.”12
Another book with After Identity in the title, a reader in law and culture
published in 1994, contains a passage which I find helpful in addressing the
history of the emancipatory concept of ‘identity’: “In what could be considered
the first stage of identity politics, individuals identified with general charac-
teristics such as race, gender, or national origin to contend that discrimina-
tory distinctions should not be made on the basis of those categories. The
early civil rights and women’s movements, for example, argued that African
Americans and women were entitled to the same rights as white men. As-
serting that there was no significant difference between blacks and whites
or between women and men, these movements aimed to achieve a system
by which skin color or sex did not determine one’s place in society. Subse-
quent movements rejected this paradigm of liberal pluralism on the ground
that its colorblind and sexblind mentality obscured real cultural and political
(and some even argued biological) differences between the groups. Some in-
dividuals and groups in a proliferating list of movements based on identity
began proudly to (re)assert, or perhaps reclaim, their identities – as African-
American, Asian-American, Latino or Native American, as female, as gay or
lesbian, as disabled, as working class and so forth.”13
The concept of identity as a collective definition thus derived from a form
of negative identification for the purposes of exclusion from rights such as the
right to vote. The early emancipatory movements then fought to neutralize
this negation before the law. From the outset (and this is overlooked in the
11 Jonathan Rutherford, After Identity (London 2007), 10. The same year, Georgia Warnke
published After Identity. Rethinking Race, Sex and Gender (Cambridge 2007), with a prag-
matic approach focused on multiple identities realized in the everyday life of an indi-
vidual, and the consequences for normative processes in society.
12 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Acting Bits/Identity Talk” in Critical Inquiry 18 (1992), 770-
803: 798.
13 Dan Danielsen, Karen Engle (ed.), After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture (London,
New York 1995), Introduction, xiv.
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legal overview quoted above) it was clear that the definition of these identities
– woman, “negro” – went far beyond the legal context, being culturally and
socially re-/produced.The problem of exclusion, then, could not be dealt with
by policies of equality alone. Researchers of stereotypes within women’s and
African-American studies since the 1970s were not the first to examine the
functioning of such reproduction and the impact of such definitions via visual
representation. As early as 1900, with his portrait albums Types of American
Negroes, the black scholar and civil rights campaigner W.E.B. Dubois tried to
counteract the negative image of African Americans. He did this not by taking
the stereotypes and trying to give them a positive spin, as in the aesthetic
of “black is beautiful” and “back to the roots” more than 60 years later, but
by clothing the image of the “negro” in the dress codes of the white middle-
classmale.14 Thevisual evidence of these “bourgeois” portraits was intended to
show that the “American Negro” had a self-evident claim to equal citizenship.
In its theoretical ramifications, the debate on identity as a cultural and
thus political concept since the 1970s has drawn above all on theories of dif-
ference and hybridity; I will focus here on the central problems that also make
themselves felt in visual representations of identity by both artists and activist
groups. The basic problem with deploying identity as the basis of a political
strategy lies in its imposition from outside, from where the power lies. Iden-
tity thus involves defining difference from groups of others for the purpose
of discrimination and exclusion based on criteria of race, class, sexual orien-
tation and gender. Identity in this sense is understood as immutable being,
mostly on a biological basis, to which social and cultural stereotypes accrue in
the course of history – or conversely: the historically formed stereotypes and
their exclusion have often been justified, since the end of the 19th century, in
biological terms. And in the 1960s and early 1970s, when the black liberation
and women’s movements, but also the gay and lesbian movement, picked up
these stereotypes and attempted to give them a positive value, using them
as representations to fight for recognition, opposition to this strategy soon
emerged within these movements. I remember from the women’s movement
of the mid-1970s being accused, as an intellectual, of having a “male” social-
ization.
14 See Shawn Michelle Smith, “Photographing the ‘American Negro’. Nation, Race, and
Photography at the Paris Exposition of 1900” in Lisa Bloom (ed.),With Other Eyes. Look-
ing at Race and Gender in Visual Culture (Minneapolis, London 1999), 58-87, in particular
72-78.
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Adopting the familiar stereotypes, even as an attempt to give them a pos-
itive turn, brought the associated exclusion into the groups concerned: those
who didn’t match the stereotype did not belong. Hall summarizes the prob-
lem in theoretical terms: “Precisely because identities are constructed within,
not outside discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific
historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and
practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within
the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of
the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identi-
cal, naturally-constituted unity – an ‘identity’ in its traditional meaning (that
is, an all-inclusive sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation). …
it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to
precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the
‘positive’ meaning of any term – and thus its ‘identity’ – can be constructed.
Throughout their careers, identities can function as points of identification
and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to ren-
der ‘outside’, abjected.”15 But belonging was the basic condition for political
effectiveness; individuals came together in groups via a shared identity. How,
then, were differences within groups to be dealt with?
Firstly, it was necessary to confront the normative power of the term, its
so-called essentialism – identity as destiny in the sense of an immutable be-
ing, based, for example, on biology.Thiswas achieved by examining identity in
theoretical terms as a cultural and social construction. Identity as destiny that
offered a feeling of unity and community was now faced with anti-essentialist
positions that conceived of identity as a formative process. The essential-
ism, unity and continuity that characterized modern identities (including the
hegemonic identities of nationality) were contrasted with the anti-essentialist
figures of discontinuity, construction/constructedness/deconstruction, plu-
rality, fluidity and hybridity. Behind these theoretical impulses stood Fou-
cault’s postmodern critique of the subject and Derrida’s theory of difference.
For the liberation movements of the time, these theoretical developments
brought a new dilemma: on the one hand, a theoretical revision of the en-
lightened humanist philosophy of emancipation, calling the concept of the
bourgeois, sovereign, self-identical subject into question; on the other, those
15 Hall, “Who Needs Identity?”, 4-5. He refers here to Jacques Derrida, Positions (Chicago
1981); Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London 1990); and
Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter (London 1993).
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groups to whom this status had to date been denied, also referred to in theo-
retical discourse as subaltern, campaigned to be recognized as “new” subjects
of history and to have a “voice”.16 The conflict between these positions led to
proposals like that of “strategic essentialism”17 as a way of legitimizing the
formation of identity-based groups and consciousness for a political prac-
tice of self-empowerment, even within the theoretical framework of radical
deconstruction. However, such strategic essentialism demanded a constant
awareness of the limitations and constructedness of the very identity that
was supposed to be the driving force behind the cohesion and political ac-
tivism of these groups – a psychodynamic balancing act both individual and
collective. Looking back, it seems to me that the concept of identity never lost
its fundamental stigma, its birth defect. Critiques of the concept of “identity
politics” began to appear around 1991(and this too is revealing in retrospect)
around the time of the Gulf War that reinvigorated the debate on postcolonial
imperialism, at a time when the discussion of multiculturalism was making
waves in the United States.18 The identity debate was thus a highly political
one, as highlighted by a critical comment by Judith Butler from 1992: “I don’t
believe that gender, race, or sexuality have to be identities, I think that they’re
vectors of power.”19
Back to visuality as a factor in identity-based strategies, and to the conflict
that exists between the strategies of Dubois and the Black liberation move-
ment. Although Dubois drew on a pseudoscientific discourse of race when he
spoke of “types”, his visual tactic produced positive evidence by trying to con-
stitute these “types” via the cultural codes of clothing, thus arguing for culture,
and specifically hegemonic culture, as a factor in identity: biologism crossed
16 An important contribution to this discussionwas Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Can the
Subaltern speak?” in Cary Nelson, Lawrence Grossberg (eds.),Marxism and the Interpre-
tation of Culture (Urbana 1988), 272-313.
17 Spivak speaks of the “strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously vis-
ible political interest” by subaltern subjects. As part of a “strategic interest in
the self-alienating displacing move of and by a consciousness of collectivity, …
self-determination and an unalienated self-consciousness can be broached.” From
“Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography”, in Spivak, In Other Worlds: Essays
in Cultural Politics (London, New York 1988), 197-221: 205). Her “strategic essentialism”
became a key concept of identity politics in the age of deconstruction.
18 See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., TheDisuniting of America: Reflections on aMulticultural Society
(New York 1992).
19 “The Body You Want: Liz Kotz interviews Judith Butler” in Artforum 31, no. 3 (1992), 82-
89.
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with cultural (hegemonic) identity as appropriation and process, which in
turn points to another serious conflict within his strategy. “Black is beauti-
ful,” on the other hand, together with the “back to the roots” movement, with
its insistence on, for example, the Afro as an appropriate, non-white hairstyle,
constitutes visibility in the field of white hegemony via an image of African-
ness for which Spivak’s biting remark on “‘museumized’ identity, roots in as-
pic” is apt. Conversely, this image could also fit into the category of strategic
essentialism, as developed by Spivak, as a group identity that supports sol-
idarity and activist energy in what is referred to abstractly as “Otherness”.
Once again here, the basic problem of identity politics becomes clear: ulti-
mately, there was no way out of the dilemma of the gap between negative
definition from outside and positive definition from within which is always
based on the original negative definition. This dilemma is not even resolved
by a potentially endless multiplication of minority identities based on crite-
ria of race, sexual orientation, and gender that would conflict with individual
processes of attribution.20 In the 1990s, a polemical version of such multiple
identities circulated in the debate on political correctness in the form of the
“black, Jewish, disabled lesbian”.
Since 1990, when Judith Butler published Gender Trouble: Feminism and the
Subversion of Identity,21 queer theory has sought to respond to the normative
structure of these processes of attribution with a variant of anti-essentialist
critique based on performativity. In art, this was reflected in a heightening
engagement with the social significance of identity-based visibility and its forms
of visual representation.
Political visuality: visibility as a contested resource
“Hardly a week has passed in the last two years without public attention be-
ing drawn to yet another battle over identity and culture.” This is how the
20 In 1991, to address this problem, KimberléW. Crenshaw proposed the concept of inter-
sectionality, which plays an important role in feminist and queer theory. See Kimberlé
W. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
against Women of Color”, Stanford Law Review 53, no. 6 (1991), 241-1299.
21 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London, New York
1990). For an introduction to queer theory, see Judith Butler, “Critically Queer”, in Paul
du Gay, Jessica Evans und Peter Redman (eds.), Identity: A Reader (London 2000), 108-
117.
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artist, activist and writer Coco Fusco began her text for the Whitney Bien-
nial catalogue in 1993, and she offers some examples: Who are we? asks Time
magazine. Whose values? asks Newsweek. Whose museums and whose aesthetics?
ask the artists and curators. Whose icons? ask the multicultural theorists and
activists. That sums up the situation quite well: the “ethnic makeup” of Amer-
ican society is changing colour, its basic tone becoming “increasingly non-
white”22 – a threat not only to the white right, but also to the liberal notion
of a universally valid culture of values which, in the eyes of the “subaltern
peoples”, too often merely cements western-white power.
In Europe, Fusco continues, these ideological struggles usually have a
geopolitical theme, whereas in the United States they focus on symbolic rep-
resentation. Not only access to political power, she claims, but also the con-
trol of subaltern communities over their symbolic representation is restricted
by the dominant culture. Systematic misrepresentation via stereotypes fuels
their “disempowerment”; it offers the starting point for an understanding of
“the racially inflected, voyeuristic impulses in Euro-American and other col-
onizing cultures”. In the case of appropriation, for example, a buzzword of
the postmodern art elite of the 1980s, this involved not just “disinterested
pastiche or tracing one’s creative bloodlines to Marcel Duchamp and Andy
Warhol”, but also, where non-western cultures and people were concerned,
“forms of appropriation as symbolic violence”. Fusco offers the following ex-
ample: in 1992, Chicana actresses protested against Hollywood plans not to
cast a Chicana actress in the role of Frida Kahlo in a film. 23
This example shows why the battle for symbolic representation is fought
not only, but primarily in the field of visibility. The defining and normative
power of (visual) media in the United States seems to far outstrip anything yet
seen in European societies. As a consequence, the activists of the gay and les-
bian, feminist and African-American groups, including many artists, who in
the 1980s fought for recognition (the feminist artists of the Guerrilla Girls, the
black artists of the PESTS group) and against AIDS (ACT UP), were tactically
correct to concentrate on culture and the media as their battleground. Their
protest actions criticized the relations between culture, art practice, commu-
nities and public space; for Fusco, they are “some of the most interactive pub-
22 Coco Fusco, “Passionate Irreverence: The Cultural Politics of Identity” in Elisabeth Suss-
man et al. (eds.),Whitney Biennial Exhibition (NewYork 1993), 74-85, reprinted inWallis,
Weems, Yenawine (eds.), Art Matters, 63-73: 63.
23 Fusco, “Passionate Irreverence”, 65-67.
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lic engagements with the media and the arts that have emerged in the past
decade. … merging activism with spectacle”.24
For Fusco, the conflict over an essentialist concept of identity and its cri-
tique via a processual, open-ended concept of identity is a problem reflected
strategically in a double objective: on the one hand, it is about the right to
self-determination of one’s “own” culture (this is especially true of ethnically
defined groups in the diaspora) and on the other it is about a hybridization
of these same cultures in the face of diverse, wandering influences and mi-
gration biographies. What is “one’s own” must be kept open and constantly
reshaped in order to integrate this hybridization – a balancing act of identity
construction. Fusco herself, who migrated from Cuba to the United States as
a child, tries to achieve this in her own work as an artist.
Looking back at the ACT UP protests, Mary Patten summed up as follows:
“But perhaps we need to examine more closely and critically our notions of
‘visibility’, a key political buzzword used by the lesbian/gay/bisexual/trans-
gendered (LGBT) communities. … ‘Visibility’ is posed as an inherent undiffer-
entiated good – even necessity – whether we’re debating our participation in
the political process, examining images/representations of queers or homo-
sexuality in the media and popular culture, or ‘discovering’ and ‘reclaiming’
literary or historic figures from the closets of the past. Only if we are collec-
tively visible, the argument goes – … will we have power and be regarded as
a force to be reckoned with in the larger culture.” The success of this strat-
egy has its price, however: “But we need to acknowledge that our heightened
visibility – even on our ‘own’ rebellious, seemingly autonomous terms – has
hastened the absorption of ‘queered’ representations into the mainstream.”
The hallmarks of queer identity, she writes, once “markers of rebellious sub-
cultures” are now “individual identity ornaments promising the fulfilment of
our desires”.25
24 Ibid., 68.
25 Mary Patten, “the thrill is gone: an act up post-mortem (confessions of a former aids
activist)”, in Deborah Bright (ed.), The Passionate Camera. Photography and the Bodies of
Desire (London 1998), 385-406: 398.
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The academic discourse of visuality
One of the two genealogical keys to visual culture studies is public visibility
of subaltern and subcultural identities, marked by symbolizations imposed
from without or claimed from within, understood as a strategy of subver-
sion and self-empowerment, and practised by artists and/or activists on the
streets, in the media and in the venues of alternative and established culture.
This agenda also entered the university as countless individual studies on vi-
sual culture indicate which already in the title refer to identity, be it regional
and national or relating to race, class, sexual orientation and gender.26 It is all
the more surprising that in the academic discourse of visual culture studies,
two texts from art history that I have already presented as classics are of-
ten mentioned in connection with the search for the “roots” of the discipline:
Baxandall’s Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy and Alpers’ The Art
of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century. In view of attempts by visual
culture studies to distance itself from art history, this is as astonishing as it
is understandable, as such distancing manoeuvres concern close neighbours.
Other often-cited “founding figures” are Warburg, Kracauer and Benjamin
for German-speaking cultural studies, Barthes for semiotics, British cultural
studies in general and specifically the “material culture” approach developed
at British polytechnics, where training in creative practice in the broadest
sense has been interdisciplinary since the 1970s.27
More important for the academic positioning of the discipline was the de-
bate about a revision of the western-rational model of seeing, mostly exem-
plified by the philosopher René Descartes.The historian of philosophy Martin
Jay called this model “Cartesian perspectivism”; in 1988, he opened a confer-
ence on Vision and Visuality at the DIA Art Foundation in New York with a con-
centrated summary of the debate and its prehistory. The conference brought
together five writers from philosophy, art theory and psychoanalysis; it was
followed by a publication of the same title that Jay later named as the mo-
ment “when the visual turn… really showed signs of turning into the academic
26 Of the veritable torrent of such publications, I will name just two examples here (more
are listed in Dikovitskaya, Visual Culture): James M. McClurken, The Way it Happened:
A Visual Culture History of the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa, East Lansing (Michigan
State UniversityMuseum 1991); GenDoy, Black Visual Culture–Modernity and Postmoder-
nity (London 2000).
27 Here I am following Morra, Smith, Visual Culture, Vol. 1, 12. See also Daniel Miller,Ma-
terial Culture and Mass Consumption (Oxford 1987).
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juggernaut it was to become in the 1990s”.28 In retrospect, Vision and Visual-
ity proves to be an exemplary “symptom” of the emergence of visual culture
studies as an academic discipline.
By this time “Cartesian perspectivism” had already become a key negative
metaphor in the poststructuralist critique of logocentrism. In psychoanalysis,
philosophy, media studies, cultural studies and art history (with one exam-
ple being Alpers’ Art of Description), perspective as an early-modern model of
seeing became the matrix of a western-rational, pseudo-humanist project of
enlightenment that used reason as a practice of power.This ‘project of moder-
nity’ was judged as failed, especially in view of the genocides of the 20th cen-
tury. In his book entitled Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth
Century Thought Jay explains this critique and centres it within the history of
French philosophy.29
The aim now was to break down the monolithic character of Cartesian
perspectivismwith the twin concepts of vision and visuality. On the one hand,
seeing (vision) was no longer conceived of (only) as a mechanically-physically
determined, predictable optical process, but (also) as socially and historically
determined and hence subject to change. On the other hand, visuality brought
a new concept into play, an umbrella term for all relations of seeing (and being
seen) concerning the social as well as body and mind.
One-point perspective as a metaphor for rationalist cultures
of power
What exactly are the accusations levelled at seeing as “the master sense of
the modern era”,30 at one-point perspective as the practice corresponding to
Cartesian perspectivism, at the theory on which it is based, and at the conse-
quences of all three for visual practices and cultures? In oversimplified terms,
28 Martin Jay, “Cultural Relativism and the Visual Turn” in Journal of Visual Culture 1, no. 3
(2002), 267-278: 267. On the conference, see Hal Foster (ed.), Vision and Visuality (Seat-
tle 1988). Those involved were Martin Jay, Jonathan Crary, Rosalind Krauss, Norman
Bryson and Jacqueline Rose.
29 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century Thought (Berke-
ley, Los Angeles 1993). I do not share Jay’s position on French post-structuralism; it
should be taken with a grain of salt, bearing in mind Jay’s roots in critical theory.
30 Martin Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity” in Foster, Vision and Visuality, 3-23: 3.
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here are some of the charges (some of which have, in the ever-growing liter-
ature on modern visuality since the 1990s, certainly degenerated into preju-
dice): central perspective is a gaze that makes a clear distinction between its
subject and its object; it is static and abstract, though pretending to be em-
pirically “true”; it implies absolute control of the subject over what is seen; it
is per se male (the usual example cited being Dürer’s Draughtsman Making a
Perspective Drawing of a Reclining Woman); it claims to give a consistent picture
of the world and to be scientifically reliable; of what is seen, it implies “this is
how it is”, claiming an objective truth for its representation. In brief terms,
it serves “metaphysical thought, empirical science, and capitalist logic all at
once”.31
The model of perspective as a way of viewing the world is seen as the
foundation on which the western, white, male, autonomous subject is con-
structed: “Certainly the entire discussion draws on analyses of the subject and
the image derived from poststructuralism and psychoanalysis; in fact, vision
is investigated as a structure instrumental to the (dis)placement of both these
terms.”32 The debate on identity also touched on critiques of the subject; and
the two debates meet up in visual culture studies: a specific gaze becomes a
metaphor for the hegemony of themodern, autonomous, white,male subject.
One strategy used by critics of Cartesian perspectivism is the search for al-
ternatives: examples named in Vision and Visuality are the cartographic gaze in
the Netherlands of the 17th century, the multi-perspective spatial order of the
Baroque, and the subject-less aesthetic of Japanese art. ButVision and Visuality
had already set itself the task of criticizing just such critiques of perspective:
the search for alternatives, it argued, led to new fixed oppositions, obscuring
the fact that in historical practice, themodel being criticized was anything but
consistent or ubiquitous.Divergent practices had always existed.This critique
of the search for alternatives as a way out of the constraints of perspectivism,
“whether these are to be located in the unconscious or the body, in the past
(e.g., the baroque) or in the non-West (e.g., Japan)”, aimed to avoid rendering
these differences uniform again, keeping them open, “so that different visual-
ities might be kept in play, and difference in vision might remain at work”.33
Vision and Visuality, then, is about the deconstruction of unitary concepts
of modern seeing, not the establishment of alternatives that fall victim to the
31 Hal Foster, “Preface” in Foster, Vision and Visuality, x.
32 Ibid., xiii.
33 Ibid., xiv.
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very thing they claim to criticize: the claim to universal validity. This conflict
recalls the above-mentioned dispute over the de-/construction of alternative
identities in the field of visibility: consolidate and secure via exclusion and ho-
mogenization, or open up and expose to permanent precariousness? To this
extent, the ideological and theoretical conditions for the two debates (on po-
litical identity and on perspective as hegemonic gaze) resemble one another.
The debate touches on other areas such as the implications for the disciplines
that deal with seeing. For Hal Foster, perspectivism is a concept on which
the discipline of art history is founded; hence this debate “is also allied with
a certain ‘anti-foundational’ critique, i.e. a critique of the historical concepts
posited by a discipline (e.g., art history, for instance) as its natural epistemo-
logical grounds (my italics).” In other words, by engaging with the historical
evolution of visuality, by introducing mental, sexual and gender-critical di-
mensions into its repertoire, and by developing a “semiological sensitivity to
the visual as a field of signs produced in difference and riven by desire”,34 art
history is touching on its epistemological foundations.
Jay is certainly right to seeVision andVisuality as a symptomof the academ-
ization of visual culture studies. But it is worth noting that the three art his-
torians involved, Norman Bryson, Rosalind Krauss and Jonathan Crary, did
not whole-heartedly defect to visual culture studies in the following decade
like other representatives of their discipline. One reason for this may be their
insistence on the special status of art as practice in contrast to the broad
field of the visual – an insistence that manifested itself several years later
in the much-quoted questionnaire on the relationship between art history
and visual culture studies, and in a similarly much-quoted article by Ros-
alind Krauss polemicizing against the loss of art-historical skills (deskilling).35
What was mainly at stake here, then, was the revision of art history as a dis-
cipline.The theoretical framework is, however, brought to the discipline from
“outside”: critiques of the subject from poststructuralism, psychoanalysis and
semiotics, applied to vision and visuality, not only touch on the epistemolog-
ical foundations of art history, but also produce new epistemes that visual
culture studies seeks to incorporate. At the same time, the debates on vision
and visuality really do feature many politically committed interests and posi-
tions pregnantwithmoral significance that were not previously at home in the
34 Ibid., xiii.
35 “Visual Culture Questionnaire” in October 77 (1996), 25-70; Krauss, “Tod der Fachkennt-
nisse”.
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field of traditional art history; the correspondingly interest-driven projections
associated with this from the outset, as well as the critiques and deconstruc-
tions of these projections, are also revealing, especially concerning questions
of seeing and visuality.
The first such projection is the generalization that defines perspective as
the modern scopic regime tout court. This basic assumption feeds into other
projections – that can also be referred to as interpretations. I use the term
projections because they set up an ideal opponent against which to argue; cri-
tiques of these projections can then be understood as deconstruction. One ex-
ample: the assumption of a single, immutable, fixed perspective sees itself
confirmed in a model of seeing which takes not two eyes but one, abstract
eye as the basis for its construction of space in two dimensions.This model is
critically deconstructed by assuming and researching a historically changing
diversity of models of seeing, that is via a historicization of visuality. In this
debate, Panofsky’s essay on perspective is thus considered a pioneering work.
Martin Jay’s discourse-historical introduction to Vision and Visuality com-
presses the critique of perspective into two pages (whereby it remains unclear
whether or not he recognizes its implications in terms of projection).36 In his
account, one-point perspective, described as a scopic regime, is the object of
several such projections. Firstly, the gaze of perspective is abstract, disem-
bodied37 and therefore cold (an anti-rationalist assessment) – the result is the
emotional withdrawal of the painter from the objects captured in this abstract
and thus cold, geometrized space. (But how, onemight ask, looking at a paint-
ing, are we supposed to know about this supposed withdrawal? This assump-
tion is, in other words, a projection.) Secondly, the participatory involvement
of previous “more absorptive visual modes” has been reduced, “if not entirely
suppressed”, because the gap between “spectator and spectacle” has grown.
(But, one might ask again, which visual modes before the Renaissance are
supposed to have been “more absorptive”? Medieval stained glass windows?
They had to be impressive as a visual event as a whole, but their sequencing
of tiny, highly encoded scenes can hardly have fostered participatory involve-
ment in the sense of identification). And thirdly, within the scopic regime of
36 Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity”, especially 8-9. The writer Jay mainly refers to for
these positions appears to be Norman Bryson, as well as Christian Metz, Rosalind E.
Krauss, Sarah Kofman, Svetlana Alpers, Rodolphe Gasché, Christine Buci-Glucksmann,
Irit Rogoff.
37 This criticism can essentially be traced back to Bryson’s Vision and Painting.
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one-point perspective the element of erotic desire in the gaze, as condemned,
for example, by St. Augustine, is lost because the bodies of painter and viewer
are eliminated from this regime in favour of an “allegedly disincarnated, abso-
lute eye” (Jay’s use of “allegedly” here is the only sign of his distancing himself
from these projections). Where this kind of disembodied, male gaze falls on
a desirable body, as in Dürer’s Draughtsman Making a Perspective Drawing of a
Reclining Woman, it objectifies this body and turns it to stone. Jay names ex-
ceptions: Titian’s Venus of Urbino and Caravaggio’s seductive boys avoid this
fate because they look at the viewer, as does, much later, Manet’s Olympia.
Here, if not earlier, confusion sets in. What does this looking out of the
picture have to do with one-point perspective? Does it counteract it? No – it
counteracts the projection of the divide between viewer and viewed allegedly
created by perspective as a scopic regime. And it promotes a further pro-
jection: according to Jay, nudes that do not look out at the viewer radiate
no erotic energy towards the viewer, meaning, conversely, that the figure’s
gaze at the viewer generates this energy. The opposite conclusion could also
be drawn here: if the eyes of the (mostly) female nude are averted, although
no dialogue ensues, the viewer absorbed in the act of seeing (if we follow
Diderot’s dramaturgy of empathy as discussed by Kemp) can give free reign
to his erotic imagination. In any case, Jay equates perspective representation
with de-eroticization. It wouldn’t take much effort to turn these analyses on
their heads: perspective aims to perfect mimesis, a goal produced by desire
itself – a desire that can be traced from photography and film through to the
latest achievements of imaging technology, always hand in hand with eroti-
cism.
On to the next projection: the scopic regime of perspective is to blame
not only for de-eroticization, but also for “de-narrativization or de-textualiza-
tion”. This is an astonishing conclusion,38 as just a few years earlier, inThe Art
of Describing, Alpers had proposed a different polarization – associating text
and narrative with the scopic regime of Italian one-point perspective which
was created to tell stories with close textual links, whereas de-narrativization
was associatedwith the empirically orientedmultiple-point approaches of de-
scriptive Dutch painting. From this charge, Jay then deduces that of formal-
ism: the painter is more interested in reproducing “abstract, quantitatively
conceptualized space” with the help of perspective construction than in the
“qualitatively differentiated subjects painted within it” – three-dimensional
38 Whether Jay shares this view or whether he is merely reporting it is not always clear.
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representation as an artistic end in itself. “Thus the abstraction of artistic
form from any substantive content, which is part of the clichéd history of
twentieth-century modernism, was already prepared by the perspectival rev-
olution five centuries earlier.”39 The realism effect of perspective, he continues,
also led to pictures being enriched with more and more information that had
nothing to do with the story being told, designed only to showcase the artist’s
technical virtuosity.40
For critics of Cartesian perspective, mathematically structured space as
reflected in perspective-based painting stands for the neutral researcher’s sci-
entifically dispassionate view of the world and for the “fundamentally bour-
geois ethic of the modern world”,41 thus elevating the critique of perspective
to the status of a political project – and this in vehement terms: perspective is
to be equated not with Alberti’s window, for example, but with a “safe let into
a wall, a safe in which the visible has been deposited”.42 This raises the ques-
tion of who knows the combination for the lock on this safe, the combination
needed to free the visible from the strictures of perspective’s scopic regime?
Jay then mentions some of the ‘emancipatory’ alternatives, including that of
the Baroque: anti-static, anti-classical, open, “soft-focused, multiple”.43 Jay
refers here to Christine Buci-Glucksmann, who suggests the “explosive power
of baroque vision … as the most significant alternative to the hegemonic vi-
sual style we have called Cartesian perspectivalism”.44 From an art-historical
viewpoint, this is an astounding conclusion, since this alternative to the hege-
monic visual style was in itself the expression of political hegemony: it was
39 Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity”, 8-9.
40 According to Jay, this idea, which surprisingly links the representational realism of per-
spective space with the charge of formalism levelled at the “content-free” abstraction
ofmodern painting, comes from Bryson: Norman Bryson,Word and Image: French Paint-
ing of the Ancien Régime (Cambridge 1981), Ch. 1. Like the polarization between realism
and formalism as contested during the 20th century, however, this anti-formalism has
a peculiarly moralizing tone.
41 Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity”, 9.
42 Here, Jay, ibid., is quoting John Berger,Ways of Seeing (London 1972), 109.
43 Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity”, 16.
44 Ibid.. See Christine Buci-Glucksmann, La raison baroque: de Baudelaire à Benjamin (Paris
1984) and La folie du voir: de esthétique baroque (Paris 1986). However, Foster’s above-
mentioned scepticismwith regard to what I consider to be the highly projective search
for alternatives shows that in the later 1980s, the discussion enters a new phase: from
thenon, it was impossible to attribute specificmodelswith the desired liberating effect.
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commissioned by absolutist monarchs and the counter-reformatory Catholic
church.
If we give this range of negative attributions a positive turn, the agenda
driving these projections becomes clearer. Twomain trajectories can be noted:
firstly, the bodymust be re-inscribed within the gaze – hence the accusations
concerning both the abstraction of the viewing subject and de-eroticization;
secondly, the power structures inherent in this gaze must be abolished – this
also applies to the power structures of gender relations as analysed above
all in feminist film theory and history of photography.45 This is where the
Lacanian model of the gaze enters the stage.
45 See, among others, Mulvey, Solomon-Godeau.
5. Visual Culture Studies’ Foundational Concept
The Gaze – Looking and Power
The model of the gaze
The model of the gaze is perhaps the most important gift from French
poststructuralism to those Anglo-American art historians who from the early
1980s were becoming increasingly discontented with the state of art history
as a discipline. Their aim was to fundamentally revise the discipline, or, as
Hal Foster put it in 1988, to critique perspectivism “as its natural epistemo-
logical grounds”. According to Foster, the disembodied, abstract eye of art
history needed to take on a “semiological sensitivity to the visual as a field
of signs produced in difference and riven by desire.”1 And this is where the
concept of the gaze came into play, introducing psychological, sexual and
gender-critical dimensions into the apparatus of art history. And then the
exact thing Foster had warned of in 1988 in Vision and Visuality happened:2 a
counter-model to one-point perspective was fielded and it became dominant
from 1990, although less so in art history than in visual culture studies. The
Lacanian concept, evolved from Sartre, provided the necessary theory. As
well as involving the body and the unconscious in the act of seeing, it also
addressed the relationship between seeing and signs. This concept, most
usually reduced to the term “mirror stage”, manifests itself primarily in
1 Hal Foster “Preface” in Foster (ed.), Vision and Visuality, xiii.
2 Foster, “Preface”, xiv.
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two texts: The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in
Psychoanalytic Experience3 and The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.4
Lacan’s model has become something akin to a founding theorem of vi-
sual culture studies. It is responsible (and provides academic legitimacy) for
the above-described political agenda of visibility as a strategy and badge of
social recognition. This already points to what I will deal with in more de-
tail later: as received within visual culture studies, Lacan’s model of the gaze,
which conceives of subjective identity as an illusion, becomes amodel forming
the basis for the recognition and hence the affirmation of the identity of the
subject. I begin by offering a brief prehistory of this model.
Sartre: being-looked-at
The story begins with Sartre, but it could be traced back further to the early
days of western philosophy, as Martin Jay does in his history of the denigra-
tion of vision in 20th-century French thought.5 Being andNothingness contains
the famous scene in which Sartre explains his model using the example of the
voyeur. While looking through a keyhole, he is caught by someone else’s gaze:
“I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me!”6 The result is shame
and a sensation of being-as-object for the Other. More critically, he now sees
himself because someone else sees him. The gaze of the other alienates him
from himself and takes away his freedom. This gaze does not have to be an
actual look; aware of being looked at, the subject becomes aware of itself – and
alien to itself. Moreover, “the alienation of myself, which is the act of being-
looked-at, involves at once the alienation of the world which I organize.”7 This
gaze, then, is threatening to the subject precisely in its subject-founding qual-
ity; it cannot be returned, it must be repaid in kind so as to avoid becoming
3 Jacques Lacan, “Le Stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je: telle qu'elle nous
est révélée dans l’expérience psychanalytique” in Revue française de psychanalyse 13, no. 4
(1949), 449-455. English translation in Écrits, Vol.1 (New York 2006), 75-80. On the com-
plicated publication history, see Jane Gallop, “Lacan’s Mirror Stage: Where to Begin” in
SubStance 37+38 (1983), 118-128.
4 Jacques Lacan, Seminar, Vol XI (1964), in English, The Seminar, Book XI: The Four Funda-
mental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (New York 1998).
5 Jay, Downcast Eyes.
6 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York/London 2003), 284.
7 Ibid., 287.
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an object oneself. A dialogical encounter of gazes between human individu-
als is impossible, replaced by a “hostile contest of wills between competing
subjects”.8 This threatening feeling of being looked at resembles the always-
already-looked-at subject in Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts (discussed be-
low under the heading “Gaze, Screen, Identity”).
Lacan: the mirror stage
Sartre began work on Being andNothingness in 1939, publishing it in 1943.Three
years previously, Jacques Lacan had given his lecture on the mirror stage that
was published in 1949 in reworked form under the titleTheMirror Stage as For-
mative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience, going on to
make waves, decades later, first in film theory and then in visual culture stud-
ies. In the phase referred to by Lacan as themirror stage, the child reacts to its
own image in the mirror. Samuel Weber offers a concise outline: “The mirror
stage described by Lacan can be briefly summarized as follows: between the
ages of six and eighteen months a child displays a reaction to its mirror im-
age that strikingly distinguishes it from other creatures such as chimpanzees.
The chimpanzee loses interest in its mirror-image as soon as it recognizes it
to be an image; a child, on the contrary, displays a jubilant reaction when it
recognizes its own reflection. From this jubilant acknowledgement of one’s
mirror-image, Lacan does nothing less than to derive the constitution – and
above all: the destiny – of the ego. At this point in time, the child is not yet in
control of its body and finds itself in a state of total helplessness and depen-
dency. This situation is an effect of the ‘premature’ birth peculiar to human
beings, a consequence of which is that visual perception is much more highly
developed than the motor function. A human being is thus able at a much
earlier stage to perceive the unity of an image than it is to produce this unity
in its own body.The look of another human being, be it the mother, nanny, or
even one’s own mirror-image, becomes thematrix of a sense of unity, identity
and continuity which the child’s bodily existence is incapable of providing. …
The jubilant reaction of a child that has recognized its mirror image is a sign
not of the recognition of the subject’s identity but of its constitution.”9
8 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 287.
9 Samuel Weber, Return to Freud. Jacques Lacan’s Dislocation of Psychoanalysis (Cambridge
1991), 12-13. Originally published in German as Rückkehr zu Freud (Frankfurt 1978). Mi-
nor alterations made to published translation, NG.
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According to Lacan, the child reacts “in a flutter of jubilant activity” be-
cause it wishes to “take in an instantaneous view of the image in order to
fix it in his mind”. This activity “reveals both a libidinal dynamism … and an
ontological structure of the human world that fits in with my reflections on
paranoiac knowledge. It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this con-
text as an identification, in the full sense analysis gives to the term: namely,
the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes [assume]
an image. […] The jubilant assumption [assomption] of his specular image by
the kind of being—still trapped in his motor impotence and nursling depen-
dence—the little man is at the infans stage thus seems to me to manifest in an
exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated into
a primordial form, prior to being objectified in its function as subject. […]
But the important point is that this form situates the agency known as the
ego, prior to its social determination, in a fictional direction that will forever
remain irreducible for any single individual or, rather, that will only asymp-
totically approach the subject’s becoming, no matter how successful the di-
alectical syntheses by which he must resolve, as I, his discordance with his
own reality.”10
Reception of the mirror stage in film studies and later in visual culture
studies centres on the mirror that shows the baby an image with which it
identifies. The mirror becomes a metaphor for the relationship between sub-
ject and society, as well as being equated with the visual media under dis-
cussion, such as the film screen. In visual culture studies, this model came
to be read as an affirmation of the subject: the mirror becomes a self-image
to whose visibility within society the subject has a right. Not only does the
subject feel him/herself to be represented by this image, this actually is the
case. It is worth noting, however, that although the mirror offers the baby a
jubilant self-image that glosses over its “motor impotence”, the baby identi-
fies with a fiction, resulting in a lifelong struggle with the discrepancy between
this triumphant fiction and its actual reality, creating a feeling of inadequacy.
This is the starting point for my critique of the identity model of affirmative
representation on which the political agenda of visual culture studies is based
– more on which later.
With the mirror stage, parallels between Lacan and Sartre are already ap-
parent: both use visual metaphors to show that ego identity is an illusory
10 Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I”, 76.
5. Visual Culture Studies’ Foundational Concept 117
representation. The proximity between Lacan’s approach and Sartre’s being-
looked-at becomes clearer still in Lacan’s later model of a gaze that is often
conflated with the mirror stage. Weber thus introduces the gaze of an other,
“the mother, nanny, or even one’s own mirror-image”, that is not (yet) men-
tioned in The Mirror Stage, that becomes the “matrix” of the child’s “sense of
unity, identity and continuity”. Here, then, a third party is involved – appear-
ing in Lacan’s text not as someone looking but only as a person or device
(the French trotte-bébé) that supports and surrounds the infant that cannot yet
walk or stand.Weber thus integrates the gaze of the Other into the mirror stage
– something that takes a central position in Lacan’s later model of the gaze
from the 1960s. Here is the often-cited passage that incorporates the gaze of
the other into the mirror stage: “For the Other where discourse is situated,
which is always latent in the triangulation that consecrates this distance, is
not latent as long as it extends all the way to the purest moment of the spec-
tacular relation: to the gesture by which the child at the mirror turns toward
the person who is carrying him and appeals with a look to this witness.”11 The
fundamental fragility of the ego function achieved by looking in the mirror is
underlined again when Weber makes the gaze of this other overlap with the
gaze of “one’s own mirror-image”: Is the figure in the mirror I or an Other?
Gaze, screen, identity – Lacan in film studies and visual culture studies
Themirror stage is still relatively simple in structure;12 and, according toMar-
garet Iversen and Stephen Melville, it was mainly to the mirror stage that
models of the gaze in the film theory of the 1970s and ‘80s referred.13 But
two metaphors that were to be important for film studies and later visual
culture studies come from the Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, a
11 Jacques Lacan, “Remarque sur le rapport deDaniel Lagache: Psychoanalyse et structure
de la personnalité” in Lacan, Écrits (Paris 1966), 647-684: 678. In English, “Remarks on
Daniel Lagache’s Presentation: Psychanalysis and personality Structure” in Écrits, 543-
574: 568.
12 It was based on experiments conducted by the psychologist Henri Wallon to compare
the reactions of animals and human infants to their image in themirror. See Jay,Down-
cast Eyes, 343.
13 Margaret Iversen, StephenMelville,WritingArtHistory.DisciplinaryDepartures (Chicago
2010), 119. On film theory, see above all Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative
Cinema” in Screen 16, no. 3 (1975), 6-18; Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier. Psycho-
analysis and Cinema (London, Bloomington, 1982).
118 Beyond the Mirror
long, highly complex work published three decades later; Jacqueline Rose and
Kaja Silverman in particular engaged intensively with the Four Fundamental
Concepts.14 The theoretical fabric woven by Lacan here is highly complicated
and his use of meandering chains of association and metaphor to avoid clar-
ity does not make things any easier. Interpretations of Lacan are marked by
the temptations or projection traps laid by his metaphorical language. This is
especially true of gaze and screen, twometaphors that seem to invite direct ap-
plication to the concepts and media of the disciplines under discussion here
– the extent to which this was a matter of projection will become clear below.
Lacan’s famous diagram of interlocking triangles illustrates the re-
lationship between “the gaze”, “the subject of representation” and the
“image/screen”.15
 
The screen (écran in French) forms the vertical line that links the intersec-
tions of the two triangles. Each triangle’s point bisects the other’s base, la-
belled “the gaze” and “the subject of representation”. This diagram shows the
interlocking of seeing and being seen, thus displaying parallels with Sartre’s
model of being-looked-at.16 But however simple this diagrammay appear, the
possible interpretations are unlimited. I associate the vertical line between
the two points/layers of gaze and subject with the figure of a filter that sieves
the information passing between these two points (gaze and subject), thus
“formatting” it, to use a metaphor from the digital realm.
14 In Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London 1986) Jacqueline Rose offers an immensely
precise and intensive analysis of Lacan’s models of the gaze in connection with film
theory, especially in the book’s second section under the heading “The Imaginary” (167-
197). See also Kaja Silverman,Male Subjectivity at theMargins (New York, London 1992).
15 To be found in Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 106.
16 On these parallels, but also on Lacan’s critique of Sartre’s notion of an autonomy of the
subject, see Jay, Downcast Eyes, especially chapter 6.
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Now for the explanatory descriptions of the diagram’s elements:17 “Images
are a result of projection. This is especially true of the images to which Lacan
attributes a role in the genesis of the subject. These include the prototype of
the Lacanian concept of the image, the mirror-image (l’image speculaire)”18
with which the baby reassures itself of its own body in the mirror stage. Ac-
cording to Lacan, this “emerging subject” (that cannot yet speak) is subject
to the “predominance of the visual”.19 In the diagram, image and screen lie
on the same line, leading to many interpretations where they are equated
with one another. “The image as screen frames the subject’s perception. In a
first approximation, it can be seen as the basis of cultural standards that al-
lows individual experience to become understandable. […] The screen points
to the Other, allows access to the discourse of the Other, and thus to the un-
conscious.”20 For Lacan, image and screen are “sites of an immobilization” of
memory, but the screen is also “the site of mediation [between subject and
world]. It serves to overcome an innate solipsism by offering a path to inter-
subjectivity.”21 But like the image, the screen is subject to Lacan’s anti-ocular
verdict: “An image always blocks the truth.”22
Beginning in the 1970s, it was film studies that received and transformed
Lacan’s models of the gaze in a way that significantly aided their transfer into
visual culture studies, in particular in the form of apparatus theory that re-
lates the setting of the cinema to Lacan’s mirror stage and connects it with
Althusser’s concept of ideology. “During this period, the cinema appeared as
the place to illustrate the ideological construction of the subject”, as Marie-
Luise Angerer remarks.23 In Fassbinder and Lacan: A Reconsideration of Gaze, Look,
and Image,24 Kaja Silverman, whose analyses are a frequent point of reference
17 I have based my brief outline of the theoretical network established by Lacan around
the gaze on the remarks of the Lacanian psychoanalyst Ulrike Kadi: Ulrike Kadi: “‘…
Nicht so einen geordneten Blick’. Bild, Schirm und drittes Auge” in Claudia Blümle, An-
ne von der Heiden (ed.), Blickzähmung und Augentäuschung. Zu Jacques Lacans Bildtheorie
(Berlin, Zurich 2005), 249-264.
18 Kadi, 253.
19 Ibid., 254.
20 Ibid., 256/257.
21 Ibid., 259.
22 “Une image bloque toujours la vérité.” Jacques Lacan, “YaleUniversity: Kanzer Seminar”
in Scilicet 6+7 (1975), 7-37: 22.
23 Marie-Luise Angerer, Desire After Affect (London, New York, 2015), 5.
24 Kaja Silverman, “Fassbinder and Lacan: A Reconsideration of Gaze, Look, and Image,”
in Silverman,Male Subjectivity at theMargins (New York, London 1992), 125-156, slightly
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in the reception of Lacan in film studies, links the concept of identity (cen-
tral to the agenda of visual culture studies) with the gaze in specifically filmic
terms. In the mirror stage, she argues, Lacan highlights the significance of in-
ternalizing things external to the subject in the process of identity formation,
first in the guise of a mirror image, then in the form of parental imagoes,
and later still “in the shape of a whole range of cultural representations, the
moi becoming over timemore andmore explicitly dependent upon that which
might be said to be ‘alien’ or ‘other’. What Lacan designates as the ‘gaze’ also
manifests itself initially within a space external to the subject, first through
the mother’s look as it facilitates the ‘join’ of infant and mirror image [the
same moment referred to by Weber in his account], and later through all of
the many other actual looks with which it is confused. It is only at a second
remove that the subject might be said to assume responsibility for ‘operating’
the gaze by ‘seeing’ itself being seen, even when no pair of eyes are trained
upon it – by taking not so much the gaze as its effects within the self.”25
Here, then, identity is the internalization of the external gaze, with the
gaze taking on a relatively specific formulation as the gaze of the other. In
Silverman’s model, the screen is responsible for filtering the “whole range of
cultural representations” with which the subject is confronted after its entry
into language.Thismodel of the screen is important for the reception of Lacan
in visual culture studies.
By focusing on the identity-fixing internalization of the gaze in this way,
Silverman obscures the flipside – the destabilizing effect of the gaze on this
same identity. In The Threshold of the Visible World (1996), she goes further still
in this positive recasting of the gaze in the context of what Mieke Bal calls
her utopian project of an “ethics of vision” – utopian in its desire to find a
dimension of love in the narcissistic constellation of Lacan’s gaze, in order to
postulate utopian potential for visual representations such as those of film
reworked version published in Norman Bryson, Michael AnnHolly, KeithMoxey (eds.),
Visual Culture – Images and Interpretations (Hanover, London 1994), 273-301, on the La-
canian model of the gaze see in particular 286-294. I refer in the following to the 1994
version, as it appeared in the context of the debate on visual culture. In terms of cul-
tural images of identities, Silverman’s focus shares the horizon of visual culture studies
to a different extent than the earlier texts by Rose that respond to the poststructuralist
and feminist debates on film.
25 Silverman, “Fassbinder and Lacan”. Here Silverman links Lacan’s earlyMirror Stagewith
his later Four Fundamental Concepts.
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and photography.26 This has consequences for Silverman’s rewritings of the
screen, which are now even more specifically linked to its analogy with the
film projection screen. The screen renders culturally determined images and
ideal images visible to the gaze, enabling the subject to read them, and in
its media structure, film is “almost an embodiment – at least a metaphor –
of the screen”.27 The film as screen is now the site for Silverman’s utopia of
the gaze. Bal welcomes this clarification of the screen as a utopian rework-
ing of Lacan: “For a feminist film theory that wishes to move beyond the cri-
tique of what is damaging in dominant culture, that wishes to understand
how film works and how effects other than the usual ones can be achieved,
the screen is the workshop or arena or stadium in the middle of the visual
field.”28 But this analogizing of the screen with the film projection screen,
the founding trope of psychoanalytical film theory since Christian Metz’s Psy-
choanalysis and Cinema. The Imaginary Signifier,29 was also criticized, in partic-
ular by Anglo-American feminist film theorists, including Mary Ann Doane
in 1980 and Joan Copjec in 1989.30 Doane criticizes the analogizing of mirror
stage and cinema in Metz: because the movie does not show a mirror image,
Metz concludes that the spectator identifies with his own gaze and thus with
the camera. Doane criticizes this notion of identification on the part of the
spectator subject on the grounds that it implies a coherence of the gaze in
the sense of a “guarantee of the untroubled centrality and unity of the sub-
ject”.31 But this, she points out, no longer corresponds with Lacanian theory.
Copjec, too, criticizes film theory for analogizing the screen (in this case the
cinema projection screen as well as the Lacanian écran) and the mirror of the
mirror stage, thus founding its conception of the cinematic apparatus on a
misunderstanding of Lacan. The critique levelled by Doane and Copjec ba-
sically concerns a tendency to take Lacan’s metaphors of the gaze literally,32
26 Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World. Cf. Mieke Bal, “Looking at Love. An Ethics
of Vision” in Diacritics 27, no. 1 (1997), 59-72.
27 Bal, “Looking at Love”, 65.
28 Ibid.
29 Originally published in Paris in 1977 as Le signifiant imaginaire. Psychanalyse et cinéma.
30 See Mary Ann Doane, “Misrecognition and Identity” in cine-tracts 3, no. 3 (1980), 25-32;
Joan Copjec, “The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of Lacan” in
October 49 (1989), 53-71.
31 Mary Ann Doane, “Misrecognition and Identity”, 27-28.
32 The urge to over-clarify not only Lacan’s linguisticmetaphors but also his use of images
and diagrams has also been remarked on by Claudia Blümle and Anne von der Heiden,
who write that he seduces the reader “into wanting to understand him in strictly sys-
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thus rendering them one-dimensional. In contrast, Doane and Copjec wish to
preserve the complexity and unsettling potential of Lacanian theory, in par-
ticular for film theory. Silverman goes beyond a critique and tries to rewrite
Lacan’s models of the gaze for her utopia of a positive identification of the
subject.
To sum up, there are two contrary effects of the gaze on the “function of
the I”: on the one hand, the attempt to internalize the gaze to achieve “the
agency known as the ego”, and on the other a threatening quality, an aware-
ness of lack. These contrary effects are given very different weightings in re-
ception, especially with regard to visuality as a factor in identity. As will be
seen later, the way visual culture studies have taken up the Lacanian model
of the gaze is indebted to its one-dimensional reception by film studies in so
far as it, too, tends to take Lacan’s metaphors of the gaze literally. The reason
for this may well be the political agenda of visual culture studies with regard
to identity politics. Identities cannot be affirmed and reassured through an
awareness of lack in the subject; on the contrary, the strategy of identity poli-
tics needs to reinforce the “agency known as the ego”.The critique articulated
by Doane and Copjec in the decade before visual culture studies was estab-
lished could also be levelled against the new discipline’s version of the gaze.
The threatened subject – Norman Bryson
One of the first to introduce Lacan’s model into art history, mainly via his
readings of film theory in the 1980s, was the literary theorist Norman Bryson,
who was also involved in the academic establishment of visual culture studies
at universities in the United States and who features in Vision and Visuality
with his essay “The Gaze in the Expanded Field”.33 This and one other text
by Bryson, his introduction to the anthology Calligram. Essays in New Art His-
tory from France,34 deal with the model of the gaze, and they can also be read
tematic terms, but this is constantly thwarted by his discourse”. Claudia Blümle, Anne
von der Heiden (eds.), Blickzähmung und Augentäuschung. Zu Jacques Lacans Bildtheorie
(Berlin, Zurich 2005), 10.
33 Norman Bryson, “The Gaze in the Expanded Field” in Foster, Vision and Visuality, 87-108.
34 Norman Bryson, “Introduction” in Norman Bryson (ed.), Calligram. Essays in New Art
History from France (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne 1988), xiii-xxix. In this volume,
Bryson published essays not by art historians but by French poststructuralist theorists
like Julia Kristeva,Michel Serres, RolandBarthes, JeanBaudrillard andMichel Foucault,
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as a deliberate effort to make this model appeal to his colleagues in art his-
tory.These texts are rhetorical feats designed irrefutably to show the heuristic
benefit of the model for art history, a discipline Bryson claimed had grown
tired; in terms of a history of discourse, I see them occupying a position at
the interface of art history and visual culture studies.
A little detective work shows that in his first book,Word and Image. French
Painting of the AncienRégime (1981), the literary scholar Bryson referred to seeing
as looking, discussing it in connection with gender.35 Two years later, in Vision
and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze,36 he tried to bring seeing and sign together
through his reception of Lacan’s model of the gaze. His aim was to create a
theoretical basis for the assumption of textual structures for the field of the
visual, thus radically altering the foundations of art-historical interpretation.
In his texts for Vision and Visuality and Calligram, both published in 1988, these
positions were further radicalized and focused.
InTheGaze in the Expanded Field,Bryson’s programmatic point of departure
is the “radical decentering of the subject”.37 This leads logically to a dethron-
ing of perspective as a model which constructs seeing from the position of a
subject that forms the centre of the world.This “self as focus of its visual king-
dom”38 and one-point perspective belong together, and both must therefore
be rethought. According to Bryson, Sartre and Lacan, too, were influenced by
this model. A “residual centering upon the standpoint of the subject”39 can be
detected, he argues, in the way they conceived of seeing as being threatened,
grouped under the label of “New Art History” with Louis Marin, Jean-Claude Leben-
sztejn and Yves Bonnefois (whowere art historians, but not exclusively) on the grounds
that “recent innovation has taken place extra-territorially”. (ibid., xii).
35 For Fragonard’s The Swing, he (rather mechanically) borrows the feminist model from
Laura Mulvey’s famous essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975): “Within a
‘heterosexual’ optic where specialised functions are assigned to each sex, pleasure in
looking is broken between active (male) and passive (female).” Bryson, Word and Im-
age, 98. Cf. Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”. In her model of the gaze,
Mulvey refers to Freud’s concept of scopophilia, combining it with Lacan’s model of
“The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function”; she uses the term looking; gaze only
appears as a generalizing noun (“the male gaze”) corresponding to its character as a
theoretical model that does not refer to the factual activity of individual seeing. Mul-
vey’s essay broke new ground in two ways: it made seeing a matter of (patriarchal)
power, and it offered a psychoanalytical model for this.
36 Bryson, Vision and Painting.
37 Bryson, “The Gaze”, S. 87.
38 Ibid., 88.
39 Ibid.
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even persecuted, at this centre (the site of the subject) by the gaze. Here we
find a first vagueness in Bryson’s formulation that renders seeing and the sub-
ject indistinct because what is under threat and what is decentred by the gaze
of an (imagined) outside is primarily the subject. In The Gaze in the Expanded
Field, Bryson proposes a radical alternative model. It is taken from the culture
of Japan, from the religious philosophers of the Kyoto School who combined
eastern concepts of the void and the non-ego with European existentialism.40
And, compared to Lacan, it represents a “muchmore thoroughgoing displace-
ment of the subject in the field of vision”.41 As a theoretical strategy, this ap-
proach is strange: Lacan’s thinking (and that of other poststructuralist theo-
rists like Foucault) did involve a critique of the humanist model of the subject,
but in spite of this (or precisely because of this) there can be no question of
the subject having the alternative of simply leaving its symbolic order and lan-
guage.This seems to be Bryson’s wish, however, when he replaces the western
model with one from an entirely different culture, thus attempting to shake
off the “paranoid” Lacanian construct of the gaze42 and its threat to the ego.
Let us take a brief look at Bryson’s account of Lacan’s model of the gaze,43
which he contrasts starkly in its threat to the I with the positive example of
the Japanese model. According to Bryson, in Lacan – unlike in Sartre – it is
not the gaze of the other that thwarts and threatens the autonomy of the sub-
ject in the visual field, but “the irruption, in the visual field, of the Signifier.
When I look, what I see is not simply light but intelligible form: the rays of
light are caught in a rets, a network of meanings.”44 As such, seeing is so-
cialized: “For human beings collectively to orchestrate their visual experience
together it is required that each submit his or her retinal experience to the
socially agreed description(s) of an intelligible world.” Deviations from this
40 See Bret W. Davis, “The Kyoto School”, especially paragraph 3.7: “The ‘Self that is not a
Self’ and the Nothingness of Radical Subjectivity” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
first published Feb 27, 2006; substantive revision May 6, 2010 (http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/kyoto-school/, accessed 26 Sept 2016).
41 Bryson, “The Gaze”, 88.
42 See Jacqueline Rose’s contribution to the discussion of his text, in which Rosalind
Krauss, Martin Jay and Jonathan Crary also took part. In Foster (ed.), Vision and Visu-
ality, 109-113.
43 Beyond Bryson’s, one of the most accessible accounts of this confusing model is Kaja
Silverman’s essay “Fassbinder and Lacan”.
44 Bryson, “The Gaze”, 91.
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“social construction of visual reality” can be measured and named as disrup-
tions.45 Here, a concept comes into play that was to take a central place in
theoretical debates surrounding visual culture: visuality. “Between the sub-
ject and the world is inserted the entire sum of discourses which make up
visuality, that cultural construct, and make visuality different from vision,
the notion of unmediated visual experience.” Bryson gives another descrip-
tion of this visuality in Lacanian terms, in particular the screen that stands
between the subject/retina and the world: “Between retina and world is in-
serted a screen of signs, a screen consisting of all the multiple discourses on
vision built into the social arena.”46 Hans Holbein’s paintingTheAmbassadors47
with the anamorphically distorted skull in the foreground becomes Bryson’s
example for the effect of this screen: the seeing subject (by which he means
the viewer who cannot identify the skull as such from the usual position in
front of the picture dictated by one-point perspective, but only by viewing the
painting at an angle while standing to the right of the frame) is as little the
centre of its visual experience as it is the centre of its speaking. This screen,
a central concept in the film theory of those years, introduces the sign into
the visual field, supplying the tool for semiological interpretations.48 With
this approach, which uses Lacan’s linking of semiotics and psychoanalysis,
thinking about seeing can now be freed from the inadequacies of perceptu-
alist definitions that understand the image only as a perfect reproduction of
the perception of a prior reality.
Bryson used this, for example, as the basis for his attack in Vision and
Painting on Ernst Gombrich’s “mimetic doctrine”,49 contrasting the view of
painting as the replication of a perception of external reality, that takes place
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 92.
47 1533, National Gallery, London. See Jacques Lacan, “Anamorphosis” in The Four Funda-
mental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 79-90. Many writers have discussed Lacan’s reference
to Holbein for his model of situating the subject in the visual field; to mention just
two from art history: Hubert Damisch, L’origine de la perspective (Paris 1987); Tom Con-
ley, “TheWit of the Letter: Holbein’s Lacan” in Teresa Brennan, Martin Jay (eds.), Vision
in Context. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Sight (New York 1996), 47-61.
48 Seminal books in the fields of film theory, semiotics and feminist theory have been
written by the theorists Kaja Silverman (until 1988, especially: The Subject of Semiotics,
1983, and The Acoustic Mirror, 1988) and Teresa de Lauretis (until 1988, especially: Tech-
nologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction, 1987, and Alice Doesn’t: Feminism,
Semiotics, Cinema, 1984), neither of whom is mentioned by Bryson.
49 Bryson, Vision and Painting, 50.
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independently of social and cultural contexts, with the character of the im-
age as a sign. In other words: for Bryson, the entry of the social (and thus of
meaning) into the picture and its interpretation is only possible via the as-
sumption of the image as a sign.50 Ultimately, Bryson equates the physical
picture with the Lacanian screen. He takes Lacan’smetaphor of the screen lit-
erally.51 A strangely retrogressive consequence of this kind of transfer is that
by equating it with the Lacanian screen, the picture/painting is fixed to the
model of one-point perspective that imagines the picture as a section through
this perspective – the model of painting as an Albertian window.52 With this
literal transfer, then, art is taken back to the very model of perception that
Bryson criticizes so vehemently in Vision and Painting: Gombrich’s perspec-
tivism. More problematic, however, is another consequence of this position.
The concrete object of interpretation disappears for the interpreting subject
in themirroring function of the screen. In this way, a strangely paradoxical ef-
fect occurs: the viewer/subject who in the Lacanian model is not autonomous
(and this aspect is crucial to the critical force of this model) re-autonomizes
itself from the outside world in a kind of narcissistic circular reasoning.
Before outlining the Japanese alternative, Bryson again summarizes the
threatening consequences of the Lacanian model of the gaze: “the viewing
subject does not stand at the center of a perceptual horizon, and cannot com-
mand the chains and series of signifiers passing across the visual domain.
Vision unfolds to the side of, in tangent to, the field of the other. And to that
form of seeing Lacan gives a name: seeing on the field of the other, seeing
under the Gaze.”53 Under the gaze of the other as the social field (unlike in
the model of one-point perspective, which in this theoretical context is also
identified with the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum”), the subject is not the centre
of its field of vision, fittingly referred to here as the “visual domain”. At this
50 On its publication, the books was criticized, among others, for over-simplifying Gom-
brich’s position. See David Ebitz, “Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze by Norman
Bryson” in TheArtBulletin (69:1, 1987), 155-158; AlexPotts, “DifficultMeanings.Visionand
Painting: The Logic of the Gaze by Norman Bryson” in The Burlington Magazine (129:1006,
1987), 29-32.
51 This problem with the treatment of Lacan’s theoretical language is familiar from the
much-practised and much-criticized identification of Lacan’s phallus-metaphor with
the actual, physical penis.
52 Lacan himself reinforced this, however, since his example of anamorphosis inHolbein’s
The Ambassadors reads a deviation from this model as a symptom, thus confirming the
normativity of one-point perspective beyond the historical evolution of scopic regimes.
53 Bryson, “The Gaze”, 94.
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point, Bryson’s basic claim is that the Cartesian model implies and produces
nothing but power and control of the subject over the world. What he doesn’t
even consider as a possibility is dialogue, as a relation of the subject to the
outside world, or communication.
As a solution to the “Cartesian self-enclosure of the cogito,”54 Bryson pro-
poses the model of the Japanese philosopher Nishitani from the Kyoto School,
whose aim is “to dismantle this anthropocentric subject” – and to do so more
radically than Sartre and Lacan with their threatening scenarios. With refer-
ence to Buddhist teachings, this involves the concept of shunyata, translated as
emptiness, radical impermanence, blankness, nihility,55 which is intended to
override the subject-object problem of western philosophy at a single stroke.
On this basis, Bryson develops a model of the gaze that is more like a promise
– and which remains without consequence in his own work and in the subse-
quent debate. But Bryson clearly sees in it a force that is more positive than
the “negative or terrorizing gaze”56 of Lacan. For him, precisely this “para-
noid coloration given to the Gaze” is an indication that Lacan is still thinking
from the position of a certain “intellectual enclosure”,57 by which he means
the above-mentioned residual subject-centeredness.
Nonetheless, Bryson comes to a point where he needs Lacan’s version of
visuality precisely for its critical negativity, since it is capable of doing some-
thing the positive promise of the Buddhist model cannot, that is, offering
a critique of previous models of the gaze and their political consequences.
Among these he counts: for the 19th century, the “truth of vision” in the phys-
iology of the eye and the neurology of the optical apparatus; in the art history
of the 20th century, he argues, this truth of the retina gave rise to formalism,
in art theory to the positions of Gombrich und Arnheim based on a psychology
of perception, and in the exhibition policies of museums to the decontextu-
alization of pictures to achieve direct communication between the viewer’s
eye and pure form. In short, art as a matter of pure perception, timeless, “se-
questered from the social domain, universal”.58 This is the art history soon to
be taken on by visual culture studies – or, to be more precise, a simplified and
in many ways abbreviated version of that art history, especially with regard
to the German practice oriented towards cultural history and to books like
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., 97.
56 Ibid., 105.
57 Ibid., 104.
58 Ibid., 107.
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Baxandall’s Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy and Alpers’ The Art
of Describing.
As a key element for Bryson, Lacan’s model brings culture into the field
of visuality, or rather, it is culture that turns pure seeing into a visual field
consisting not only of forms but of meanings “permeated by verbal and visual
discourses, by signs”. This also brings the dimensions of the social and of
power into play: “What is at stake is the discovery of a politics of vision.”
In this way, Bryson gives Lacan’s gaze a political turn that in a certain way
disarms its “paranoid or terrorist coloration” by transporting the gaze away
from the subject into the field of power: “it is a bit easier, since Lacan, to think
of visuality as something built cooperatively, over time; that we are therefore
responsible for it, ethically accountable.”59 As examples he cites the voyeuristic
male gaze and the colonialist gaze, structured by power and powerlessness.
Now, Bryson concludes, it is a matter of analysing how power uses the social
construction of seeing and how it hides its manoeuvres in the field of visuality
“in myths of pure form, pure perception, and culturally universal vision”.60
What role does art history play here? This question takes us away from
the gaze. Bryson’s answer would probably be as follows: were it to radically
revise its basic assumptions, art history could become a kind of auxiliary dis-
cipline for the analysis of social power relations to the extent that they are
represented in visual culture. It could unmask what the image conceals – the
exercise of power. This is strongly reminiscent of a vulgar Marxist notion of
ideology as the masking of power relations, which is based on a concept of
power as repression and which falls behind the concept of power proposed by
Foucault as not only repressive but productive and as being active throughout
the social body.Moreover, this notion is exceedingly hostile to images, casting
them as lies that help to shape a visuality that also acts in the service of power.
The lack that constitutes the Lacanian subject (and which, in a terminological
shift, “threatens” the Brysonian) is thus wholly repositioned in a political out-
side. In Bryson’s view, this outside in turnmanifests itself in the art-historical
myths of purity and universality of form and perception – a rather restricted
understanding of the political that seems paradoxically linked to the notion
of visual immanence.This relationship between the inside of a subject and its
outside, less fraught than unclear, obscures another important tension within
the triad of artist/work/viewer that is key to the status of seeing in art history
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 108.
5. Visual Culture Studies’ Foundational Concept 129
and visual culture studies: that between subject, be it artist or recipient, and
object. Will the object (here the object of art history) become another mirror
of the subject? In Bryson’s model, will it coincide indistinguishably with the
screen of the network of signs (which he sees as a threat to the subject)? Is it
ultimately a matter of contesting the myth of the autonomy of the object/art-
work that results from the myth of purity? What importance does this “battle”
against the concept of autonomous art still have at the end of the 1980s? For
the time being, I only have a clear answer to the last of these questions. With
the discourses and art practices of postmodernism, such as appropriation,
and essentially already with the neo-avant-gardes of fluxus, land art, body
and performance art or happenings in the 1960s and ‘70s, this battle was over
(at least in the absolute, either/or terms of autonomy on the one hand and a
dissolution of the object in its context on the other). This is also true within
art history as a discipline, where the autonomy of art in relation to sociality
and/or function is no longer the founding principle for a definition of art as
the discipline’s object.
In all fairness, it must be said that Bryson’s main focus in The Gaze in the
Expanded Fieldwas not on art history but on a discussion of the gaze in connec-
tion with an expanded concept of the visual field. In his editor’s introduction
to the Calligram anthology, on the other hand, he positions his collection of
(post)structuralist texts “from France” clearly against “official art history”.61
There is an attack on Gombrich’s perceptualism62 and a critique of so-called
social art history that follows the Marxist distinction of base and superstruc-
ture, assigning art to the latter, unable to connect it with the former except
as an illustration. To both, perspectivism and social art history, Bryson pre-
scribes the insight that painting is an art of signs, as a cure for the isolation
of art from the social.
What interestsme about this text is the construction of the nexus between
sign, historicization and interpretation that can be isolated within it – which
bears on central issues of art-historical practice that also determine the sta-
tus of seeing in the discipline (and vice versa). Bryson claims that: “Prevailing
art history famously insists on limiting itself to ‘what was possible in the pe-
riod’: its historicism demands a purity or puritanism of perspective in which
61 Bryson, “Introduction” in Calligram, xv-xvi.
62 An interesting comment on Bryson’s restricted reception of Gombrich as exclusively
perceptualist is to be found in Christopher S. Wood, “Art History Reviewed VI”.
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‘leakage’ from the present into the past is viewed with suspicion and alarm.”63
Although art history insists on the present of the artwork in question, it is
not, Bryson argues, interested in its own present. Consequently, art history
must adopt the theory of French (post)structuralism that has “a far more so-
phisticated understanding of the relations of signs to history”. The question,
he claims, is why “we, in England and America” choose to work within self-
imposed theoretical limits when literary criticism has broadened its theoret-
ical horizons, “so self-aware in methodology, so confident in its right to read
from the present?”64 I am interested in this idea of “confident in its right to
read from the present”. The implications are many and varied. Bryson’s focus
is clearly on the right to interpret from the present, and less on explaining the
theoretical necessity of doing so. This is an interesting take on the postmod-
ern critique of objectivism that highlighted the latency of position and thus
the presence of the viewer in the act of interpretation. Bryson’s take on this
approach turns the negativity of critique into a positive right – the right of
the viewer, that is, Bryson’s right to read the work from his present. This is
not just a critique of the supposed objectivity of art-historical fact-production
– a critique I share; Bryson goes further, shifting the weight within the triad
of artist/work/viewer in favour of the last in a way that largely abolishes not
only the relation between viewer/present and work/past, but also the rela-
tional tension between all three poles. To my mind, this shift goes so far as
to suggest that the author disempowered by poststructuralism has been re-
placed by (the power of) the interpreter.
How does Bryson connect this argument with the sign? Here, too, he
opens up a polarizing battleground: art history “reacts to the image by seeking
documentation” (he always refers to the object of art history as “the image”);
to date it has not conceived of the image “in terms of signs”, “as something
to be interpreted”.65 The new art history he is presenting in Calligram, on the
other hand, “reacts to the image as to any other work of signs. It is naturally
hermeneutic, and it knows reading to be as complex and intricate a process
as, for academic or Warburg iconology, it is the comparatively simple decod-
ing of emblems and motifs.”66 This is a highly polemical view of iconology
which Bryson claims is not a hermeneutic activity.
63 Bryson, “Introduction”, Calligram, xvi.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., xvii.
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Apart from the fact that using the word “naturally” in the context of post-
structuralist theory feels strange, the problem with this attitude is the mix
of general accusations and simplification, as reflected in the reviews of Vision
and Painting.67 Particularly annoying is the way Bryson’s very simple view of
art history seems to be guided by a tactical ignorance that aims to present
the discipline of literary criticism, from which he comes, as a methodological
role model so that it remains unclear, looking back, how much of his polemic
is motivated by academic politics. So why do I take it seriously? Bryson is not
the only literary critic/theorist who switched to art history, and he exerted a
major influence on the academic context in which the first university course
on visual culture was founded soon after. More interestingly, Bryson’s for-
mulations also seem to express a desire that was also crucial to the founding
and the programs of visual culture studies: with the overly one-sided shift in
emphasis to the viewer/interpreter within the triad of artist/work/viewer, the
author, at least theoretically abolished by poststructuralism in favour of tex-
tual interdependence, is replaced by the viewer, who according to Bryson now
has the right to interpret, independently of the historical unfamiliarity (and
other unfamiliarities) of the object. But what is the nature of an interpreta-
tion that does not acknowledge its object as Other? Does this object then take
on the function of a mirror for the viewer?
Another revealing choice of words, offering an insight into the role of
the gaze, comes in Bryson’s arguments against the “perceptualist account”,68
where he speaks of recognition (a wordwhosemeanings range from cognition
to identification, and to approval). To refute Gombrich’s method of a percep-
tual comparison between a painting and reality outside the picture, Bryson
examines picture-making from the position of the “viewer’s gaze,” using the
example of a particularly realistic representation. In this case, he writes, it is
possible for the viewer to re-experience “the original vision, retinal or imagi-
nary, of its creator”. But such matching, he argues, can hardly be a necessary
criterion for the “recognition of a painting” since the viewer knows nothing
of the original intention or vision of the painting. From this he concludes
that the “act of perception in the viewing gaze cannot of itself provide criteria
of recognition”. The examples given for what he understands by recognition
are the ability to comprehend mathematic formulae and a child’s learning to
67 Especially Potts, Difficult Meanings.
68 Bryson, “Introduction”, Calligram, xix.
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read. His conclusion: not only mathematics and learning to read are “activi-
ties of the sign”, but also painting. Recognition of a painting calls for skills in
“social codes of recognition”.69 Here, then, perception is replaced by recogni-
tion as the term for the viewer’s act of seeing. In this way, seeing as the form
of perception specific to the sense of sight becomes the act of cognition via
the recognition of social codes – an act that reads signs to derive meaning
from them. Elsewhere, he takes this distinction one step further, describing
purely perceptive seeing as an individually isolated act, contrasting it with the
recognition of signs as social interaction: “It takes one person to experience a
sensation; it takes (at least) two to recognize a sign.”70
By basing his argument on an isolation of the act of seeing as (pure) per-
ception in this way, he contradicts his own claim that no such thing as pure
seeing exists. At the same time he asserts that the formal properties of the ob-
ject that are perceived by “pure” seeing are not socially and historically coded,
that is to say, they lie below the threshold of legibility or encoding (and thus
of the social). These would be, for example, those elements grouped together
by conventional art history under the heading of style, from ways of applying
paint, to palettes, and to modes of composition. Studies exist, however, even
for non-representational painting of the 20th century, which analyse these
factors of painting – often labelled as “formalism” and treated with suspicion
– as socially, culturally and historically structured. Dealing with such paint-
ing though involves using a descriptive vocabulary other than that found in
conventional art-historical accounts of style.71
In brief, this is the package offered by Bryson: with the gaze, the sign
enters art (interpretation), bringing with it power and the social; the social
is identical with the screen, which in turn coincides with the image; the gaze
becomes an act of reading, based on the social codes circulating in the present
of the viewer/interpreter. What Bryson then fails to address, however, is the
restricted authorial autonomy of the viewer/interpreter within the coding of
his/her own present. He limits himself to deducing the right to interpretation.
The latent desire that speaks through his text is, I propose, as follows: the in-
terpreter takes on the position of the author/artist as criticized by poststruc-
turalism, and the object of interpretation is reduced to an outside, present
and ahistorical, whose existence does not go beyond its own interpretation.
69 All quotations from Bryson, The Gaze, xix-xx.
70 Ibid., xxi.
71 For painting, see, for example, Yves-Alain Bois,Painting as Model (Boston 1993).
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Similar to the mirror in Lacan’s model of the mirror stage as formative of
the function of the I, it serves to show the viewer/interpreter a self-image via
whose recognition the plausibility of the viewer-ego/I is secured. Moreover
this model collapses the tension, or relationship, between the elements in-
volved in art-historical seeing (the triad of artist, object/work and viewer/in-
terpreter) because the element artist no longer features, while object/work
and viewer/interpreter collapse into the interpreter-I. When the viewer has
no counterpart, all that remains is the viewer him/herself. Why is this? Four
basic factors come together in Bryson’s position: 1) the gaze is understood as
a threat to the I; 2) for this reason it is pushed away from the I into an out-
side; 3) the Lacanian screen is literally equated with the art image; 4) the I,
which in the Lacanian model can only deceive itself about its own wholeness,
seems to be salvaged in an interpreting I whose irreparable lack is not open
to debate. This is the effect of equating screen and viewer/interpreter in the
act of interpreting.
The evil eye and a counter-model – Margaret Olin
“There is usually something negative about the gaze as used in art theory”,
writes Margaret Olin in her article “Gaze”, included in Critical Terms for Art
History (1996), a handbook on new concepts “in the late twentieth century”72
including those borrowed from poststructuralist, feminist and psychoanalyt-
ical theory like sign, representation, simulacrum, fetish, gaze and gender.
Olin places the negative reading of the gaze at the centre of her text: “the
notion of the pernicious power of the gaze. The gaze, it seems, destroys.” In
her view, there are historical antecedents, like the myth of Medusa or a be-
lief in the power of the gaze as manifested in the “evil eye”, but also cultural
rules like asking someone before taking their picture. In 20th-century dis-
course, “the gaze has taken on new villainous qualities”:73 Hitler’s “hypnotic”
gaze could have played a part when Sartre was writing Being and Nothingness
during the German occupation of France; Foucault linked the gaze with the
apparatus of surveillance, and Guy Debord warned of the “dehumanizing as-
pect of being a spectator”.The key point in Lacan, she remarks, is that the eye
72 Robert S. Nelson, “At the Place of a Foreword: Someone Looking, Reading, andWriting”
in Critical Terms, ix.
73 Margaret Olin, “Gaze” in Critical Terms, 208-219: 214.
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and the gaze, although separate, are parts of the same person because “the
gaze is projected, imagined. It is not the gaze of a real person who wishes
malevolently to deprive us of our independence as subjects, but the result of
our own struggle for self-mastery.”74 Precisely this aspect of the function of
the viewer/interpreter is what is lost in Bryson’s approach, as the gaze, sepa-
rated from the eye, that goes hand in handwith the “desire for self-completion
through another”,75 is relocated within this very Other/outside.
Olin aptly sums up the dimension of power in the gaze: “There is a struggle
over the gaze: one gets to look, to be master of the gaze; the other (or Other) is
looked at.”76 This struggle involves a clash of gazes each based on the desire to
complete the self. It goes beyond the struggle between the sexes; it concerns
the relations between majority and minority, between the West and the so-
called Global South, “whose inhabitants can be the object of the gaze because
they are viewed as exotic … The subject-turned-object sees itself as the other
sees it: it internalizes the gaze. Thus the poor self-image and limited sense
of one’s own possibilities that result when women see themselves as men see
them, when minority groups see themselves as the majority sees them.”77
This brings us back to the problem described above with reference to the
identity politics of these minorities: how can this power relation and this gaze
be altered? Can it be achieved by giving the cliché, the stereotype, resulting
from such a gaze, a positive turn, continuing to relate it to oneself – a strategy
that has been both used and contested by all minorities, both ethnic groups
and women, gays and lesbians? Is it possible to exit this dynamic by creating
a “new” self-image? This in turn recalls Bryson’s manoeuvre of avoiding the
gaze’s threat to the self by adopting amodel from a non-western culture based
on a non-I – what Olin calls an attempt “to find an alternative to the notion
of the subjugating look in other cultures”.78
Olin herself has another proposal that departs from the “paranoid” La-
canianmodel. She suggests a positive rewriting of the gaze of the kind already
conceived of in other theories. One example she gives is Martin Buber: in his
thinking, she writes, there is an attempt to replace the I-it with an I-Thou re-
lationship; something similar is to be found, she adds, in Mikhail Bakhtin’s
heteroglossia (multiple voices, equally weighted). What these models have in
74 Ibid., 215.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 216.
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common is that they take dialogue as the basis for thinking relations. The
gaze that is returned in the dialogical model rescues the sense of self of the
one being looked at. “If you can look back, you cannot be possessed by the
gaze of the other. What is proposed is not a stare-down. It is a shared gaze.
Rather than emphasizing the power of the gazing one to make the one gazed
at into an object, this idea suggests responsibility toward the person looking
back at one.”79 This model is ethically founded and as such highly volitional.
It appears as optimistic regarding the possibilities of human communication
as Lacan’s model is pessimistic. What remains intact here is the relation be-
tween the looking subject and what is being looked at, be it artist and work or
work and viewer/interpreter.With this model there is no need to deny the un-
familiarity of the other. In this it resembles Pächt’s approach; but it describes
more of an attitude than a method – an attitude that may colour both cogni-
tive aim and methodology, just as a “paranoid” attitude does. In both models,
the dialogical and the Lacanian, the emphasis is on recognition, but with one
key difference: in the Lacanian model, it is (self-)recognition of the I, in Bu-
ber and Bakhtin the recognition of the Other. The Lacanian model has been
adopted much more frequently than Buber’s or Bakhtin’s – which is hardly
surprising; for with this model, it is possible to pose the question of power
relations within the gaze that is not possible with the dialogical model, as it
postulates a form of communication without a hierarchic divide.
Olin’s article on the gaze has just a single illustration: Walker Evans’ pho-
tographic portrait of Annie Mae Gudger, the wife of a tenant farmer. It shows
the face of a white woman, her hair parted and pulled back, looking straight at
the photographer, and thus the viewer, with a frown. Any further characteri-
zation of her gaze would be interpretation. AnnieMae Gudger and the picture
look at the viewer – a picture that looks back, in the most obvious way imag-
inable: the person in the picture looks back, which means: “Our gaze does
not hit the side of her face but the front” – an allusion to Barbara Kruger’s
work entitled Your gaze hits the side of my face.80 “She looks at us and we meet
her gaze directly.”81 This portrait could thus become a concrete example of the
dialogical constellation of gazes proposed by Olin.
In western art since the Renaissance, figures looking out of the picture
at the viewer have not been the rule, especially where female figures are con-
79 Ibid., 217.
80 Title of a photo collage by Barbara Kruger (1981).
81 Olin, “Gaze”, 216.
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cerned, which brings us to art history as a discipline and the way it has dealt
with this problem. Famous exceptions include Tizian’s Venus of Urbino, Goya’s
Nude and Clothed Maja and Manet’s Olympia, all from the genre of the female
nude. For this genre, the rule was that the nude does not look at the viewer,
casting her eyes instead discretely and modestly to one side. And the Majas
and Olympia were often the focus of scandalized outrage on account of their
“obscene” character. In most cases, this was the effect of a naked woman look-
ing at those looking at her – an unwelcome, disturbing dialogical exchange
of gazes that startled the viewer out of his position of a gaze that controls
its object. Elsewhere, another remarkable effect can be observed: some critics
seem to forget that they are looking at a picture, speaking of the image of a
female body looking at them as a subject: this Maja “is aware of power and
her entirely unsentimental, even aggressive gaze definitively turns her into a
subject, even as an unclad woman”.82 T.J. Clark is not the only one to see in the
gaze of Olympia the self-determined desire “of the female subject herself”.83
This raises the question of how such a neutral, indifferent gaze becomes, in
the eye of the (male) viewer, a signifier of self-determined female desire, and
whether it is perhaps this gaze that causes the medium of representation,
the painting, the canvas, the pictorial codes, to become invisible, allowing the
woman portrayed to achieve a presence in the present and in the perceptive
space of the viewer.84
According to Olin, the eyes of Anna Mae Gudger are “meant to urge us
into a relation. … We are asked to be her partner, to offer her ‘respect’, which
means literally a returned look. Her look is intended to empower her.”85 Un-
like the above-quoted interpreters of theMajas andOlympia, Olin does not fall
into the trap of presence. Instead, she understands the woman’s gaze clearly
82 Werner Busch, “Goyas ‘Nackte und Bekleidete Maja’” in Claudia von Braunmühl (ed.),
Etablierte Wissenschaft und feministische Theorie im Dialog (Berlin 2003), 113-124: 121.
83 Timothy J. Clark, The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and his Followers
(London 1984), 131. Besides Busch and Clark, it is also worth mentioning Charles Bern-
heimer, “Manets Olympia: Der Skandal auf der Leinwand” in Weissberg, Weiblichkeit
als Maskerade, 148-176, especially 158.
84 See Susanne von Falkenhausen, “Maja undOlympia: Der Streit umdenweiblichenAkt”
in von Braunmühl(ed.), Etablierte Wissenschaft und feministische Theorie, 125-133. Fou-
cault takes a different approach to viewer positions with regard to Olympia, see ibid.,
130, and Michel Foucault, Manet and the Object of Painting (lecture originally delivered
in 1971), 63-66.
85 Olin, “Gaze”, 217.
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as a strategy on the part of the photographer that is often seen in documen-
tary photography with a social agenda. And she finds fitting words for this
“perceptive phenomenon” of the tension between the presence of the person
portrayed, occasioned or reinforced by his/her gaze out of the picture, and
this representation in its quality as a media artefact: “Depiction of eyes look-
ing out from the image is only one way to seek to achieve such a presence.”
For today’s viewers, she continues, the powerful presence of the photogra-
pher might actually seem stronger than that of the woman – a remark that
brings the artist back into play via the reality of the photograph, rendering
the triad of artist/object/viewer complete again in its communication through
the picture. In a nutshell: “It is the sense of a human presence who is alive to
our own presence that constitutes the encounter theorized as the gaze.”86
Olin’s model of a dialogical exchange of looks draws on her study of Alois
Riegl’s concept of attentiveness, on which he founded his pictorial analyses
above all in The Group Portraiture of Holland (1902/1931).87 For Riegl, the atten-
tiveness of the figures inside the picture towards one another, perceivable
in the form of exchanged looks and facial expressions, generates an empa-
thetic attentiveness in the viewer. This attentiveness is based on respect for
the other – be it someone else portrayed in the same picture or the picture
itself, or rather what is portrayed in the picture. In a broader sense, it is an
ethically motivated concept for intersubjective communication. In any case, it
is firmly rooted in the picture, making it reminiscent of Wolfgang Kemp’s re-
ception aesthetics that is not ethically founded but whose model of reception
is also based on the object.88 Another link to Riegl is found in Alpers when she
describes the visual culture of the Netherlands in the 17th century as a culture
of visual attentiveness. But there is one key difference: while Alpers identifies
description as a structural characteristic of Dutch painting, in Riegl’s model,
as interpreted by Olin, attentiveness has a narrative structure.89
In conclusion, the positions of Bryson and Olin on the gaze can be dif-
ferentiated on the basis of their respective weighting of the communication
86 Olin, “Gaze”, 218.
87 Margaret Olin, “Forms of Respect: Alois Riegl’s Concept of Attentiveness” in The Art Bul-
letin 71, no. 2 (1989), 285-299. She also embeds this concept in the intellectual currents
of turn-of-the-century Vienna, examines its adoption by Bakhtin and Buber, and sit-
uates it within the modern discussion of the theatricality of art initiated by Michael
Fried.
88 Kemp, too, refers to Riegl.
89 Olin, “Forms of Respect”, here, for example, 287.
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triangle artist/object/viewer: while Bryson centres this relational structure on
the viewer, Olin seeks a dialogical structure that focuses on the object but
connects it with artist and viewer. In this way, Olin also postulates a commu-
nication between producer and viewer via the object.
Bryson’s model of the role of the viewer depends on the character of the
picture as sign; as well as being the precondition for interpretation, this qual-
ity also turns the act of perception into an act of reading. ForOlin, on the other
hand, this act can be described as a dialogical exchange of looks with the ob-
ject.This also permits a recognition of the object as Other, in turn allowing the
historically unfamiliar to be integrated not into the interpreting subject but
into relations within the communicative triangle. Bryson, by contrast, must
deny this unfamiliarity as it cannot be integrated into the viewer.
A comparison between the two positions is more difficult on the question
of the power of the gaze. Bryson situates it twice: in the gaze of the person
who crosses one’s own gaze and threatens the subject, and as an imbalance
of power in the social field. These sites of power have two things in com-
mon: both endanger identities, that of the individual and that of the social
group, and in both cases those endangered are the objects of the gaze. In this
light, interpretation becomes something like a struggle for recognition of the
self/group in the eyes of the other.
With her dialogical model, on the other hand, Olin offers an ethical so-
lution to the problem of identity in confrontation with the Other. It calls for
a conscious positioning of the viewer towards the Other and therefore im-
plies the volitional agency of the viewer. The dialogical model demands the
acknowledgement of the Other, but without demanding one’s own recogni-
tion in the eyes of the Other – a model of nonviolent communication that
recalls the ideals of Gandhi or Martin Luther King, but that seems hardly ca-
pable of doing justice either to the realities of a political struggle between
identity-based forces, or to those of a paranoid subject.
Comparing these concepts of the gaze highlights the dynamic of politi-
cal thinking associated with them. As we will see, however, the question of
how this dynamic shapes the practices and methods of visual culture studies
and art history is easier to answer for visual culture studies than it is for art
history.
6. Visual Culture Studies’ Operational Concept
Visuality – Seeing in the Cultural Field
Visuality must be considered the key concept in the theoretical and practical
basis of visual culture studies. The word is not a poststructuralist neologism,
nor is it precisely situated in theoretical terms. Therefore I can only describe
its use in these texts: as a metaphor that is deployed in different ways and as
an abstract concept with similarly diverse definitions. The first usage cited is
from Thomas Carlyle, praising Dante for the intensity with which he works
out not just the whole, but every detail “into truth, into clear visuality”.1 Here,
visuality is that quality of a text whose intensity allows the reader to imagine
something with the clarity of vision; at the same time, this “clear visuality”
is equated with truth. For Carlyle, visuality is the essence of a historiogra-
phy which, imagined from the elevated position of the hero, shows the grand
heroic whole of history, like history painting, defying the revolutions since
1789 and the rise of positivism.2 The key here, it seems to me, is that this
visuality does not mean the actual seeing of a visual object or an exchange
of glances between people, referring instead to what the text evokes in the
reader’s imagination while it is being read.
In order to trace the ways the term visuality is used in visual culture stud-
ies – however unclear this usage may be – there follow readings of texts by
three writers: W.J.T. Mitchell, Nicholas Mirzoeff and Mieke Bal. If one wished
to situate their positions between the poles of essentializing the visual on
1 Thomas Carlyle: On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History, Lecture III. The
Hero as Poet. Dante: Shakespeare (May 12, 1840): “Not the general whole only; every
compartment of it is worked out, with intense earnestness, into truth, into clear visu-
ality.” http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1091 (accessed 26 Sept 2016).
2 On Carlyle and visuality, see also Nicholas Mirzoeff, “On Visuality” in Journal of Visual
Culture 5, no. 1 (2006), 53-79. Mirzoeff situates this visuality in the context of reac-
tionary and anti-modern currents of the time.
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the one hand and constructivism on the other, Mirzoeff would be on the side
of essentializing, Mitchell would stand halfway between the two with his at-
tempt to maintain the two extremes in a relationship of tension and paradox,
and Bal would represent the constructivist-semiological pole.3 In this light,
the three positions I have chosen as examples cover the full breadth of the
discussion.
What is visual culture? W.J.T. Mitchell
In 1995, when W.J.T. Mitchell published What is Visual Culture?,4 the first
courses in visual culture were just a few years old;5 they were developed not
on a common basis but according to the interests and disciplines of those
involved and the existing structures at the institutions in question, giving
each course its own genesis and its own focus.
In What is Visual Culture? Mitchell presented his version of visual culture
studies, developed in 1993 with a corresponding syllabus as an internal memo
for a working group on visual culture at The University of Chicago including
colleagues from literary criticism, film studies and art history. As Mitchell
writes, the group’s members agreed that it could not just be about uniting
humanities scholars around the problem of visual culture, but that social and
natural sciences should also be involved, as well as non-western concepts and
practices of the visual. This is followed by a long list of key questions for the
“study of human visuality”, including cultural otherness, the society of the
spectacle, scientific research on vision and imaging, imaging technologies,
and prosthetic “extensions” of the visible.6 He thus formulates a comprehen-
sive collection of themes for knowledge production on visuality, while avoid-
ing any fixed definition of the term. His approach is characterized above all
3 In her 2003 essay “Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture”, Bal accuses
Mirzoeff of visual essentialism. See the section on Mieke Bal in this chapter.
4 W.J.T. Mitchell, “What is Visual Culture?” in Irving Lavin (ed.),Meaning in the Visual Arts.
Views from the Outside. A Centennial Commemoration of Erwin Panofsky (Princeton 1995),
207-217.
5 In Cornell, Harvard, Rochester, Irvine, Santa Cruz and Chicago. See W.J.T. Mitchell, “In-
terdisciplinarity and Visual Culture” in The Art Bulletin 77, no. 4 (1995), 540-544: 541; see
also Dikovitskaya, Visual Culture, chapter 2.
6 Mitchell, “What is Visual Culture?”, 208.
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by two further strategies: he avoids being pinned down on the basis of po-
larizations, and he juxtaposes approaches that seemed to be the subject of
consensus with their opposites. As one example, he contrasts the consensus
on the social and cultural construction of visuality with the question of the
natural dimension of the visual: “What is the boundary between visual cul-
ture and visual nature?”7 – a question rejected by Mieke Bal, who insists on
the cultural construction of the visual.8
It is interesting to see the context in which Mitchell published this “failed
attempt at a manifesto”, as he calls it: Meaning in the Visual Arts. Views from the
Outside. A Centennial Commemoration of Erwin Panofsky is an anthology edited
by art historian Irving Lavin that examines Panofsky’s art history, as the title
claims, from outside the discipline. And indeed, of the scholars who came to
visual culture studies from outside art history, Mitchell is the one who has
declared and maintained the greatest affinity with the latter discipline. This
is reflected in his adoption or “reconstruction”9 of Panofsky’s iconology. On
another point, too, Mitchell appears as Panofsky’s ethical heir: taking his ex-
ample of the greeting (the “primal scene” for Panofsky’s iconology in which
he meets a man who greets him on the street and he recognizes his gesture
as a greeting) he reinterprets it in the sense of a critical iconology.10 Mitchell
also refers to this scene in other texts; it is a very vivid, narrative-dramatic
metaphor that makes a brief and striking appearance in What is Visual Cul-
ture?, where he states: Panofsky’s “comparison of looking at painting to greet-
ing other persons has deep resonances for the whole issue of visuality and
alterity”.11 To greet means to recognize; extending this into greeting one an-
other turns the scene into a dialogical situation that brings forth a recognition
of the other. Because Mitchell does not state whether this other is an object
in the sense of an artwork or another subject, the metaphor applies both to
the act of interpreting an object and to communication between people. As
well as allowing Mitchell to conceive of visuality as a social field, this allows
me to refer back to Olin’s dialogical concept of the gaze, which I contrasted
7 Ibid., 211.
8 See Bal, “Visual Essentialism”.
9 See W.J.T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago 1986) and Mitchell, Picture
Theory (Chicago 1994), especially chapter 1.
10 In Erwin Panofsky, “Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renais-
sance Art”, in Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History, (Garden
City, NY 1955), 26-54: 26.
11 Mitchell, “What is Visual Culture?”, 211.
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with the narcissist model of Lacan as interpreted by Bryson. Unlike Bryson,
then, Mitchell takes a dialogical structure of seeing as the point of departure
for both the social and the object-based dimension of visuality.
What is Visual Culture clearly reflects the aim of bringing together all of the
various facets of a discussion on visual culture that had not, until then, been
conducted systematically, though it can hardly be called systematic. Rather
than any attempt to define key concepts, there is more of a quest to describe
and redefine a field that is not (yet) a discipline and its central concerns. A first
indication is given by a brief account of the genesis of visual culture: a revo-
lution in literary theory, new philosophical approaches to representation and
its connection with language, and new developments in art history (we are
not told which) have, Mitchell argues, laid the foundations for thinking “vi-
sual realities (including everyday habits of visual perception) as cultural con-
structions, therefore interpretable or readable”.12 Neither film studies with its
strong feminist theories13 nor cultural studies, whose agenda in the 1980s was
far more political than that of literary theory or art history, are mentioned at
this point. This may be because for Mitchell, with his doctorate in literature,
there is another central problem that now becomes critical again as the em-
phasis is placed on the visual: the difference between language and image14
that is also reflected in the division of the humanities into “verbal” and “vi-
sual” camps. The new field of visual culture is associated with the promise of
overcoming these divisions or at least loosening them in the sense of inter-
disciplinarity.15 In view of the analysis of language by linguistics, the lack of
a corresponding system for the image – or the visual16 – is an unsettling flaw
(and Mitchell is not the only one to address it). This applies in particular with
respect to the institutionalization of the field as a discipline. Here, Mitchell
is concerned above all with avoiding definitions and delimitations that might
lead visual culture studies to ossify into a discipline in its earliest years; he re-
peatedly emphasizes the impossibility of separating language from the visual,
12 Ibid., 207.
13 See also chapter 5, The model of the gaze, on the reception of Lacan’s model of the gaze
in film studies.
14 This begins with his dissertation, Blake’s Composite Art (Princeton 1977). Further titles
include: Iconology (1986) and Picture Theory (1994).
15 On interdisciplinarity in relation to visual culture studies, see Mitchell, Interdisciplinar-
ity and Visual Culture.
16 In my opinion, the line between the two, where it is deliberately discussed at all the
debates surrounding visual culture studies, is extremely blurred.
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highlighting their fields of interaction. ForMitchell, this implies a specialmis-
sion for visual culture studies: “The emergence of visual culture is a challenge
to traditional notions of reading and literacy as such; it is asmuch a revolution
in verbal culture as it is in the study of the visual image proper.”17 Mitchell sees
fit to address the challenge of renewal to literary studies and to art history in
equal measure. Art history can no longer rely on the traditional concepts of
beauty and aesthetic meaning to define its object, he claims. As examples of
such concepts, however, he then names myths that have been subject to criti-
cism in the practice of left-wing and feminist art history in both the English-
and German-speaking worlds since the 1970s, if not before: aesthetic hierar-
chy, the discourse of mastery and genius. Like the other advocates of visual
culture studies, Mitchell draws a narrow, reduced picture of art history as a
discipline, constructing it as the other of visual culture studies. Finally there
is a conciliatory turn in the form of a dialectical argument: juxtaposition with
the productions of kitsch and mass culture, he claims, will actually reinforce
the greatness of “authentic artistic achievements” – a conservative appeal to
quality and authenticity that recent art history would hardly endorse.
With the transfer of theory from the “verbal” camp, then, “visual realities”
become “legible” as social constructions. This gives us a first description of
the visual. But what are these visual realities? Less abstract than “visuality”,
this description seems to point not to exchanges of looks between people, but
to looks directed by the perceiving subject towards external reality. Although
there are signs of approaches like the gaze or the visibility of the subject itself
being involved, the main emphasis here is clearly the gaze that the subject
fixes on external object-reality.
Soon after, Mitchell was to ask a question that seemed to reverse this
direction: What do pictures really want? This essay, later followed by a book,18
contains a sentence that may illustrate his attitude to visuality: “What pic-
tures want from us, what we have failed to give them, is an idea of visual-
ity adequate to their ontology.” (my italics) Just as pictures have an ontology, he
claims, there should also be an ontology of visuality.Thiswould certainlymake
Mitchell’s opening up of cultural constructivism towards the “nature” of the
visual (more) understandable. But the following passage marks a clearer dis-
tancing than previously from the semiotic model: “Contemporary discussions
17 Mitchell, “What is Visual Culture?”, 209.
18 W.J.T. Mitchell, “What do pictures really want?” inOctober 77 (1996), 71-82, andWhatDo
Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago 2007).
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of visual culture often seem distracted by a rhetoric of innovation and mod-
ernization.They want to update art history by playing catch-up with the text-
based disciplines and with the study of film and mass culture. … They appeal
to ‘semiotic’ or ‘discursive’ models of images that will reveal them as projec-
tions of ideology, technologies of domination to be resisted by clear-sighted
critique.” These words betray a certain anger directed, as I see it, against the
instrumentalization of pictures (and the visual, terms Mitchell uses more or
less interchangeably) and against the semiotic equating of language and im-
age.19 Once again, Panofsky’s “greeting acquaintance” comes into play; here
it supports Mitchell’s appeal for a hermeneutics that does justice to pictures,
one “that would return to the opening gesture of Panofsky’s iconology”.20 But
Mitchell cannot be simply tied down to an ontology of the visual beyond cul-
ture: “Themost far-reaching shift signalled by the search for an adequate con-
cept of visual culture is its emphasis on the social field of the visual, the every-
day processes of looking at others and being looked at. This complex field of
visual reciprocity [my italics] is not merely a by-product of social reality but ac-
tively constitutive of it. Vision is as important as language in mediating social
relations, and it is not reducible to language, to the ‘sign’ or to discourse.” In
connection with Panofsky’s metaphor of the encounter, “reciprocity” supports
Mitchell’s vehement defence of the picture as an Other.21
Let us return to Mitchell’s promisingly titled What is visual culture? Here
he brings us no closer to a definition of visuality. Instead, he makes it clear
that visual culture studies in the mid-1990s is a very open field, so open that
Mitchell hopes (in contrast to later statements) that the field could become
a “coherent discipline”. He backs up this hope with a clever paradox: pre-
cisely the “self-critical tendencies of its principal constituents” give grounds
for such a hope, self-critique as a path to consolidating a discipline. Later, in
2002, with increasingly successful institutionalization, Mitchell feels obliged,
19 As a note informs us, this anger is directed against the introduction to the anthology
Visual Culture. Images and Interpretations (London 1994) written by its editors Norman
Bryson, Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey.
20 Mitchell, “What Do Pictures Really Want?”, 82.
21 On certain basic points, I agree with Mitchell’s vehement defence here; what I find
problematic is that his list of interpretative approaches to be rejected includes dis-
course theory. The visual in its distinct way is part of discourse as is language. In
Mitchell’s version, situated beyond discursivity, the concept of visuality appears to end
up in anontology that is neither culturally or socially accessible. This iswhereMitchell’s
desire of having it both ways comes up against its limits.
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in Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture, to write against the creeping os-
sification of the discipline.22
Visuality as event – Nicholas Mirzoeff
In 1999, Nicholas Mirzoeff opened his Introduction to Visual Culture with the
apodictic statement: “Modern life takes place onscreen.”23 For Mirzoeff, the
screen, understood here as the television or computer screen, is the site of vi-
sual consumption. From this, he infers that visual culture is a modern and
especially a postmodern phenomenon. It also marks a boundary between
epochs: the period from 1650 to 1820 was dominated by the formal logic of
the “ancien régime image”, followed by the modern era (1820-1975).24 The dif-
ference between the two periods is that until 1820, visuality was dominated
by the logic of the image, whereas in modernity the visual stimulus, ampli-
fied to a “hyper-stimulus”, is the stronger influence: “visual culture does not
depend on pictures themselves but the modern tendency to picture or visu-
alize existence”25 – whether this is a fundamental structural difference or a
quantitative one remains unclear. In postmodernity, he claims, the kind of
visualization specific to modernity is further heightened: “it [visualizing] has
now become all but compulsory”.26 ForMirzoeff, postmodernity as a so-called
crisis of modernity is the consequence of modernity’s inability to deal with
the failure of its strategy of visualization: “in other words, it is the visual crisis
of culture that creates postmodernity, not its textuality. While print culture
is certainly not going to disappear, the fascination with the visual and its ef-
fects that marked modernism has engendered a postmodern culture that is
most postmodern when it is visual.”27 These are strong words, and they make
no effort to cultivate the interlocking of textuality and visuality favoured by
22 Mitchell, “Showing Seeing”.
23 Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture, 1. Moreover, Mirzoeff always speaks only of
visual culture, regardless of whether he is talking about the discipline’s subject matter
or the discipline itself.
24 Ibid., 7-8.
25 Ibid., 5.
26 Ibid., 6.
27 Ibid., 3.
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Mitchell. ForMirzoeff, visuality is the characteristic of post-/modernity,which
is also why visual culture deals primarily with this period.28
“Visual culture is concerned with visual events in which information,
meaning, or pleasure is sought by the consumer in an interface with visual
technology. By visual technology I mean any form of apparatus designed
either to be looked at or to enhance natural vision, from oil painting to tele-
vision and the Internet.”29 This gives an indication that Mirzoeff conceives
of visuality as a visual event that takes place at the “interface” of consumer
and visual medium. The specific quality of this visuality, analogous to the
“disjunctured and fragmented culture that we call postmodernism”,30 is that
it must react ever more quickly to the ever-increasing numbers of different,
fragmented, simultaneous stimuli – “the constant swirl of the global village”31
– which also impacts on a perceptive apparatus that possesses a seemingly
unlimited capacity to adapt to these growing demands; “The hyper-stimulus
of modern visual culture from the nineteenth century to the present day”, he
asserts, “has been dedicated to trying to saturate the visual field, a process
that continually fails as we learn to see and connect ever faster.”32
There is a causal link between this hyper-stimulus and the circulation of
images that are no longer indexically connected to realities, as was still the
case with the analogue versions of film and photography, but that now pro-
duce virtual realities. As Mirzoeff wishes to focus his discussion of visual cul-
ture mainly on new media and their consumers, it is understandable that for
him, unlike Mitchell or Bal, the concept of the simulacrum from the French
postmodern theory of writers like Virilio, Baudrillard and Lyotard plays a ma-
jor role. “The (post)modern destruction of reality is accomplished in everyday
life, not in the studios of the avant-garde.”33 Mirzoeff links the notion of the
simulacrum as reality substitute with the metaphor of the “visual event” that
emphasizes the visual-sensory experience and supposed immediacy already
implicit in “event”. The relationship between the virtuality and constructed-
ness of media/realities on the one hand and, on the other, the “immediacy”
of visual experience, however, remains unexplained. With this metaphor of
28 Although Mirzoeff never states this explicitly, he would therefore find it hard to apply
visual culture studies to older periods.
29 Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture, 3.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 1.
32 Ibid., 5.
33 Ibid., 17.
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the “visual event”, Mirzoeff wishes to make it possible “to advance interpre-
tive strategies beyond the now familiar use of semiotic terminology”.34 For
him, then, the “sensual immediacy” of the visual constitutes the fundamen-
tal difference between image and text/language35 (a point on which he has
been accused of visual essentialism by critics including Mieke Bal, of which
more later). Mirzoeff proposes a theoretical keyword for the experience of
sensory immediacy that results from “intense and surprising visual power”,
prompting reactions of “admiration, awe, terror and desire”: the sublime: “The
sublime is the pleasurable experience in representation of that which would
be painful or terrifying in reality, leading to a realization of the limits of the
human and of the powers of nature.”36 For Mirzoeff the sublime becomes the
central dimension of visual culture, “at the heart of all visual events”.37 An
aesthetic concept originating in the eighteenth century, the sublime is taken
up here to strengthen his description of the visual event as going beyond lan-
guage, and thus to position visual culture studies against semiotics.
What this theoretical shortcut ignores or bypasses is the factor of me-
diality structuring the “interface” between picture and consumer. Although
Mirzoeff is interested in experience with post-modern media, he has no con-
cept of media. In Mirzoeff ’s view of the relationship between consumer and
medium, the experience of consuming has far greater weight than that of the
image/medium: “visual culture [does] prioritize the everyday experience of
the visual, from the snapshot to the VCR and even the blockbuster art exhibi-
tion.” Apparently, the ever-changing media landscape is sufficient reason to
forego a conceptualization of mediality in favour of visual experience. As a
result Mirzoeff emphasizes all the more the external conditions of this expe-
rience. More than in traditional locations such as museum or cinema, “most
of our visual experience takes place aside from these formally structured mo-
ments of looking”;38 we watch movies in planes or at home, we see paintings
on book covers or posters. For Mirzoeff, these conditions seem to have a more
serious impact than media specificity on spectatorship, a term that goes be-
yond the process of perception itself to include all the accompanying factors
34 Ibid., 13.
35 These are the also the grounds given for his critique of the semiotic approach, ending
with the verdict: “Structuralism was in the end unproductive.” An Introduction to Visual
Culture, 14-15.
36 Ibid, 16.
37 Ibid., 16.
38 Ibid., 7.
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of time, space and setting, as well as the social and cultural practices of visual
consumption.
“Visual culture is a tactic with which to study the genealogy, definition and
functions of postmodern everyday life from the point of view of the consumer, [my
italics] rather than the producer.”39 So what of the triad of producer/object/in-
terpreter? In Mirzoeff ’s analysis the author or producer is no longer relevant
to the visual culture of postmodernity. In this, he draws a logical conclusion
(realistically, I would say) from the actual weakening of authorship that can
no longer even be theoretically founded since it takes place in the copy-and-
paste practice of the Internet. Images, on the other hand, come in Mirzoeff ’s
argument to represent compulsory visualizing itself. Once again, then, the
viewer stands at the centre, without a dialogical point of reference. In con-
trast to Bryson’s model, however, the viewer here is not an interpreter but a
consumer, the “key agent in postmodern capitalist society”.40 But there is one
important parallel: Bryson seeks the recognition of this interpretative role,
the empowerment of the viewer as author, while Mirzoeff seeks the empow-
erment of the consumer who is to be emancipated from the vortex of capi-
talist over-production with the help of the insights of visual culture studies.
But Mirzoeff does not behave like the classically Marxist, anti-visual enemy
of the culture industry (the negative example he gives being Frederic Jame-
son41). Mirzoeff ’s agenda takes the viewer’s pleasure into account rather than
damning it.
This brings me to the question of the political implications of Mirzoeff ’s
version of visual culture studies. What, I would ask, is he writing against? In
terms of academic politics, he is writing against the linguistic turn and the
influence of structuralism on the study of visual culture. His argument links
the view of a postmodern culture of simulacra based on visuality with the sen-
sory “immediacy” evoked in the consumer by these simulacra, an immediacy
surpassing the analytic power of semiotics. There are other villains, too, ex-
plicit and/or implied, including “spin doctors, pollsters and other demons of
the contemporary imagination”, against whose manipulative power to launch
and spread discriminatory or politically hegemonic narratives “everyday vi-
sual experience” offers a reservoir of resistance that is beyond the reach of
39 Ibid., 3 (my italics).
40 Ibid., 27.
41 See ibid., 10f.; another anti-visualist he writes against here is Pierre Bourdieu.
6. Visual Culture Studies’ Operational Concept 149
the manipulators on account of its unpredictability.42 According to Mirzo-
eff, then, visual culture has a special potential for political resistance: “Visual
culture is new precisely because of its focus on the visual as a place where
meanings are created and contested.”43 Western culture, Mirzoeff argues, has
privileged the spoken word (and not the written word, which, according to
Mitchell, inevitably also has visual aspects) as the highest form of intellec-
tual practice, considering visual representations as “second-rate illustrations
of ideas”. Put this way, Mirzoeff ’s militant vindication of visual culture in the
face of discrimination appears as a logical reflex.
The combative structure of this argument, fighting for the visual, popu-
lar culture of discriminated identities of race, class, sexual orientation and
gender, seamlessly gives rise to a catchy metaphor describing visual culture
studies: not a discipline, but, with deliberate reference to military parlance, a
tactic: “A tactic is carried out in full view of the enemy, the society of control
in which we live. … in the ongoing culture wars, tactics are necessary to avoid
defeat.”44 Visual culture is “a fluid interpretive structure, centered on under-
standing the response to visual media of both individuals and groups. … Like
the other approaches mentioned above, it hopes to reach beyond the tradi-
tional confines of the university to interact with people’s everyday lives.”45
This makes clear the extent to which Mirzoeff derives his motivation from
the militant identity politics of the 1980s and ‘90s, and his desire to conduct
politically engaged studies for “people’s lives”. Such a desire is often accom-
panied by a denial of the difference between theory and practice. Wanting
to bridge this gap brings with it the risk of theoretical pitfalls such as fail-
ing to take into account a further difference – that between simulated reality
and the medium of its simulation. Where the militant side of the genesis of
visual culture studies in identity politics is concerned, Mirzoeff is certainly
the most explicit of the three writers discussed in this chapter. He links the
struggle with something I would call visual vitalism. This is localized in the
recipient’s fascination with visually simulated realities, leading ultimately to
what Mieke Bal was to refer to several years later, in a text that triggered an
intense debate, as “visual essentialism”.46
42 Ibid., 29. Here Mirzoeff refers to Appadurai and Rogoff.
43 Ibid., 6 (my italics).
44 Ibid., 8.
45 Ibid., 4-5.
46 See Bal, “Visual Essentialism”. The debate on this text also took place in the Journal of
Visual Culture, in the following issue (2:2, 2003), 229-268.
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Seeing is reading47 – Mieke Bal
Unlike Mirzoeff, Mieke Bal never figured as a proponent of visual culture
studies in the narrow sense. But she was involved in founding the first vi-
sual culture program at the University of Rochester in 1989/90, together with
Michael Ann Holly, Norman Bryson, Kaja Silverman and Craig Owens. And
in the 1990s, together with Bryson, she pursued a project I propose to call the
semioticization of art history.48 Like Bryson and Mitchell, Bal’s background
is in literary criticism; like Mitchell, she is writing against a polarization of
text and image, language and vision.
With her 2003 article Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture – a
fundamental critique of visual culture studies – Bal launched a self-reflexive
debate within visual culture studies that signals the end of the first phase of
the academic establishment of the discipline.This debate had been heralded a
year earlier by Mitchell’s article Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture. Un-
like Mitchell, however, Bal made direct attacks on several colleagues so that
the Journal of Visual Culture, where both texts were published, devoted space
in the following issue to responses from within the field (not only from those
who felt attacked). I will be focussing here on Bal’s concept of visuality, char-
acterized by a radically semiotic approach which Mirzoeff rejects and which
Mitchell tries to combine with the dimension of the visual.
In 1991, Bal caused a sensation and drew sharp criticism from art his-
torians with Reading “Rembrandt”. Beyond the Word-Image Opposition,49 her
first book on images and visuality. Later reflecting on this work, she wrote:
“Throughout the book, I studied visuality in discourse and discursivity in
images, relations between the two, and the cultural impact of events of
encounter or struggle on vision and subjects. Instead of trying to define
visuality per se, I explored aspects and effects, forms and meanings that
47 SeeMieke Bal, AMieke Bal Reader (Chicago 2006), 280. She notes that vision is a “semi-
otic activity of an inherently rhetorical kind”.
48 See Bal, Bryson, “Semiotics and Art History”.
49 Mieke Bal, Reading “Rembrandt”. Beyond the Word-Image Opposition (Cambridge, New
York 1991). The critical reactions included Michael Podro, “Reading ‘Rembrandt’. Beyond
theWord-Image Opposition by Mieke Bal” in The BurlingtonMagazine 135, no. 1987 (1993),
699-700, and Roger Seamon, “Reading ‘Rembrandt’. Beyond theWord-Image Opposition by
Mieke Bal” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54, no. 1 (1996), 82-84. An enthusi-
astic response came fromGriselda Pollock, “Reading ‘Rembrandt’. Beyond theWord-Image
Opposition by Mieke Bal” in The Art Bulletin 75, no. 3 (1993), 529-535.
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visuality possesses or makes possible. …, visuality gained the status of a
discourse, not as subjected to language but as a kind of language with its
own capacity of meaning production.”50 Without going into detail on this
controversial book here, I will outline only those issues that relate to visuality.
In the foreword, Bal explains what moved her, as a literary scholar, to work
with images: “I could not remain blind to the fact that the overt emphasis
on the word hardly conceals an overwhelmingly visual dimension in our
culture, including both literature and the study of it. This prompted me to
study systematically the interplay of visual and verbal elements.”51 On the
one hand, Bal writes against the separation of writing/text and image, verbal
and visual communication. On the other, she picks up on two strands of
feminist theory and art history: firstly, the feminist revision of Freudian and
Lacanian psychoanalysis developed by Laura Mulvey, Kaja Silverman, Teresa
de Lauretis and Jacqueline Rose in connection with questions of looking and
the gaze; and secondly, a critique of the concept of male artistic authorship
discussed in feminist art history since the early 1980s.The latter is the reason
for the inverted commas around Rembrandt in the book’s title, labelling the
artist and his œuvre as constructions of traditional art-historical dating and
attribution.
Bal’s focus as a literary scholar is on narratology, and thus she draws an
analogy between verbal and visual narrative strategies: “If we are to bring the
verbal and the visual together, we must consider the relationship between the
position of the focalizer in the verbal narrative and the viewer in the visual.”52
Here she takes the concept of the focalizer from Gérard Genette, who dis-
tinguishes between narrator (the person telling the story) and focalizer (the
person who sees), and develops it further.53 The focalizer is the figure through
whose eyes and thoughts the story is seen; the reader follows and identifies
with the viewpoint of this figure – with seeing used as a metaphor here for
the function performed by the focalizer in the narrative text: “focalization be-
50 Mieke Bal, Looking in: The Art of Viewing (Introduction by Norman Bryson) (Amsterdam
2001), 266.
51 Bal, Reading “Rembrandt”, xiii.
52 Ibid., 141.
53 On focalization in narratology, see Gérard GenetteGenette, Narrative Discourse (New
York, 1980). French: Discours du récit in Figures III (Paris 1972). On focalization in Bal,
besidesReading“Rembrandt”, see also the chapter on “Dispersing theGaze: Focalization”
in Looking In, 41-64.
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longs to the story; it is the layer between the linguistic text and the fabula”,54
fabula being the story that is read or seen. By creating this analogy between
focalization in the text and seeing in the visual (text), Bal interconnects text
and image – although she limits seeing to the function of producing mean-
ing in the context of the narrative and its reception. The example she uses
to illustrate this interconnection is Rembrandt’s painting Susanna and the El-
ders, which is based on a written story: “I shall propose a visual reading of the
biblical Susanna story and a narrative reading of the paintings.”55
This process of seeing linking text/image and reader/viewer as the basis
for interpretation, is expressed via a feminist terminology of “voyeurism, the
glance, and the gaze”.56 Bal thus borrows narratology with its visual metaphor
of focalization from literary theory and then transfers it back to its visual
source, linking it with the feminist critique of the patriarchal scopic regime.
This is based on a key assumption: that seeing, which Bal treats as both visual
and verbal, is the semiotic activity. Seeing is thus not only responsible for col-
lecting the information for an interpretation; the interpretation already takes
place in the act of seeing. “In narrative discourse, focalization is the direct
content of the linguistic signifiers. In visual art, it would thus be the direct
content of visual signifiers, such as lines, dots, light and dark, and composi-
tion. In both cases, focalization is already an interpretation, or subjectivized
content.”57 Those elements of a picture discussed in art history under cate-
gories of form, technique and style – the aesthetic and material constitution
of the painted surface – are thus included here in the production of mean-
ing and its interpretation as signifiers. Focalizers within the picture, such as
eye contact, directed gazes or pointing gestures between figures, are just as
important as similar focalizers linking the figures in the painting with the
viewer.
The connections between narratology and reception aesthetics, as im-
ported from German literary theory into art history by Wolfgang Kemp,
are twofold: both are oriented towards reception, and both view pictures in
terms of narrative. The meaning produced in the act of seeing is a narrative.
As a basic assumption this is, I suggest, too narrow a view of what visual
objects can evoke in the recipient and of what might count as meaning. If
54 Bal, Looking In, 47.
55 See Bal, Reading “Rembrandt”, chapter 4, 141.
56 Ibid.
57 Bal, Looking In, 54 (my italics).
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one does not follow this assumption of narrative as the ultimate producer of
meaning in the sense of an anthropological constant, one must ask whether
focalization can only work for narrative pictures – like Susanna and the Elders,
which can be classified within the genre of history painting due to being
based on a biblical story.
Focalization and focalizer are metaphors for a model of communication
between object/picture and viewer that functions via an identification of the
viewer with the focalizing agent. The focalizing agent generates an “appeal to
identification”.58 This basic assumption concerning the communication be-
tween text/image and reader/viewer is unthinkable without psychoanalytical
theory. In film theory, for example, the psychoanalytical concept of identifi-
cation formed the basis of Laura Mulvey’s conception of the male gaze and
visual pleasure. Mulvey identified an active (male) and a passive (female) pole
of reception, tracing this back to the filmic structure of identification within
the rigid setting of consuming Hollywood movies. And her proposed strategy
of resistance to this power constellation of the gaze is also directed against the
inner narrative structure of such movies: this structure should be destroyed
by means of avant-garde filmmaking and with it the conditions for identi-
fication within the scopic regime of the gaze. Bal’s assumptions concerning
the conditions of communication between visual object (picture, film) and
viewer differ fromMulvey’s. Bal sees potential for resistance to the gaze in her
reading-based strategy of focalization: “As I see it, at the heart of focalization,
and hence, of both linguistic narrative and visual art, is a hub that shifts and
destabilizes the gaze.”59 While Mulvey argues in terms of production (the film
itself must change), Bal proposes a specific strategy for reception.
In his introduction to a collection of Bal’s essays, Norman Bryson gives his
analysis of the differences between the strategies marshalled by Mulvey and
Bal against the gaze,60 referring to Mulvey’s theory of the gaze as optical and
to Bal’s as rhetorical or semiotic. Mulvey’s stage for the gaze is the cinema: a
darkened room, the audience fix their gaze on the screen, only the beam of
light from the projector and the surface of the screen are visible. As a space,
this setting, as I indicated earlier, resembles the Albertian construction of
58 Bal, Reading “Rembrandt”, 160.
59 Bal, Looking In, chapter on “Dispersing the Gaze: Focalization”, 42.
60 Norman Bryson, “Introduction” in Bal, Looking In, 1-40. On Mulvey and Bal, see espe-
cially 6-12.
154 Beyond the Mirror
perspective with a fixed viewer position and the visual pyramid between pro-
jector and screen, into which the viewer inserts herself. “Mulvey’s model reca-
pitulates centuries of optical speculation in the West, faithfully retracing its
perennial geometry: the retina, the lens, and the plane of representations.”61
Here it is again, that reprehensible western one-point perspective,which fixes
the gaze within an order and knows only one direction of looking, only one
focus.
Not so Bal’s model. In her work, Bryson asserts: “sight is figured not as
scenic but as semiotic.The first step is to postulate signs rather than scenes as
the basic stuff of vision.” He continues: “The space is that of discourse rather
than projective geometry: of any human language where there are signs for
I, you, she, he – and where there exist stories, narratives (perhaps the key term
in all of Bal’s work).”62 In contrast to the “implacable dualism”63 of active sub-
ject position and passive object position inMulvey’s model, Bal’s is multifocal.
Her transfer of focalization from literary theory into the visual realm opens up
possibilities of seeing that are not subject to any polarization. It can be read
as a kind of counter-model to one-point perspective and thus as an eman-
cipation of the viewer position from perspective’s fixedness: “Resistance is
built into each point of the image’s field: the narrator ‘Rembrandt’, Lucretia,
the viewer. That each point possesses powers of resistance creates a far more
complex and volatile arena of power in vision …: power not as a monolith, or
pyramid (the ‘visual pyramid’), …, but rather a set of relations or a ‘swarm of
points’ (Foucault) such that the possibility of reversing the power relation is
present at each node of the image’s focalization.”64 But Bryson’s characteriza-
tion of Bal’s approach, making her semioticization of seeing responsible for
emancipating it from a fixed dualism, seems to me inherently indebted to the
antivisualism of French poststructuralism as diagnosed by Martin Jay.65
In her Rembrandt book, Bal’s use of the term visuality is correspondingly
flexible. It covers more than the gaze or the glance. In specific cases, it may
be about the visuality of a picture, as when Bal writes of the “self-evidential
effect of the painting” that is attributed to the visuality of the picture.66 This
kind of visuality relates to reception (the effect) and is not conceived of in
61 Ibid., 8.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 9.
64 Ibid., 15.
65 See Jay, Downcast Eyes.
66 Bal, Reading “Rembrandt”, 270.
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ontological terms. But visuality is also the Other of discursivity, two poles
that Bal is interested in interweaving not in the sense of an abolition of the
difference between image and text, but by integrating discursivity “into the
very center of visuality. Thus she approvingly notes of Alpers’ and Steinberg’s
interpretations of Velasquez’s Las Meninas that, rather than reading the pic-
ture with a “stable conception of the sign”, they explain it as a “sign event”
between image and interpreter, integrating the discourses about the picture
into the interpretation.67 The sign event in Bal corresponds to the visual event
in Mirzoeff.
Bal’s founding of visuality in psychoanalysis is theoretically pivotal, as it
forms the basis for her other case studies. It is also here, however, that an an-
thropological constant creeps in of the kind that becomes inevitable as soon as
psychoanalysis is deployed as a metatheory: Bal speaks in a Freudian sense of
“primary visuality” as the experience that brings forth a fear of castration. Vi-
suality is thus an experience that is both a fundamental and a gender-specific
part of identity formation.68 Another fundamental nexus between self and
visuality in Bal is the psychoanalytical concept of narcissism, which is based
on the motif of the mirror and in which the fraught relationship between self
and other is read as a kind of visual allegory.69 This motif runs through the
Rembrandt book in various combinations; to borrow a metaphor from music
theory it forms the dominant of Bal’s thinking.
Finally, Bal’s intellectual trains of thought and arguments seem to me to
be based on metaphors of the visual. One might even say that visuality is
the allegory of her theory and of her modus operandi. The result of this, as
Michael Podro puts it in his review of the Rembrandt book, is “to make the
picture an image of its criticism”.70 Looking back, she described her personal
turn towards the visual: “I felt empowered by visuality and knew that … I had
to explore this concept further.”71 It seems to me that Bal tries to speak/write
visuality, or, conversely, to bring forth visuality in writing.
What of the relationship between artist/object/interpreter? In Podro’s
view, Bal’s interpretative practice does not offer a dialogical relationship be-
tween interpreter and object because its self-reflexivity (which he sees as the
core of her writing) ends up with the work reflecting her own process back at
67 Ibid., 277.
68 Ibid., 288.
69 See in particular Bal, Reading “Rembrandt”, 18 f., and chapters 7, 8 and 9.
70 Podro, “Beyond the Word-Image Opposition”, 699.
71 Bal, Looking In, 265.
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her. Bal’s basic assumption that signs receive their meaning from the viewer,
he claims, leads to the difference between the work and our “discourse upon
it” being overwritten or suspended.72 This is contrasted with his view that “if
we recognize that utterances and depictions address and show themselves
to a viewer and that this is a fact internal to their making, then we see that
at the centre of our activity is the respect of painter for viewer and vice-
versa”. And he adds: “The reciprocity of conversation is a better model for
the relation of viewer to work than interpreting our own dreams.” To this
reciprocity, he adds the distancing motif of historical imagination, because
“otherwise we simply allow our own concerns and obsessions to feed on the
works at which we look”.
But is the dialogical model, characterized by Podro as an ethical one via
his use of the word ‘respect’, even compatible with Lacan’s narcissistic model
of the gaze on which Bal’s position is based? This question implies further
problems for both art history and visual culture studies, such as that of the
relationship between interpretative present and historical alterity, or unfa-
miliarity, of the object. Like Bryson, Bal argues for the present as the sole
legitimate moment of interpretation, while the historicity of the object must
be considered as inaccessible and any effort in this direction, out of a desire
for objectivity, can only be “pseudo”.
But quite apart from the fact that the very intensity of the recurring dis-
putes over the relevance of history to the present speaks in favour of such a
relevance, it is the material presence of the historical object in a context de-
termined by contemporary culture that sets in motion the interpreter’s con-
frontation with the object.What is most interesting here is the way this ques-
tion of historicity, which plays an important role in the academic policing of
the borders between art history and visual culture studies, acquires relevance
precisely in connection with visuality. Bryson, Mirzoeff and Bal share a ten-
dency towards a certain presentism. For Mirzoeff, it is the presence of the
fascinated and manipulated consumer; for Bal and Bryson, that of the see-
ing, reading interpreter.
72 Podro, “Beyond the Word-Image Opposition”, 700.
7. Seeing as a Political Resource
in Visual Culture Studies
Visual culture studies has become a sprawling field. Every conceivable disci-
pline is now making links to visual culture, from art history to art education,
film, media and theatre studies, literary theory, and the other usual suspects,
through to anthropology, history, sociology, theology, jurisprudence, theol-
ogy and even computer science, neurobiology, medicine, and other natural
sciences. In 2006, Marquard Smith remarked: “the huge number of books
[about visual culture] tells us that the phrase ‘visual culture’ is becoming ubiq-
uitous, omnipresent, that it can and is being used to signify works or artefacts
or spaces from any historical period, geographical location, thematic concern,
or combination of methodological practices. Because of this, the phrase visual
culture conveys little that is specific to our past or present visual culture per
se. It seems that visual culture is everywhere, and thus nowhere, wholly over-
determined and almost meaningless simultaneously.”1 In the same spirit, vi-
sual culture was often included in the titles and introductions of publications
to give conventional takes on subject matter from all manner of disciplines
an aura of topicality.
Eleven years after being cited byMitchell in 1995 as prospects, the themes,
objects and methodologies listed by Smith give a picture of the field that is
every bit as vague as Mitchell’s attempt to characterize visual culture with-
out restrictive definitions. The thematic framework of the publications may
be historically synchronous or diachronic, regional or national; it may orient
1 Marquard Smith, “Visual Culture Studies: Questions of History, Theory, and Practice”
in Amelia Jones (ed.), A Companion to Contemporary Art since 1945 (Oxford 2006), 471-
489: 473. Over a few pages, Smith also offers a survey of the publishing history to date
that tries to tackle the full breadth of applications, as well as his version of a possible
genealogy for visual culture studies.
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itself towards themes of race, class, gender and sexuality that emerged from
the political agenda of recent decades and which shaped visual culture stud-
ies as a “political and ethical field of study”.2 Smith also notes that most of
these books with “visual culture” in the title are readers and introductions for
a student readership. He describes them as “methodological inquiries, cabi-
nets of curiosity” that deal on the one hand with the production, circulation
and consumption of pictures and the “changing nature of subjectivity” and,
on the other, with gazes, visual practices and technologies.What they all have
in common is that they identify the points where “images and objects and
subjects and environments overlap, blur and converge with and mediate one
another”;3 using a metaphor from digital culture, these points could also be
referred to as interfaces.
To come to terms with this wealth of material beyond Smith’s loose struc-
turing, I will therefore examine three strategies used in studies of the gaze
to deal with concepts of seeing in their specific application to visual objects.
The main question here is that of how the concept of the gaze is linked with
the problems inherent in the category of identity. As examples I have chosen
two texts that represent opposite extremes. In both cases, it is a matter of
how to deal with the discriminating gazes in such a way that the discrimi-
nated groups in question might transform their situation within this field of
discriminatory visual practices and arrive at pictures of their “own” identity.
These are: gay and lesbian in the case of Norman Bryson’s “Todd Haynes’s Poi-
son and Queer Cinema”, and Afro-American female in the case of bell hooks’
“The Oppositional Gaze – Black Female Spectators”. A third text by Martin A.
Berger serves as an example of how evidence of a normative visuality is de-
fined, based not on discriminatory stereotypes but on visual representations
of the world, in this case the AmericanWest, seen once through the eyes of the
conquering “white man” and once through those of the “native”. For Bryson
and hooks, the political agenda of visual culture studies is the driving force,
claiming recognition for the identity of discriminated groups. Berger, on the
other hand, links the academic perspective (with its critique of one-point per-
spective as a figure of power and logocentrism) with the political agenda.
2 Smith, “Visual Culture Studies”, 472.
3 Ibid., 473.
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The stigmatizing gaze – ‘Integration and positive revaluation’ –
Norman Bryson
Norman Bryson’s text Todd Haynes’s Poison and Queer Cinema from 19994 ex-
emplifies the transformation of the evil eye into the metaphor of the socially
controlling and repressive gaze, as outlined not only by Martin Jay but also by
Margaret Olin.5 Based on his critique of gay and lesbian studies, Bryson com-
bines the model of the gaze with the heteronormativity of society. In Bryson’s
view, gay and lesbian studies have a problem similar to that faced more than
two decades previously by feminist art historians: it could not be merely a
matter of healing the discrimination of women/lesbians/gays by discovering
the forgotten heroes of these “minorities” and making them public. Around
1970, feminist art history began with the objective of expanding the conven-
tional canon to include forgotten and repressed “female” artists, only to dis-
cover that this resulted in neither a critique nor a disempowerment of the pa-
triarchy. And in the late 1980s, the art historical branch of the gay and lesbian
movement, that wanted to canonize Leonardo, Michelangelo, David Hockney
or Robert Mapplethorpe as gay artists, came to similar conclusions, accen-
tuated by the political experience of being made responsible for the AIDS
epidemic.
Bryson seeks to respond to this “minoritarian” strategy with a “majoritar-
ian position”6 along the lines of queer studies: the stigmatization of gay and
lesbian people and their culture is not a local problem that could be dealt with
via a politics of inclusion. Instead, it is linked to all of the various dimensions
of cultural normativity. Which is why it cannot be a matter of adding gay and
lesbian positions to the “normal” canon to gain access to “the club”. Instead,
one must study the structures of coercive heteronormativity which shape the
cultural canon and its organization – while bearing in mind that this same
coercive heteronormativity also permeates the visual field of the homosexual
scene.
With this argument, Bryson achieves two things: he declares the “visual
field” to be the central element of heteronormative coercion and culture, and
4 Norman Bryson, “Todd Haynes’s Poison and Queer Cinema” in Invisible Culture. An Elec-
tronic Journal for Visual Studies, 1999, http://www.rochester.edu/in_visible_culture/is-
sue1/bryson (accessed 26 Sept 2016).
5 See chapter 5, The evil eye and a counter-model –Margaret Olin, in this book.
6 Bryson, “Todd Haynes’s Poison”, 2.
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he makes it clear that the task of queer art history and visual culture studies
consists in studying this visual field with its preordained structures for het-
eronormative inclusion and exclusion.This in turn has further consequences,
since the assumption of a heteronormative structuring of society depends on
the assumption of social and cultural constructivism. This implies a critique
of the identity politics of “minorities” that is already familiar: “An acute prob-
lem within minoritarian cultural politics is the tendency to dramatize and
to valorize authentic expressions of the minority in question: the minority
is thought of as embodied in a particularly radical or foundational way,”7 a
position also known as essentialism that insists on authenticity of identity
beyond the shaping influence of culture – identity in aspic, as Gayatri Spivak
has called it.
For Bryson, then, it cannot be a question of looking for visual evidence
of gay and lesbian “authenticity”. Instead, it is about examining coercively
heteronormative structures since it is they that produce not only the subjects
included in heteronormativity but also those it excludes. For both, this pro-
cess is crucially accompanied by desire and the denial of desire, as expressed,
among others, in homophobia. At this point in Bryson’s argument, the gaze
comes into play, as homophobia is a “visual operation”.8 The precondition for
this is the historical shift, described by Foucault, from the sodomite act to the
homosexual type as the basic marker for homosexuality and its punishment.9
Since the early 19th century, techniques of visual taxonomy such as photogra-
phy made it possible to catalogue, archive and manage what was considered
socially, ethnically, racially and sexually “abnormal” – from criminals, the in-
sane and the ill, through to Jews, homosexuals, and so forth. Abnormality
is thus produced in a form “that manifests it directly to the naked eye: de-
viance or degeneration as a face”.10 But the homosexual was a “notoriously
elusive type”; the signs of homosexuality were “penumbral and deceptive”11
and mostly only decipherable by members of the scene themselves. “Among
the myriad forms of deviancy, it is homosexuality, in fact, that tests the powers
of the normalizing gaze to its limits.”12
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 5.
9 See Michel Foucault,History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: TheWill to Knowledge (Histoire de la sexu-
alité, I: La volonté de savoir, Paris 1976).
10 Bryson, “Todd Haynes’s Poison”, 7.
11 Ibid., 8.
12 Ibid., 9, (my italics).
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The ‘normalizing gaze’, the ‘homophobic gaze’, the ‘gaze of the stigma-
tizor’, the ‘diagnostic gaze’ – with these variants, Bryson creates pointed
metaphors in his description of the visualization strategies of heteronorma-
tive taxonomy. This gaze is not a simple look; it stares, bores, penetrates to
the stigmatized body’s most intimate places to shed light on the “penumbra”
of the elusive homosexual “type” and render it visible. This “gaze seeks out
its enemies”; the stigmatizor must get dangerously close to the deviant
body in order to even find out whether/that it is indeed deviant. “From the
stigmatizor’s viewpoint the stigma is intended as a brand, an inscription of
the sign of criminality; but at the same time the stigma is the very point
closest to desire, where complicity becomes inescapable, and alien desire
irrupts into the visual field of the stigmatizor.”13
At this point, the stigmatizor is gripped by a visual panic, a “disruption of
the visual field that lies at the foundation of heteronormative visuality”. The
diagnostic gaze is contradictory, it is a sadistic, invasive procedure likened
to branding the deviant body, but at the moment of applying the hot iron
“the whole visual field suddenly buckles and bends around”.14 In ever more
metaphorically charged language, Bryson describes how a secretion oozes
through stigmata from the deviant side to the “normal” side of the stigma-
tizor, “the secretion of a secret”. The stigma, inflicted by the invasive gaze,
becomes the membrane that overcomes, or at least jeopardizes, the division
between deviance and normality. The “brand-become-infection” defines ho-
mophobic panic as a visual field.15 This gaze is closely related to the evil eye.
One key difference results from its link to the construction of identity – both
“normal” identity as secured via a distinction based on visual evidence and
“deviant” identity established by inflicting a mark by which such an ‘identity’
will be recognized.
Bryson turns the tables and asks how a reversal of this stigmatization
might look. If we follow Bryson’s version of the gaze, cast by the stigmatizor
onto the deviant subject (it remains unclear whether the stigmatizor is meant
as a subject or as a Foucauldian dispositif ), then it must involve, I suggest,
turning the gaze from the deviant back onto the stigmatizor. Bryson makes
another proposal that adopts the strategies of the lesbian and gay subculture:
those who have been socially nullified and rendered invisible by this stigma
13 All quotations in this paragraph, ibid, 9-10.
14 Ibid., 10.
15 Ibid., 11.
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reclaim it, making it their own in erotic and critical terms. I suggest a de-
scription of this process as a libidinous reconfiguration. “The stigmatization
could itself be treated as a modality of desire, whose origins lay ultimately in
the brand, the mark, the seal.”16 In Bryson’s model, the stigma becomes the
site of queer desire.
Gay subculture in particular offers countless examples of this tactic.
Bryson chooses Todd Haynes’s film Poison. He is especially interested in
the film’s plot, whereas he devotes little attention to the way it is made in
terms of the gaze, although such a focus would bring cinema itself as a
visual apparatus and scopic regime into play, allowing the theoretical concept
of the gaze to be adequately applied to the film (it is worth recalling that
in her analysis of Fassbinder’s film based on the same material by Genet,
Kaja Silverman deals with the gaze entirely on this level.17) Instead, Bryson
focuses on Haynes’s stylistic use of parody and the artificiality which, he
claims, produces a Brechtian alienation effect, preventing identification.
In this way, Poison is reduced to the function of evidence for Bryson’s pro-
posal to recode the stigma into a marking of gay identity that is positively
coded in terms of “deviant” desire – an identity that also has a supposedly
critical quality (via alienation).18 For my questions on the practice of visual
culture studies, Bryson’s remarks are interesting because they introduce the
concept of the gaze into visual culture studies in connection with a specific
identity politics. He does so via a rhetoric whose persuasive power derives
from metaphors of the visual: visual panic, visual field, visual operation,
homophobic, diagnostic, medico-juridical gaze.
In his discussion of Poison Bryson’s gaze goes in one direction only. The
stigmatizor looks, the person looked at does not look back, but appropriates
the look and integrates it into the structure of his own desire. This gay tactic
is the most radical manifestation of the issue raised by identity politics of
visibility, whatever their strategic limitations: the appropriation of external
images as self-images in groups whose internal structures of belonging are
also determined via these images. This tactic is also radical in its narcissistic
16 Ibid., 12.
17 Silverman, “Fassbinder and Lacan”. It is also surprising that Bryson doesn’t even men-
tion this fundamental text, in spite of its thematic and theoretical relevance, and in
spite of the fact that it was published under his editorship.
18 In 1999, such a claim is more the re-enactment of an already established practice that
can only be seen as politically urgent if one takes gayAIDS activism into account (which
had been ongoing outside universities since the mid-1980s).
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structure. Such attempts to force recognition of deviance within a normative
framework by recognizing oneself in the image of this deviance may have the
short-term success of shifting the borders of what is recognized, but the price
is high: for one thing, these images will have to be internalized to a certain
degree and, for another, the groups showing themselves in this way not only
become visible, but their distinctive markings become consumable.
How can Bryson’s view of the relationship between gaze and object be
summed up? The gaze produces the stigma (it remains unclear whether this
gaze is meant to stand for the social discourse of homophobia in general or a
characterization of the homophobic activity of a perpetrator, the stigmatizor
– probably both); the visual representation of the stigma becomes the thing that
is sought out in the object (in this case the film). What can be considered or
referred to as such a representation is a matter of interpretation. We could
also say that the stigma is Bryson’s main aim of inquiry, which in turn struc-
tures both his use of the gaze concept and his pinpointing of the stigma in
specific iconographic and narrative elements of the film. The interpretative
tools of his approach, then, are iconography/motifs and content/plot, rather
than any focus onmedia-specific characteristics of film itself, shot and edited
using specific technologies and procedures with regard to gazes both within
the film and between film and viewer. The potential for such a dialogical ap-
proach to the film medium (an exchange of gazes between film and viewer
forms the basis for interpretation) is demonstrated by Silverman’s Fassbinder
essay. For Bryson, the film is not a counterpart of the viewer/interpreter in
the sense of dialogical seeing, but a reservoir of evidence (in the form of mo-
tifs and storylines) for the detection of a homophobic stigma and its inversion
into homosexual desire.
For Bryson, at the time of its publication in 1999 at least, this text was
programmatic – politically for the queer movement and academically for vi-
sual culture studies and art history. With regard to my examination of visual
culture studies, I consider Bryson’s text to be symptomatic and thus impor-
tant. And my reading of it is guided not only by the questions I address to
visual culture studies, but also by my own experience as a feminist activist
and intellectual since the 1970s, when I was soon confronted with the pitfalls
of identity politics. The text shows how an intensely identity-focused agenda
based on visuality impacts on the process of interpretation. By 1999, the tactic
of integrating discriminatory stereotypes into the self-image of discriminated
groups, a tactic radically demonstrated by Bryson here, had already been the
subject of critical discussion in political circles for years – highlighting the
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way academic agendas tend to lag behind political activism. The essay is also
symptomatic in what I see as its narcissistic tautologization of the exchange
of glances between film and viewer. By this I mean a closed circuit established
between the gaze of the viewer, in this case the interpreter and – that same
viewer. The film itself is but the trigger for this tautology of the gaze. In what
follows I will examine a position that responds to the discriminating gaze not
with integration, but with opposition.
The discriminating and the oppositional gaze – bell hooks
On account of the word’s double meaning (“degrading or excluding individ-
uals or groups” but also “capable of making fine distinctions”) a “discrimi-
nating” gaze may be about selecting nuances of colour for sofa cushions, but
also about using socially constructed markers to make distinctions that play
a crucial role in determining whether or not a person belongs to a discrimi-
nated group. Bryson’s stigma is a metaphor for such markers, adding a sub-
text charged with Christian associations of suffering, sacrifice and desire.The
gaze produces the stigma, seeks it out and finds it in a circular movement, as
a productive and reproductive part of visual discourses. In Bryson’s version,
as in that of Laura Mulvey, for example, this gaze falls on a passive object that
is ultimately the victim of this gaze and the discourses in which it partakes.
Many texts in visual culture studies follow this pattern when they study the
stereotypeswithwhich discriminated groups are visualised.This researchwas
and is important in order to render the history of such stereotyping visible
and thus to underline the visual dimension of both manifest and, more espe-
cially, latent racism in all its manifold cultural symptoms. But it does also have
its strategic pitfalls: when the concept of the gaze is used in this way, the gaze
is identical with the images it has produced. Put another way: the images of
racism give a transparent view of the discriminating gaze, of which they are
also evidence. Such an approach to visual culture cannot escape a politics of
the victim, since the possibility of looking back is not considered.Themaster-
servant relationship is unambiguous. In methodological terms, the result of
deploying the gaze in this way, in the study of racist, sexist, ethnic and other
stereotypes, is closely related to art-historical iconography: pictures and their
components are viewed as representations of something else. Unlike in art
history, however, such gathering of visual evidence of social discrimination is
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underpinned here by an openly articulated agenda that is highly dramatic in
political terms.
In 1992, early in the history of visual culture studies (but 17 years after
Mulvey’s Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema claimed the impossibility of ac-
tive looking for women in Hollywood movies), the African-American theorist,
film critic and artist bell hooks made a counterproposal, opposing a strategy
of resistance to the passivity of those touched by the gaze.19 Her essay was ti-
tled “The Oppositional Gaze – Black Female Spectators”. It came neither from
art history nor from visual culture studies itself, but, once again, from film
studies which, since Mulvey if not before, had been strongly shaped by fem-
inist ideas and engaged intensively with questions of viewer positions and
the gaze. In hooks’ text, gaze, identity, agency, gender and race are dealt with
together.
Like Bryson, hooks proposes countering the discriminating gaze. But
there is a radical difference between their positions: rather than the dis-
criminated appropriating the stereotypical image produced by this gaze and
integrating it into their own desire (as with Bryson’s stigma), her strategy
involves staring back. Rather than establishing it as something that must
first be established, hooks derives this “oppositional gaze” (that seems to
be the exact opposite of the “stigmatizing gaze”) from a way of looking
already practised by slaves. The ban on looking to which they were subjected
(looking back was punished) produced in them an overwhelming desire “to
look, a rebellious desire, an oppositional gaze”.20 Even in situations of the
worst oppression, the ability to manipulate one’s own gaze in the face of
structures of power that seek to restrict it opens up the possibility of agency,
a key concept in the debate on poststructuralist critiques of the subject and
their impact on thinking about the subject’s scope for action in the political
struggles since the 1970s. In the texts on gaze and visuality discussed above,
this concept played no part; this may have to do with the passive-paranoid
readings of the concepts of the gaze which (as the example of Bryson shows)
19 bell hooks, “The Oppositional Gaze – Black Female Spectators” in Black Looks: Race and
Representation (Boston 1992), 115-131. I do not mean to suggest that there were no pre-
vious critical responses to Mulvey’s text; other feminist film critics criticized Mulvey’s
gender-specific distinction between an active male position of visual pleasure and a
passive female one of being looked at, the earliest such critique coming from Kaja Sil-
verman, “Masochism and Subjectivity” in Framework 12 (1980). 2-9.
20 hooks, “The Oppositional Gaze”, 116.
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lead to a victimization of the subject by the gaze. It is this that hooks is
writing against.
hooks wants to take a practice of looking that emerged in a situation of
oppression and update it for use in resistance to power. She refers not to Lacan
but to Foucault, according to whom the potential for resistance exists within
all relations of power; critical thinkers must seek out the “margins, gaps and
locations on and through the body where agency can be found”.21 For hooks,
the gaze is one such location: “Subordinates in relations of power learn expe-
rientially that there is a critical gaze, one that ‘looks’ to document, one that
is oppositional.” African Americans, then, derive this specific gaze from the
experience of slavery. For the current media situation this entails a special ex-
perience of looking: “To stare at television, or mainstream movies, to engage
its images, was to engage its negation of black representation.”22 Resistance,
she argues, thus takes the form of rejecting a certain identity-based represen-
tation in the narrative medium.The oppositional black gaze responded to this
by developing independent black cinema; the progress of the political move-
ments for racial equality could be gauged by the construction of new images
of black identity.
hooks’ construction of a “black female spectatorship”23 that resists the
white mainstream is framed by three concepts: agency, narration and repre-
sentation. Quoting Manthia Diawara, she asserts that “every narration places
the spectator in a position of agency,” especially atmoments of “rupture”when
the viewer resists identification with the film’s discourse.24 Unlike Mulvey,
however, hooks sees such “ruptures” not in the filmic mode itself, as when a
plot is interrupted, fragmented or undermined, but in the narrative treatment
of stereotypes of race and gender. In other words: not the formal structure,25
but the plot, and especially the use of characterization (a typical example be-
ing the matronly black servant who can only stand in for the white children’s
mother because she is not allowed to have children herself), give rise to the
kind of experience that brings forth the oppositional gaze: the negative or
withheld representation of an identity that is both black and female, as hooks
focuses on this double discrimination.The paradigm of representation as the
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 117.
23 Ibid., 118.
24 Ibid., 117.
25 Here I would refer again toMulvey’s call for an avant-garde aesthetic of fragmentation
as a weapon against the identificatory pull of narrative Hollywood cinema.
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key element of identity politics, on the other hand, is something hooks bor-
rows from Stuart Hall.
So what does the oppositional gaze do? “Within my family’s southern
black working-class home, located in a racially segregated neighborhood,
watching television was one way to develop critical spectatorship. Unless you
went to work in the white world, across the tracks, you learned to look at
white people by staring at them on the screen. … Before racial integration,
black viewers of movies and television experienced visual pleasure in a
context where looking was also about contestation and confrontation.”26 The
oppositional gaze overcomes the pain of being confronted with humiliating
portrayals of black female stereotypes in the film by learning how racism
determines the visual construction of gender in cinema. While Mulvey, for
example, situates female criticality in a position “outside that pleasure of
looking”, in hooks’ model the black female viewers actively refuse to identify
with the “imaginary subjects” of the film because “such identification was
disenabling”.27 Mulvey’s distinction between active/male and passive/female
becomes irrelevant for the oppositional gaze of the black female viewers
insofar as they refuse to identify with the film representation of white
womanhood that forms the passive pole in Mulvey’s model. “Black female
spectators, who refused to identify with white womanhood, who would not
take on the phallocentric gaze of desire and possession, created a critical
space where the binary opposition Mulvey posits of ‘woman as image, man
as bearer of the look’ was continually deconstructed.”28 hooks thus identifies
specific differences between the viewer positions of black and white women
that are the result of lived, historically determined experience with the socio-
cultural conditions and effects of racism. For Mulvey, the strategic goal is a
feminist “disaffection” with Hollywood cinema, whereas for hooks resistance
to the role models for black women presented in films is the “starting point
for many black women approaching cinema within the lived harsh reality of
racism”.29 This is also the starting point for hooks’ critique of feminist film
criticism’s blindness to racism, as black women viewers identify with none
of the postulated viewer positions – neither with the phallocentric gaze nor
with the construction of white womanhood as a lack. Critical “black female
26 hooks, “The Oppositional Gaze”, 117.
27 Ibid., 122.
28 Ibid., 122-123.
29 Ibid., 125.
168 Beyond the Mirror
spectators construct a theory of looking relations where cinematic visual
delight is the pleasure of interrogation”.30 For hooks, this practice of critical
questioning then gives rise to the discursive space that makes it possible for
black women directors to formulate narratives with different representations
of black womanhood; the aim is to find new transgressive possibilities for
the formulation of identity and “new points of recognition”, thus helping to
construct a radical black female subjectivity. The examples given by hooks
for such moments describe eye contact between black characters in films,
a “shared gaze” that testifies to solidarity between women31 and to their
subjecthood.
hooks’ use of the gaze is ambivalent – besides the oppositional gaze, there
is also the repressive gaze that makes women the victims of looking and of
male desire. hooks uses the terms gaze and look with no clear theoretical dis-
tinction, more on the basis of mood: the gaze is either discriminating, mak-
ing victims, or it is actively turned against this dominant gaze by the victim, a
gaze that stares back – in both cases, it implies a form of aggressiveness and
a corresponding directedness; the look, on the other hand, comes into play
when it is a question of the investigative, analytical, learning visual mode
which, in hooks’ view, characterizes the visual pleasure of black women in
particular, including their enjoyment of Hollywood movies.32 Seeing relates
here on the one hand to a discursive, critical practice of watching and, on the
other, to glances exchanged within the film narrative. Critical spectatorship
in turn focuses on unmasking stereotypes, but also on recognizing and ac-
knowledging counter-models of identity devised by the narratives in films by
black women directors. In both cases, the narrative is the object of seeing.
For hooks, the pleasure of the critical gaze derives from the contrary
movements of unmasking negative identity models and the construction and
perception of new, positive identities. This pleasure arises not in individual,
isolated seeing but in a political context of community, discussion and aware-
ness.While this seeing itself can therefore not be described as dialogical with
regard to its object (film), the context of this seeing is distinctly dialogical.
This is also apparent in hooks’ descriptions of specific, shared moments of
such visual experience and the ways they are dealt with. What is actually
30 Ibid., 126.
31 Ibid., 129-130.
32 By contrast, Mulvey opposes Hollywood films with avant-garde strategies to aestheti-
cally thwart all visual pleasure.
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being looked at and discussed here are identity models as represented in
film. These models become visible in the (film) narrative, in turn offering the
spectator scope for agency. The aim is the construction of new, politically
resistant identity models whose visibility is considered as a political resource.
This follows the above-mentioned political agenda of visual culture studies,
with a terminology drawn from cultural studies, especially that of Stuart
Hall.
For all the differences between their positions, hooks and Bryson both take
their evidence from the elements of narrative, of filmic plot.This is a common
methodological consequence of the focus on identity politics within visual
culture studies.The theoretical basis for this focus, formulated in the writings
of Stuart Hall, is the equation of culture with the production of meaning and
of visual objects as sites of representation of such meaning.This in turn leads
to what might loosely be termed a “content-focused” position with regard to
the objects under interpretation.
An attempt at integration from art history – Lisa Bloom
The stigmatizing and the oppositional gaze are each used to construct a differ-
ent model of the acting political subject. The evil, dominating, heteronorma-
tive, racist gaze is one side of this construction; this is countered by strategies
of the resisting gaze that are intended to foster and safeguard the agency of
discriminated subjects. These gazes are both directed at identifying external
images of stereotypes which, in a second step, evoke identity-based self-im-
ages. This second step takes different forms: while the stigmatizing gaze is
integrated into the self-image of the political subject in a narcissistic loop,
the model of the oppositional gaze describes the acting subject as one that
looks back critically, deriving a newly constructed self-image from this inter-
action in opposition to the external image. These models show the extremes
between which discriminatory stereotypes are mostly dealt with: integration
and resistance, masochism and combativeness.
One of the early readers on visual culture studies, With Other Eyes: Look-
ing at Race and Gender in Visual Culture, edited by Lisa Bloom and published in
1999,33 can be used to explore briefly attempts to transfer such concepts into
33 Lisa Bloom (ed.),WithOther Eyes: Looking at Race andGender in Visual Culture (Minneapo-
lis, London 1999).
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art history, revealing parallels with the academic perspective of visual culture
studies. The book’s stated aim was to revitalize art history, which clings to
an “idea of innocent vision as simple perception”,34 by using concepts of the
gaze from visual culture studies. The texts, all written since the mid-1980s,
bring together the main themes of the political agenda as it affects art his-
tory: feminist and antiracist criticism, expanding the discipline’s brief to cover
media and the products of popular culture, visual representations of discrimi-
nated andmarginalized identities, critiques of nationalistic visual discourses.
Bloom presents a rigid and ultimately clichéd version of “traditional” art his-
tory based on “innocent vision” as a negative foil for her aims. But art history
certainly does not work on the basis of an innocent vision, in fact it could
not even have come into existence on such grounds: a historically informed
vision cannot be innocent. As Otto Pächt’s treatise on art historical method
has shown, it involves the situatedness of the object of investigation as well as
the situatedness of the interpreter’s gaze.35 Bloom, however, uses “innocent
vision” to describe the gaze of the male art historian as normative practice in
the discipline. Of interest here is not only that Bloom uses this model of inno-
cent vision to describe art history as a discipline in need of renewal,36 but also
what alternatives she brings into play – alternatives that blend metaphors of
the gaze from the political and academic discourses of visual culture studies.37
Bloom speaks from the position of a feminist critique of the universal-
izing, objectifying male gaze that the “pure seeing” of traditional art history
reveals itself to be. This gaze is prolonged and contemplative; it takes as long
as it needs to coax the secrets from the artwork, since a great work of art
“does not spontaneously lay itself open to us”, as she quotes her chief witness
Mark Roskill,38 before laying her critical finger in the wound of this chau-
vinistic metaphor that draws its vividness from a patriarchal semantics of
gender relationships. For Bloom, this seeing that is supposedly so pure is con-
structed “as an ordinary part of the development of a craft or skill in which
an opposition between woman as image and man as bearer of the look is nat-
34 Lisa Bloom, “IntroducingWith Other Eyes” in: Lisa Bloom (ed.):With Other Eyes, 2-18: 2.
35 See chapter 3, first section, in this book.
36 She uses a model of “pure vision” that would be easy to refute, but that is not my point
here.
37 As described in chapter 4 of this book.
38 Mark Roskill,What is Art History? (Amherst 1989), 9, quoted from Bloom, “Introducing
With Other Eyes”, 2.
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uralized as part of an apprenticeship that leads to art historical mastery”. 39
This echoesMulvey’s division of the gaze into active-male and passive-female,
which Bloom, too, criticizes as overly monolithic. In Bloom’s view, the fem-
inist critique of this gaze as an art-historical practice that defines the disci-
pline’s “gendered process of investigation”40 must be expanded to include a
critique of racism, thus also thwarting monolithic identity constructions of
the female.
As alternative practices of looking, Bloom offers two examples: one is bell
hooks’ oppositional gaze, that makes the gaze the site of resistance, while
the other is based on imitation and parody, suggesting a process of seeing in
which the meaning of race and ethnicity is not uniform, since race, ethnicity
and sexuality vary between ethnic and social groups and within those groups
themselves. With this position, Bloom also articulates criticism of identity-
based essentializations within the groups. Her specific example of such a
practice is from outside art history: the Jewish lesbian performer Sarah Bern-
hardt imitated black singers as a parody of her inability “to translate herself
across racial boundaries”.41 For Bloom, this is the third possible position that
corresponds neither to the universalizing gaze of art history, nor to the op-
positional gaze of hooks that still runs the risk of fixing identities.
So much for the political agenda proposed by Bloom for traditional art
history. It intersects with the academic agenda insofar as she relates the uni-
versalizing gaze of art history to a general critique of science as formulated
by Donna Haraway. Science as hegemonic knowledge, she argues, is charac-
terized by “disengagement” and “detachment”, both of which imply a “gen-
dered privilege of knowing no bodies”42 via what Haraway calls a “conquering
gaze from nowhere”43 that has the power to see without being seen. In the
critical discourse of academic visual culture against art history, this kind of
gaze is epitomized by body-denying, predictable and static one-point per-
spective; proposed alternatives pin their hopes on the multi-perspectival art
of the Baroque or the descriptive art of Dutch painting. For Bloom’s political
agenda, however, I assume that this would be too rooted in the conventional
framework of the discipline; instead she refers to a demandmade byHaraway:
39 Bloom, “Introducing With Other Eyes”, 2.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 4.
42 Ibid., 5.
43 Haraway, “Situated Knowledges”, 188, quoted from Bloom, “Introducing With Other
Eyes”, 5.
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“feminists should work from their embodied perspectives in order to produce
what she [Haraway] calls ‘situated knowledges’”.44 These “embodied perspec-
tives” form the basis for Bloom’s project of changing art history in a way that
makes it compatible with “feminist cultural studies but with an emphasis on
the visual arts”.45
Where does she locate this knowledge via embodied perspectives?
Bloom speaks of an autobiographical turn; not as a return to authorship
deconstructed by Barthes et al, but based on the assumption of a subject
“as an embodied individual within the process of cultural interpretation”.46
And this subject – both artist and viewer – is situated within the categories
of gender, race, class and sexual orientation. Bloom’s own contribution to
the reader, “Ghosts of Ethnicity: Rethinking Art Discourses of the 1940s
and 1980s”47 looks at the way “even the most formalist aesthetic positions
are inescapably imbricated by the politics of identity”.48 Her approach, the
discourse analysis she applies to the texts of art criticism, makes it clear that
she uses the concept of perspective not in relation to seeing as a physical and
mental act or socio-cultural practice, but as a metaphor for the position from
which questions are formulated and discourses interpreted.This perspective,
which in Bloom’s writing corresponds to the political agenda of visual culture
studies, is thus the place from which the epistemes of traditional art history
(the questioning of which Foster had announced as early as 198849 on the
basis of new problematizations of seeing) must be attacked and changed.
What this might mean for the relationship between the interpretative act of
seeing and its object remains unclear.
Evidence
Having looked at concepts of the gaze in the political agenda of visual cul-
ture studies and the impact of this agenda on the search for a revised art
44 Bloom, “Introducing With Other Eyes”, 5. See Haraway, “Situated Knowledges”.
45 Bloom, “Introducing With Other Eyes”, 5.
46 Ibid., 6. However, Bloom’s reception of Haraway’s critique of science does not uphold
the dialectic between the positioning of the scientist and the objectivity of her object
of study, a dialectic on which Haraway insists, see chapter 8 in this book.
47 In Bloom (ed.),With Other Eyes.
48 Bloom, “Introducing With Other Eyes”, 10.
49 In Foster, Vision and Visuality, see chapter 4 of this book.
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history, I want to turn now to a problem that Bloom clearly did not ask her-
self: What is used as evidence? Which kinds of evidence can be found for
questions concerning new political subjects and the visual representations of
their identities? Where and how should such evidence be looked for?
The question of evidence can be asked independently of the object of visual
culture studies – since, as we have seen, the question of the object of visual
culture studies is an open one. For Mitchell, this undefined, open quality con-
stitutes the pioneering character of visual culture studies as an “indiscipline”.
As Marquard Smith said, “whether we are discussing objects or subjects or
media or environments or ways of seeing and practices of looking, the vi-
sual, or visuality, visual culture studies as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry
has the potential to create new objects of study, and it does so specifically by not
determining them in advance”.50 These “new objects of study” are taken almost
word-for-word from a text on interdisciplinarity by Roland Barthes frequently
quoted in theoretical texts seeking to underpin and legitimize visual culture
studies,51 a quotation that has clearly become so canonical as no longer to be
labelled as a quotation or reference: “In order to do interdisciplinary work it is
not enough to take a ‘subject’ (a theme) and to arrange two or three sciences
around it. Interdisciplinary study consists in creating a new object, which
belongs to no one.”52
Whereas Barthes was interested in freeing interdisciplinary work from
the constraints of institutionalized disciplines, his statement is used by Smith
to give visual culture studies a unifying foundation – a paradoxical move that
uses a statement of radical interdisciplinarity to found a discipline. As a re-
sult, visual culture studies inhabits the tension between its academic institu-
tionalization and its claim to create something which, in terms of academic
politics, “belongs to no one”. This has consequences for the question of evi-
dence. The use of evidence, as proof, is part of the register of scientific ob-
50 Smith, “Visual Culture Studies”, 479.
51 As for example in the work of Bal and Mitchell.
52 Roland Barthes, “Research: The Young” in The Rustle of Language (Berkeley, Los Ange-
les 1989), 69-75: 72. Barthes continues: “The Text is, I believe, one such object.” Original
quote from “Jeunes Chercheurs” in Communications 19, no. 19 (1972), 1-5: 3: “L’interdis-
ciplinaire, dont on parle beaucoup, ne consiste pas à confronter des disciplines déjà
constituées (dont, en fait, aucune ne consent à s’abandonner). Pour faire de l’interdis-
ciplinaire, il ne suffit pas de prendre un ‘sujet’ (un thème) et de convoquer autour deux
ou trois sciences. L’interdisciplinaire consiste à créer un objet nouveau, qui n’apparti-
enne à personne. Le Texte est, je crois, l’un de ces objets.”
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jectivity; but how does such an object of investigation take shape when visual
culture studies does not have a defined, concrete object (in the sense that the
object of art history is art)? Or should visual culture studies itself, by analogy
with Barthes’s Text (capitalized in the original) be classified as an “object which
belongs to no one”? But studies cannot be equated with their object of study.
So could visual culture be analogous to Barthes’s Text as the object of visual cul-
ture studies? Then visual culture would be to visual culture studies what text is
to semiotics, an analogy that fails in my opinion because visual culture stud-
ies is not secured by a theoretical framework comparable to that possessed
by the Text in Barthes. Visual culture was born as a combination of concepts
(vision and culture) that are not capable (individually or together) of bringing
forth a coherent theoretical framework, being shaped instead by a diversity
of positions, interests and discourse histories. Conversely, this makes visual
culture studies more flexible than semiotics as it has not only produced no co-
herent theory, but also nomethod. As a result, unlike semiotics as the study of
text, visual culture studies cannot be criticized as a totalizing interpretative
model. Visual culture studies lives as long as its theoretical and methodolog-
ical eclecticism can react to historically evolving issues.
Evidence in visual culture studies, then, must relate not to a single object
(as in the case of art history, which has art as its object of inquiry) but to
many. Object and evidence alike result from the specific line of inquiry, and
not vice versa. Neither is objective in the sense of pre-existing as things; they
are extremely discourse-dependent and must be constructed. In view of the
diversity of themes and approaches in visual culture studies, I will now read
a text whose academic research comes from the political agenda of visual
culture studies not only in terms of its position with regard to seeing, but
also concerning its construction of visual evidence, which in turn follows the
academic discourse of visual culture studies with its negative view of one-
point perspective.
Evidence of the non-visible – Martin A. Berger
In Sight Unseen. Whiteness and American Visual Culture (2005), Martin A. Berger
studies “the links between racial identification and vision”.53 His book re-
53 Martin A. Berger, Sight Unseen.Whiteness and American Visual Culture (Berkeley, Los An-
geles 2005), 1.
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sponds to problems resulting from research into the visual “politics of rep-
resentation”54 on race and racism in the United States. He gives a precise
analysis of the dilemmas faced by white scholars wishing to work on race,
the first and most difficult being that in their attempts to study visualiza-
tions of race, and in their desire to shed light on racist stereotypes, they risk
not only consolidating such images of the “racially” Other, but also, in pos-
itive terms, sexualizing, idealizing and romanticizing them. “In critiquing
the dominant construction of black, brown, or red identity, such studies have
had an undeniable impact on the material conditions of nonwhite peoples.
Yet in the light of the pernicious legacy of whites’ taking both vicarious and
physical pleasure in the bodies of nonwhites, it seems prudent to consider
the investment of whites in producing even the most progressive analyses of
nonwhite representations.”55 Berger doubts that well-meaning whites are ca-
pable of transcending “their race’s investment in depictions of nonwhites”.56
From this he draws the logical conclusion: since even progressive whites are
still white, those interested in “racial justice” should study the ways that white
identity influenced the lives of white and non-white peoples. The first step
would be for “European-American scholars”57 to shift their primary evidence
for race from black to white representations. Here he quotes bell hooks, who
made this demand as early as 1995: it is time, she writes, for “righteous white
people, to begin to fully explore the way white supremacy determines how
we see the world, even as their actions are not informed by the type of racial
prejudice that promotes overt discrimination and separation”.58 In connec-
tion with the visual conditions and effects of racism, the visual metaphor how
we see the world (recalling but not identical with the concept of worldview) takes
on a particular weight, as it highlights the dramatic importance of visual rep-
resentations of race not only in the history of racism in the United States,
but for American culture in the broadest sense. Visuality and race also have a
special connection via racist metaphors of colour.
54 Smith, “Visual Culture Studies”, 476.
55 Berger, Sight Unseen, 2.
56 Ibid., 4.
57 Berger, ibid., introduces this category as a parallel to the way whites name non-white
population groups in theUnited States (Afro-American, AsianAmerican,NativeAmeri-
can), labellingwhites as one group amongmany, countering implicit racial hierarchies.
58 bell hooks, Killing Rage: Ending Racism (New York 1995), 188, quoted from Berger, Sight
Unseen, 4.
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With regard to evidence, Berger draws a seemingly paradoxical conclu-
sion. He selects his materials “for their conspicuous distance from the politics
of race.This book not only shuns artworks containing obvious racial themes or
tropes, but also avoids analyzing images that include nonwhites.” His theory
is that “a decidedly racialized perspective animated even those cultural prod-
ucts most removed from racial concerns”.59 The “unseen” in his book’s title
refers to his basic theory that the power and omnipresence of race conditions
the meaning of American culture as a whole; his aim is to demonstrate this
using those visual artefacts that do not visibly point to racism. In this way, he
avoids not only the trap of an “insatiable white desire for racial others”60 but
also the risk of duplicating or even consolidating the obvious (racist stereo-
types) in his interpretation, even if this is done with informative intent. But
where does he see this unseen becoming visible? Which objects does he con-
sult in his search for evidence? Since he assumes the cultural omnipresence of
the racial paradigm, the question is not whether but only how the paradigm
of race “hides” in the visual “texts” in which he will discover it.
Berger’s strategy, then, consists on the one hand of shifting the focus of
attention to “white” representations and on the other of selecting material
in which the racial paradigm is not present as a theme or motif (unlike in
the portrayal of stereotypes). What does he class as “white” representations?
The answer to this question lies in his quotation from bell hooks: how we see
the world, or in the corresponding metaphor of perspective. Berger finds his
evidence in representations of how whites see the world – representations
based on “racialized viewing practices of which European Americans were
utterly unaware”.61 Berger describes his turning away from obviously racist
themes as a radical shifting of the borders of what is considered “racial”. Since
changes in the representation ofwhites and non-whites neither cause nor heal
racial inequalities, which are rooted in structural and discursive systems, he
argues that it is of central importance to look beneath the narrative surface of
images. He speaks of an “operational logic of race and its manner of guiding
the interpretation of our visual world”. He sees his task as “excavating” this
logic, for only in this way can its power in American culture be understood and
59 Ibid., 2.
60 Ibid., 3.
61 Ibid., 8.
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eliminated62 – a strong programmatic statement with which he positions his
methodological approach.
As an example of Berger’s analysis, let us consider his chapter on
“Landscape Photography and the White Gaze”. He begins by explaining the
theoretical basis for his choice of landscape photography as an object for
racism research into “white” identity. Unlike landscape painting, landscape
photographs from the American West show no human figures, thus ruling
out the narrativity that characterizes history and genre painting. In spite of
this, Berger argues, pure landscape photography is still involved in the racial
politics of its time since the cultural values active within it are the same as
those shaping the production and reception of narrative painting. He also
rebuts objections that the contemporary audience of landscape photography
around 1860 viewed photographs as faithful records of reality: photographs
appear less real when the viewers perceive a discrepancy between their values
and what the photograph shows. Conversely, they appear more real when
the photograph reflects the ideologies of the viewers. From this, Berger
concludes that photographs accepted as true by a society have a unique
potential to reveal that society’s values.63 He also assumes that images do
not shape discourse but affirm it. In other words, he constructs a chain of
causality, with ideology/discourse (Berger treats the two terms as synonyms)
as the cause and the image as the effect.64
Which characteristics of landscape photography does Berger cite as ev-
idence of the white gaze? As specific examples he takes Carleton Watson’s
photographs of the Yosemite Valley taken during a surveying expedition in
1866. Berger names two kinds of photographic gaze: “tightly focused close-
ups of monumental geological features and distant overview shots”.65 One
such distant overview shot became famous under the title The Yosemite Valley
from the Best General View.66 For Berger, this “best general view” is evidence
of the white way of looking at the nature of the American West. How does
Berger construct this evidence? In a first step, he asks what it means to pro-
duce the best general view of an amorphous object like a rugged valley seven
miles long and two miles wide. He argues that a belief in the best view of the
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 44.
64 See ibid., 1. I see this very differently. Forme, visual artefacts (not just pictures) are part
of discourse history as both producers and effects.
65 Ibid., 46.
66 See illustration, ibid., 45.
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valley implies that its component parts can be quantified, and it is true that
the photograph highlights a fixed number of landmarks that have become
the standard repertoire of postcards and tourist guides on Yosemite. In this
process, the detailed views of individual landmarks and the general view in-
terlock: the individual images of rocks, mountains and waterfalls “provided
the visual and ideological building blocks out of which the ‘general’ vistas were
created”.67 The result is a “value system” that notes the valley’s natural won-
ders in numbers that are talked up in tourist guides and integrated into the
corresponding maps. Berger’s description of this value system makes clear
what he considers to be specifically white: quantification, control over nature
via panoramic views, touristic exploitation by limitation to an unchanging set
of attractions, cartographic measurement. Although these are characteristics
commonly attributed to modern western culture, they do not yet specifically
imply the category of whiteness: this is focused by Berger in a further step
by introducing the “racially other”68 of the “white man”, the Native American,
in the form of a comparison: “We can gain a sense of the visual and cultural
bias ofWatkins and his white contemporaries by considering how indigenous
peoples viewed their environment.”He then compares the “white” cartography
of Yosemite with maps made by the region’s indigenous population, of which
only a few are documented. His example, drawn on birch bark, was found in
1841 by an officer of the Royal Engineers, fixed to stiff paper, copied and an-
notated, and is now in the British Library in London.69 Themap was fastened
by two Native American travellers to a tree along their route to give those who
came after them information about the route. Unlike “white” maps, it repre-
sents not a large section of the area but just a thin strip marking daily stages
with no differentiation between types of terrain. The map thus shows only
the traveller’s immediate surroundings, it follows no cartographic scale and
is not aligned with the compass.The size of natural phenomena is adapted to
the shape of the medium on which they are marked (in this case the piece of
bark).
It is not hard to imagine the conclusions Berger draws from the extreme
differences between these two examples: while ‘white’ cartography fulfils the
requirements of objectivizing western science, the other map shows no inter-
est in scale; it adheres only to criteria that result from the “personal experi-
67 Ibid., 47.
68 Ibid., 67.
69 See illustration, ibid., 53.
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ence”70 of the travellers. Amountain was interesting because of its connection
with the history of the community, to the spirits and ancestors, and to usable
natural resources. Unsurprisingly, then, objectivity (however constructed the
concept may be) was not a criterion for the Native Americans, and nor was
a comprehensive, panoramic view of the region. Berger’s argument has two
strands: first, he shows that the objectivity of ‘white’ maps and of landscape
photography is illusory, that the representational systems of cartography and
photography help to shape the way society sees the world; second, he frames
this gaze, beyond its categorization as western and rationalist, as white, by
contrasting it with the gaze of the Native American as the ‘racially other’, less
a view of the world as a view of his/her world. Furthermore, he situates the
categories of gender and class in the hierarchy of the dominant ‘white’ system
of representation: “In the symbolic system applied to Yosemite, race always
trumped gender and class.” He continues: “There are obvious social and polit-
ical drawbacks inherent in any attempt to establish a hierarchy of suffering,
but it remains important to appreciate how individuals who depart from re-
ligious, gendered, racial, sexual, political, or class norms pay unequal prices
for their outsider status.”71 This passage highlights the huge difficulty of an
argument that moves between the proliferating categories of marginalized or
oppressed minorities within the political project of visual culture studies.
In this argument, for all its attempts at precision, and in particular its
efforts to avoid essentializing the category of race, the category of ‘white’
remains unclear, which also has to do with the problematic fact that this
category usually remains unnamed in the cultural system as the denomina-
tion of the dominant group with regard to racial others, just as other nor-
mative and hegemonic categories (masculinity, heterosexuality, etc.) remain
unnamed with regard to the deviations from them. In the course of the argu-
ment, however, it becomes clear that Berger is speaking of the whites as the
dominant group that shapes and imposes its worldview in accordance with
its interests. This prompts him to conclude the following on different ways
of seeing nature among whites: “if a white gaze might usefully be said to ex-
ist, it constitutes a common interest, stemming from often distinct ways of
looking, rather than a shared view of – in this case – the landscape.”72 It is
unclear, however, what can be meant by “racialized meanings of the images”
70 Ibid., 54.
71 Ibid., 58.
72 Ibid., 67.
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other than a representation that corresponds to such interests (exploitation
and protection of nature, for example). Or, conversely: “Landscapes advanc-
ing a white perspective promote the varied interests of whites rather than
depict particular forms in regularized arrangements,”73 by which he presum-
ably means that, where the “white gaze” is concerned, the interests are more
important than the form, and that therefore the forms have no determin-
ing role when it comes to diagnosing this white gaze on the basis of images.
Berger formulates a layering of the constitution of meaning with regard to
whiteness: in Watkins’s photographs meanings are “circumscribed by the in-
visible discourse of whiteness (residing in viewers), then particularized by the
visible discourse of nature (suggested by the subject matter of the works), and
ultimately refined … by formal evidence”.74 The pictures, then, are sources of
evidence (forms) for the invisible discourse of whiteness that must be sepa-
rated out from the forms as a visible and thus assailable identity of whiteness
with its various interests. The Yosemite Valley from the Best General View, which
according to Berger was seen and produced through the lens of whiteness,
thus offers him a model for the westward spread of European-American so-
ciety into surroundings that the whites would alter irrevocably.
In Berger’s terminology, gaze and perspective are used interchangeably as
metaphors for the ideology, discourse and interests of the dominant group,
and they are evidenced and thus made visible in the forms of image pro-
duction. These forms presented by Berger as evidence (panoramic view and
cartography as gazes of power and exploitation) are indebted to the academic
discourse of visual culture studies (with its roots in critiques of one-point
perspective as a rationalist-objectivizing gaze). In Berger’s analysis, beyond
their association with modern western culture, they now become represen-
tations of whiteness. At this point, the political and the academic discourses
of visual culture studies intersect, combined in the figure of representation:
rather than racist stereotypes, here it is ideologies, discourses and interests
that are visually represented as self- or external image. In methodological
terms, however, an aporia appears which originates in visual culture studies’
academic discourse,75 and whose ubiquity in visual culture studies tends to
reduce it to the status of a prejudice: one-point perspective as the gaze of the
powerful, objectified in the photographic apparatus.
73 Ibid., 68.
74 Ibid.
75 See chapter 4, last section, of this book.
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The utopian gaze and its failure – Nicholas Mirzoeff
In the texts from visual culture studies that we have examined so far, concepts
of the gaze move between a critique of representations of the Others of the
dominant normon the one hand and, on the other, positive turns given to con-
structions of self from a position of alterity. The examples deal with gender,
sex and race – to which other categories of alterity could be added.The follow-
ing readings explore two concepts of the gaze that go beyond these positions,
displaying a utopian character. They are closely linked with the claim to push
visual culture studies beyond academia towards a political impact.The author
of both concepts is Nicholas Mirzoeff whose definition of visual culture stud-
ies as a tactic in the political struggle against the “society of control” we have
already encountered.76 Rather than attempting any in-depth portrayal of the
political agendas associated with these concepts, my reading concentrates on
uncovering their methodological status.
The Multiple Viewpoint. Diaspora and Visual Culture
In 1998, Mirzoeff edited The Visual Culture Reader. The book contained his es-
say “The Multiple Viewpoint. Diaspora and Visual Culture” that he used the
following year as the introduction to Diaspora and Visual Culture: Representing
Africans and Jews, which he also edited.77 In this text, he uses the concept of
the diaspora and its representation as the focus of a program for visual cul-
ture studies that aims to point the way forward, captured metaphorically in
the terms multiple viewpoint and intervisuality. Thirteen years later, in 2011,
Mirzoeff published a new proposal for a general political criticality in visual
culture studies under the title The Right to Look. A Counterhistory of Visuality.78
TheMultiple Viewpoint is an attempt to transfer the theoretical approaches
of post-colonialism with its concepts of hybridity and créolité, as developed
by writers including Arjun Appadurai, Homi Bhabha, Paul Gilroy and Stuart
Hall,79 to the field of visual culture. The concept of diaspora, that draws on
76 See chapter 6 of this book, the section on Nicholas Mirzoeff.
77 See Nicholas Mirzoeff, “The Multiple Viewpoint. Diaspora and Visual Culture” in Mir-
zoeff (ed.),TheVisual Culture Reader, 204-213; andMirzoeff (ed.),Diaspora andVisual Cul-
ture: Representing Africans and Jews (London, New York 1999), 1-13.
78 Mirzoeff, The Right to Look. A Counterhistory of Visuality (Durham, NC 2011).
79 See Patrick Williams, Laura Chrisman (eds.), Colonial Discourse & Postcolonial Theory: A
Reader (New York 1994).
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these approaches, is summarized by Hall as follows: “The diaspora experience
as I intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition
of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which
lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora iden-
tities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves
anew, through transformation and difference.”80 In contrast to more conven-
tional notions of diaspora, as with regard to the Jews, rather than a culturally
and ethnically fixed identity that is inclined to shield itself from external in-
fluence in the diaspora (or obliged to do so, as in the case of ghettos), the
focus here is on a diasporic identity that is constantly changing as a result of
diverse migratory movements in the course of globalization, a development
that also breaks down the hierarchy between centre (the West) and periphery
(all other parts of the world). For my reading, what is important is why and
how Mirzoeff relates these ideas to seeing and its theoretical derivatives such
as visuality and perspective. The why is best explained in terms of Mirzoeff ’s
opponents, first and foremost the nation state, that he contrasts (in the same
apodictic style he applied to his underpinning of visual culture: “Modern life
takes place on screen.”81) with the post-national world: whereas the diasporas
of the 19th century “revealed interconnected nations, our current experience
is of an increasingly interdependent planet”.82 This means that the culture
that had been installed over centuries by (colonialist) western nation states
and that was meant to prove their “superiority” is now obsolete, including,
for example, national museums and national styles, as constructed by tradi-
tional art history to demonstrate an essentialist vision of national identity.
The essence of these styles was “of course, race”.83 Mirzoeff thus frames the
project of a history of “diaspora visual cultures”84 as a critique of the now ob-
solete culture of dominance by western-colonialist nation states; and he sees
art history as their accomplice.This also means integrating a notion of future
into the “diaspora identity” which in the 19th-century model was still fixed
on the search for roots. If it were possible to rethink diaspora today as “an
80 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora” in Williams, Chrisman (eds.), Colonial Dis-
course&Postcolonial Theory, 392-403: 401-402. Essay first published in Jonathan Ruther-
ford (ed.), Identity: Community, Culture, Difference (London 1990), 222-237.
81 Mirzoeff, “An Introduction to Visual Culture”, 1.
82 Mirzoeff, “The Multiple Viewpoint”, 205.
83 Ibid., 206.
84 Ibid.
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indeterminate future to come” then, according to Mirzoeff, this could result
in “a significant reevaluation of diasporas past, present and future”.85
In order properly to represent post-national diasporas, national culture,
metaphorically linked byMirzoeff to “one-point perspective”,86 must be coun-
tered by the titular “multiple viewpoint”. Such a multiple viewpoint is im-
portant not only as a critique of national cultures with their implications of
essentialist identities, but also as the condition for a dialogical relationship
between diasporic groups that often inhabit the same geopolitical context but
that often fight each other.Mirzoeff cites the example of conflicts between the
Jewish and African diasporas in the United States in which backward-looking
identity definitions based on origins (what he calls a one-point perspective)
were used by each group to contest the status of diasporic chosenness. Mir-
zoeff thus uses visual metaphors to develop political arguments. One-point
perspective as a scopic regime of western-rationalist power is contrasted with
multiple perspective as both a critique and a vision for the future: “The mul-
tiple viewpoint moves beyond the one-point perspective of Cartesian ratio-
nalism in the search for a forward-looking, transcultural and transitive place
from which to look and be seen.”87 In this model, looking and being seen
correspond to the theoretical concepts of the gaze and spectatorship, which
Mirzoeff argues could also benefit from this new viewpoint.
Here, once again, the theoretical foundations of visual culture studies give
reason to investigate the discipline’s position on seeing concrete objects. “To
look and to be seen” refers exclusively to structures of the gaze between sub-
jects in society; what remains unclear is how these concepts might be trans-
ferred to relationships with the visual artefacts that enter into this visual re-
lationship as a third party. Do they feature in visual culture studies only as
evidence of seeing and being seen?We have encountered this question several
times already, mainly as the problem of a narcissistic-tautological relation-
ship between the interpreting subject (viewer) and the object under interpre-
tation. In most cases, the filter or medium of this relationship is represen-
tation, its result is meaning (the meaning of this representation), while this
meaning in turn refers to the complex of identity constructions. But can or
must this be the only way for the subjects practising visual culture studies to
relate visually to the objects of the world?
85 Ibid., 207.
86 Ibid., 205.
87 Ibid., 208.
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Which relationship with objects does Mirzoeff propose in the context of
a visual culture studies diasporically renewed by the multiple viewpoint? He
notes that the diaspora as he conceives of it generates a multiple viewpoint
in every diasporic image. This viewpoint, he claims, incorporates both what
Derrida called différance and “polycentric vision”, as defined by Ella Shohat and
Robert Stam in their essay in the same book (TheVisual Culture Reader edited by
Mirzoeff) where the visual is situated between individuals and communities
in the process of dialogical interaction.88 Mirzoeff then claims that “changing
the way in which people see themselves is in all senses a critical activity”.89 As
this once again makes clear, the focus here is on identity constructions that
may lead to conflicts between communities. Mirzoeff ’s utopia thus appears
to involve the possibility of positively influencing the process of negotiation
between these communities by working on a new understanding of diasporic
identities in their visual representation, understood as a critical activity. In
methodological terms, this prompts him to propose transferring intertextu-
ality as “a matter of interlocking texts” to the “interacting and interdependent
modes of visuality that I shall call intervisuality”.90 Surprisingly, his concrete
example for this comes not from the visual but from the auditory field: the
yodelling of the Pygmies, “gateway to a multiple viewpoint on the African di-
aspora”, points to Congolese music and the blues of the Mississippi Delta,
from there to the whistling of steam trains and the migration of black former
slaves from the south to the north of the United States.91 The yodel becomes
a hyperquote with multiple intertextual references. In the objects of visual cul-
ture, Mirzoeff looks for “polyvalent symbols”92 as transcultural evidence for
diasporic cultures. These symbols cannot be reduced to static constructions
of identity, and in their hybridity they represent post-national diaspora as a
now global condition of life.The polysemy of these symbols through historical
and transcultural change is referred to by Mirzoeff as intervisual.
In this way, concepts like the gaze or visuality lose their specifically visual
quality: the gaze loses itself in the symbol, and intervisuality has little to do
with a gaze between individuals or communities, instead closely resembling
the polysemia of the open artwork in the writings of Umberto Eco. Ultimately,
88 Ella Shohat, Robert Stam, “Narrativizing Visual Culture: Towards a Polycentric Aesthet-
ics” in Mirzoeff (ed.), The Visual Culture Reader, 37-59.
89 Mirzoeff, “The Multiple Viewpoint”, 208.
90 Ibid., 209.
91 Ibid., 209-210.
92 Ibid., 210.
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where the relationship between visual culture studies and the object is con-
cerned, Mirzoeff ’s focus is on finding iconographic elements in which the
shifts of cultural meaning related to identities that mix and change via pro-
cesses of migration become tangible. A political agenda that brings forth new
subjects is allied here with an old method from art history, namely iconog-
raphy. Paradoxically, however, the visual metaphors in which this alliance is
clothed – viewpoint, intervisuality, “to look and to be seen” – refer neither
to the visual object nor to the relationship between viewer/interpreter and
object, but to the diasporic agenda.
Another link to traditional art history, on the other hand, is rigorously
cut off by Mirzoeff for political reasons: as mentioned above, he places the
category of style in the enemy camp, in the discourse of the national, and he
further sharpens this verdict by describing style as visual evidence of this na-
tional character. Thus, while giving the legibility of pictures a figurative level
by adopting iconography, which can in turn quite naturally be linked to an
agenda-driven search for identity-basedmeaning, the category of style,which
is essentially an aesthetic category calling for a way of seeing the object other
than that practised by iconography, is accused of formalism. Mirzoeff ’s visu-
ality already reflects the above-mentionedmovement of visual culture studies
away from the formalist tradition of American art history.93
It is the figurative iconography – foremost the human figure itself – that
visual culture studies looks for because this iconography, farmore readily than
aesthetic qualities, facilitates a reading in terms of recognizably coded signs
of identity. It is also the gateway to what I call the narcissistic circle of in-
terpretation, where the figure (and its gaze) may serve as a mirror for in-
terpretive projections (which results, as described above, from an affirmative
transcription of the Lacanianmodel of the gaze).94 Within visual culture stud-
ies, iconography’s figurative relationship to the visual object thus facilitates
a trend towards narcissistic, identity-based interpretations that could not be
arrived at via the observation of formal properties.
93 See, among others, the introduction to this book.
94 For the reception of the Lacanian gaze see Chapter 5. For examples of narcissistic in-
terpretations see also Chapter 7. For a critique of the narcissistic circle, see Chapter
8.
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Counter visuality: The Right to Look
Between Mirzoeff ’s utopia of the diasporically multiplied gaze and his book
The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality (2011) came the September 11 at-
tacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury, marked by America’s “global war on terror”.This may explain why in this
book Mirzoeff changes his strategy: he abandons the ideal of multiple view-
points that he formulated as his conclusion from the debates on ethnic iden-
tities in the age of post-national migratory movements, and returns to the
binarism of a friend-foe perspective. The conflict between postmodern cap-
italism and the consumer from Mirzoeff ’s introduction to An Introduction to
Visual Culture (1999)95 has given way to that between repression and rebellion.
Mirzoeff tells the story of repression and rebellion, slavery and emancipation,
as the history and genealogy of modernity, structured around the nucleus of
the dialectic of colony/plantation and colonising empires/nations.This history
is not hard to understand. Mirzoeff brings together an impressive quantity
of research literature, mainly from colonial studies;96 he is also a good sto-
ryteller. More difficult to understand, however, is how visuality is or should
be the key to this story. As early reviews show,97 the book raised hopes of a
more systematic orientation within visual culture studies that was felt to be
somewhat “every which way”98 on account of its diffusion across disciplines
and themes.
The cover ofThe Right to Look already signals its departure from the multi-
ple viewpoint.The circles of the two Os of Look contain details from graphics99
showing the heads of a white man with a late 18th-century hairstyle and of
a Maori, both in side profile, their gazes fixed on each other. One white, one
95 Mirzoeff, “An Introduction to Visual Culture”, see also chapter 6 in this book.
96 Here he seems to have drawn in particular on Catherine Hall, Civilizing Subjects:
Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Chicago 2002), as in his con-
trasting of metropole and plantation and his discussion of the colonial imagination.
97 T.H. Milbrandt in Surveillance & Society 9, no. 4 (2012), 459-461, http://www.surveil-
lance-and-society.org (accessed 26 Sept 2016); Jan Baetens in Leonardo online, http://
leonardo.info/reviews/may2012/mirzoeff-baetens.php (accessed 26 Sept 2016); Terry
Smith, “If Looks Could Kill Empires” (18 July 2012), www.publicbooks.org/nonfiction/if-
looks-could-kill-empires (accessed 26 Sept 2016).
98 Smith, “If Looks Could Kill Empires”. Terry Smith is Professor of Contemporary Art His-
tory and Theory at the University of Pittsburgh.
99 Detail of Maori from Anonymous, Johnny Heke (I.E. Hone Heke) (1856), reproduced in
Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, Plate 1.
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“indigenous” – it looks like a warlike clash, and that is what the book de-
scribes. Contrary to what the image suggests, however, this white man is not
a coloniser but a revolutionary from the Jacobin phase of the French Revo-
lution, when slavery was briefly abolished.100 The glances exchanged by the
two men thus stand not for a confrontation between colonizer and slave, but
for an encounter between two political subjects who share a rebellion against
those in power. The cover image uses the gaze to present a non-hierarchical
relationship between the “native” and the white; and this also characterizes
the right to look postulated by Mirzoeff in the title: “Because the right to look
is a consenting exchange between two (or more) it is by definition non-hier-
archical.”101
Mirzoeff ’s “counter-history of visuality” is based on a notion of visuality
that differs from that previously current within visual culture studies. Mir-
zoeff ’s 2006 article “On Visuality” forms the basis for his definition: in it, he
attempts to redraw the genealogy of the concept, tracing its origins toThomas
Carlyle.102 Reading the article,which already contains the book’s concerns and
concepts in embryonic form, gaveme a better insight into the inner structures
of a book often driven more by associations than by arguments. Firstly, then,
a few words about “On Visuality”.
Having named visuality as an epoch-specific phenomenon of postmoder-
nity in 1999, Mirzoeff now notes that it is not a poststructuralist term, but
one coined, along with other related concepts such as “visualize”, by the Scot-
tish historian Thomas Carlyle and later forgotten when Carlyle was branded
anti-democratic and racist, vanishing from discussions of visual culture. As
an opponent of all of the emancipatory movements that emerged from the
French Revolution,Mirzoeff writes, Carlyle devised the visualized narrative of
a moral imperialism led by “great men” that resonated both with his contem-
poraries and with later generations. But for “many key figures in the emanci-
patory movements of the period, Carlyle’s vision of the hero had to be stood
on its head, as Marx did to Hegel, in order to create a sense of possibility.”
100 Detail from the pamphlet La Chute en Masse (Paris 1793) reproduced in Mirzoeff, The
Right to Look, 43. Mirzoeff refers to the man as a sans-culotte.
101 From Nicholas Mirzoeff, “The Will to Justice”, posted on 3 September 2012 as part
of his blog about the Occupy movement: http://www.nicholasmirzoeff.com/O2012/
2012/09/03/the-will-to-justice/ (accessed 26 Sept 2016).
102 Mirzoeff, “On Visuality” andMirzoeff, The Right to Look, chapter 3, 123-146. Carlyle’s ver-
sion of visuality is briefly mentioned in chapter 4 of this book.
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Mirzoeff sees this manoeuvre of “reverse appropriation” as part of the mod-
ern production of the “visual subject, a person who is both the agent of sight
(regardless of biological ability to see) and the object of discourses of visual-
ity”.103 Furthermore, he argues, Carlyle’s discourse of visualized heroism was
so central for Anglophone imperial culture that any claim to such a subject
status had to be made in terms of such visuality – a theory with far-reaching
theoretical implications. Basically, Mirzoeff is claiming that such a subject
status is inconceivable without visuality. Or, to put it another way: the forma-
tion of the western-imperial subject in the 19th century (and thereafter) took
place primarily through this visuality.
What does this visuality have to do with seeing, whether as a biological
or a sociocultural practice? Little or nothing. In The Right to Look, Mirzoeff
begins by noting: “The right to look is not about seeing.”104 He develops the
concept “by thinking how it emerged into Western discourse at a specific and
charged moment of modernity as a conservative critique of Enlightenment and its
emancipations”.105 In a counter-movement, it was appropriated, inverted and
disguised by subcultural practices as a strategy of emancipation – inTheRight
to Look he calls the result countervisuality.
To return now to Mirzoeff ’s reading of Carlyle, he borrows the highly
metaphorical language of the period 1837-1841, as when he speaks of the “eye
of history” as the embodiment of historiography, referring not to the objectiv-
ity of a source-based science of facts but to an “idea of the whole” that Carlyle
sought to portray in a “succession of vivid pictures”.106 This in turn recalls
the then highly appreciated large-format history paintings like those com-
missioned by Carlyle’s hero Napoleon I for his imperial propaganda. If that
were all, however, it would be no more than the description or justification
of a pictorial narrative style in historiography. Carlyle, and with him Mirzo-
eff, goes far beyond this: the historian is a visionary, seeing history with his
inner eye, as if from a “Mount of Vision”, gaining an overview not accessible
to historical figures themselves – although Carlyle named one exception: the
hero. Only the hero was able to see history as it unfolded. The Mount of Vi-
sion, affording the hero a historical overview, invites a contemporary analogy:
the military commander positioned on a piece of high ground as portrayed in
103 Mirzoeff, “On Visuality”, 54.
104 Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 1.
105 Mirzoeff, “On Visuality”, 55, my italics.
106 For this abridged account of Carlyle, see Mirzoeff, “On Visuality”, 55ff.
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battle pictures of the period and in topographical portrayals of battles since
the Baroque.
Carlyle wrote his history as a heroic story; he “imagined the eye of history
sweeping across what he called ‘clear visuality’, ‘visualizing’ what could not
be seen by the minor actors of history themselves. Visuality was, then, the
clear picture of history available to the hero as it happens and to the historian
in retrospect.” The simple observations of simple people, on the other hand,
“did not constitute visuality”.107 Andwhat was expected of these simple people
was not visuality but hero-worship, “a proper submission to the quasi-divine
authority of the hero”.108
At the end of the 18th century, Jeremy Bentham sought to reform prisons
using the model of the panopticon; he also wrote a pamphlet against Britain’s
penal colonies in Australia. Carlyle rejected the model of the panopticon, and
he also favoured the penal colonies because, as Mirzoeff deduces, “a world
dominated by heroes required that its anti-heroes be treated with severity”.109
Mirzoeff now links Carlyle’s heroic visuality with his rejection of Bentham’s
panoptic gaze (that was meant to replace the previous draconian measures
used to control prisoners) and with his advocacy of deportation and penal
colonies, thus making visuality a key category in the imperial structures of
power and repression in the modern world. In The Right to Look, he extends
this right up to the current imperial behaviour of the United States, allowing
his narrative, that begins in the 17th century with references back to antiquity,
to be read, in a reflexive movement, as a genealogy of America’s current global
policy.
In very general terms, therefore, this visuality has something to do with
the actions of political subjects. The implications of this broad description
are diverse and in some cases contradictory. One such contradiction concerns
the concept of representation. At one point, Mirzoeff defines visuality as “a
point of contestation in political and cultural discourse over the very meaning
of representation”. Is this political or symbolic representation? He continues
by asking: “Was representation possible only through a heroic male body or
could others represent? Must others be individuals or could there be a collec-
tive representation? How, then, might the subaltern and subcultural groups
107 Ibid., 57.
108 Ibid., 58.
109 See ibid., 59.
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in the metropole and the colonies come to representation?”110 The way these
questions are formulated brings no real clarity; the reference to the “heroic
male body” makes it probable that the focus is once more on visibility and
the right to visibility, on the kind of symbolic-visual representation we know
from the political agenda of visual culture studies. This is confirmed by an-
other definition of visuality: “Visuality, far from being a postmodern solution
predicated by contemporary visual culture to the problems of medium-based
visual disciplines, is therefore a problem of the conceptual scheme of moder-
nity and representation that underlies it.”111 In this way, he departs from the
two definitions we have already encountered (visuality as a mode of techno-
logical postmodernity and as a diasporic, multiperspectival gaze), ending up
with the confrontation between ruling subjects and the representations that
legitimize them, and subaltern subjects to whom representation is denied.
This, too, is already familiar; the stigmatizing and the oppositional gaze also
draw on this struggle for recognition via visibility.Which is why, for Mirzoeff,
visuality has “very much to do with picturing and nothing to do with vision,
if by vision we understand how an individual person registers visual sensory
impressions”.112 In this light, his apodictic claim that “the right to look is not
about seeing” is easier to understand: he is rejecting seeing as a sensory ac-
tivity. But this draws a clear line between the two factors of the visual that
Mitchell, for example, does not want to separate: the nature and culture of
seeing. It also raises the question of how this negation of the act of seeing
influences the treatment of the objects of analysis (e.g. their form and medi-
ality) through which Mirzoeff intends to study the genealogy of modernity:
“For contemporary critics, then, visuality has a complex and challenging ge-
nealogy. Rather than lead us into the complexities and redundancies of 19th-
and early 20th-century optical sciences, visuality implies an engagement with
the politics of representation in transnational and transcultural form.”113
This program, formulated in 2006, is surely what gave rise to Mirzoeff ’s
broad-based counterhistory of visuality,TheRight to Look, in 2011.Having taken
Carlyle’s concept of visuality as his point of departure for a politicization of
the term as an imperial practice of power and authorization in “On Visual-
ity”, here Mirzoeff writes the decolonial genealogy of this visuality. In doing
110 Ibid., 65f.
111 Ibid., 67.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., 76.
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so, he assumes that the current policy of global counterinsurgency (GeorgeW.
Bush’s “post 9/11 war on terrorism” that was ongoing under Obama) is being
implemented with practices of “post-panoptical” visuality that can be traced
back to the oppressive practices of slavery in the 17th and 18th centuries and
to the colonial politics of imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. These
practices include control, surveillance and classification as well as killing in
the name of freedom and democracy, the most striking example of this be-
ing visual technologies for remote-controlled killing with no risk to the killer
(drone warfare).
Visuality is contrasted here with countervisuality. This is Mirzoeff ’s term
for resistance against this visuality by subalterns (slaves, workers, the popu-
lations of colonized countries). It manifests itself in practices of self-empow-
erment that are developed in the places where visuality is deployed against
those slaves and workers: on the plantations in the colonies, on the streets
of the metropoles. The history of visuality and countervisuality since the 17th
century as a history of western dominance and resistance to that dominance
is subdivided by Mirzoeff into three phases: the ‘plantation complex’ (1660-
1860), the ‘imperial complex’ (1860-1945) and the ‘military-industrial complex’
(1945 onwards), with ‘complex’ referring both to the production of structures
of social organization that shape a specific complex like the ‘plantation com-
plex’, and to the mental economy of individuals, like the Oedipus complex.
“The resulting imbrication of mentality and organization produces a visual-
ized deployment of bodies and a training of minds, organized so as to sustain
both physical segregation between rulers and ruled, and mental compliance
with those arrangements.”114
Here, Mirzoeff describes technologies of power as discussed by Foucault
in his lectures of 1975/76: “in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we
saw the emergence of techniques of power that were essentially centred on
the body, on the individual body. They included all devices that were used to
ensure the spatial distribution of individual bodies (their separation, their
alignment, their serialization, and their surveillance) and the organization,
around those individuals, of a whole field of visibility. They were also tech-
niques that could be used to take control over bodies. Attempts were made to
increase their productive force through exercise, drill, and so on. They were
also techniques for rationalizing and strictly economizing on a power that had
114 Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 5.
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to be used in the least costly way possible, thanks to a whole system of surveil-
lance, hierarchies, inspections, bookkeeping, and reports: all this technology
can be described as the disciplinary technology of labour. It was established
at the end of the seventeenth century, and in the course of the eighteenth.”115
As the primal scene for these technologies, Mirzoeff sees the organization of
the slave plantation. And, unlike Foucault, he places the entire genealogy of
modernity under the paradigm of Carlyle’s visuality. This creates a peculiar
tension between Bentham’s panoptic gaze that served Foucault as an exam-
ple and metaphor for the mechanisms of control in the late 18th century, and
Carlyle’s visuality. Bentham was among the reformers of the late Enlighten-
ment, while Carlyle, as described above, vehemently resisted the Enlighten-
ment’s emancipatory consequences.This tension between an enlightened and
a reactionary gaze, both of which are described as technologies of power (by
Foucault and Mirzoeff respectively) repeatedly frustrates Mirzoeff ’s attempts
to describe an order of visuality and countervisuality with the corresponding
practices of dominance and revolution.116
Let us return now to the three complexes and the practices and agents
of their visuality: The plantation complex is represented by the forms of classi-
fication, segregation, legislation, control and organized labour, especially on
the British and French slave plantations of the Caribbean. All of these factors
are underpinned by visuality. First, the ‘slave’ is classified as a species on the
basis of ‘natural history’ before being separated from ‘free’ space by means of
cartography. The slaves’ work was monitored by the overseer and misconduct
was punished with violence. Special laws declared all of this legal and, in Mir-
zoeff ’s argument, thus ‘aestheticized’ it. The key figure in these practices and
their visuality was the overseer who – not unlike Carlyle’s example of a hero
of history, the military commander – has an overview of what is happening
from a piece of higher ground. This order was confronted via slave rebellions
and the struggle for freedom, which Mirzoeff classifies under the heading
countervisuality. According to Mirzoeff, this organization of the plantations
on the basis of visuality exerted a key influence on the use of visuality and
visual technologies in western societies.117
115 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended“. Lectures at the Collège de France (1975-76)
(New York 2003), 242.
116 This remark is made in passing only, since it is not my aim here to mine Mirzoeff’s
wealth of sometimes associative andmetaphor-laden arguments for potential internal
incoherencies in his theoretical references.
117 See Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 48-49.
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“In a sense, all visuality was and is imperial visuality, the shaping of
modernity from the point of view of the imperial powers.” This definition of
visuality opens the chapter on the ‘imperial complex’, dated between 1860
and 1945, which covers the strategies of dominance of the colonial powers at
home and in the colonies. Having shown how western empires shaped their
technologies of power outside their ‘own’ countries, the focus here is on the
blending of colonial plantation and home city as sites of orders of bio-power
where colonizing authority is crossed with the “hierarchy of the ‘civilized’ and
the ‘primitive’”.118 The slaves on the plantations corresponded to the workers
in the cities, except that the latter were not pseudo-scientifically classified
as a separate species. Thus, although the dividing line between rulers and
proletariat was not drawn by a racially implemented hierarchy, workers
and slaves shared a lack of rights, as reflected, for example, in the practice
of deportation. For Mirzoeff, missionaries were the key figures or agents
of the spread of western modernity to non-western societies, as well as
being “products of its [modernity’s] emerging hegemony”.119 As an example,
Mirzoeff names the missionaries in the British crown colony of New Zealand,
whose activities he contrasts with the resistance of the Maori that led to
an “indigenous countervisuality”.120 Immediately after this he discusses
proletarian countervisuality in the cities of England and France, by which he
means primarily the forms of self-organization in the workers’ movement
of the 19th and early 20th centuries and their symbolic representation, as
expressed in the general strike and the May Day festivities. For Mirzoeff, the
general strike is a “counterpoint to the hierarchy of imperial visuality”, “a
tactic for visualizing the contemporary by creating a general image of the
social”. This chapter clearly presented considerable structural problems, as
the imperial visuality he postulates is conceived of in historical and territorial
terms that are very broad. The history of discourse, decades of theory, and
historical research are woven together to construct exemplary moments of
countervisuality. The examples for the 20th century are the former colonies’
struggle for liberation, illustrated by visual evidence such as the 1955 Paris
Match cover photograph portraying a young black soldier saluting as a French
118 Both quotes, ibid., 196.
119 Ibid., 198. Here he is quoting Ryan Dunch, “Beyond Cultural Imperialism” inHistory and
Theory 41 (2002), 301-325: 318.
120 Ibid., 199.
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patriot (an image made famous by Roland Barthes’s analysis121) and the film
The Battle of Algiers.
In his chapter on the period since 1945, Mirzoeff refers to Dwight Eisen-
hower’s famous warning about the total influence – “economic, political, even
spiritual” – of the constellations of power that brought forth the Cold War
arms race and which he called the ‘military-industrial complex’.122 Mirzoeff
describes the technology of this period as “aerial visualization”, which has
grown since 1989, and especially since 9/11, into a “post-panoptic visuality”
that brings together electronic and digital technologies in the global war on
terror.This post-panoptic visuality is based on the assumption that “anywhere
may be the site for an insurgency, so everywhere needs to be watched from
multiple locations”.123 The ‘military-industrial complex’ is marked by a “global
counterinsurgency as the hegemonic complex of Western visuality”.124 Mir-
zoeff ’s main examples here are the Algerian War and the War on Terrorism.
Here, in post-panoptic visuality, the parallels between the concept of vi-
suality and the visual technologies of power that are actually used are obvi-
ous: closed-circuit television surveillance, satellite images, infrared and other
technologies render visible what was previously unseen. They are joined by
military technologies like armed drones that can be operated from locations
far away from the theatre of war. Mirzoeff also combines these effects with
Carlyle’s visuality as a producer of authority: “The post-panoptic visuality of
global counterinsurgency produces a visualized authority whose location not
only cannot be determined from the visual technologies being used but may
itself be invisible.”125 For the current situation, Mirzoeff uses the term ‘neovi-
suality’: “Neovisuality is a doctrine for the preservation of authority by means
of permanent surveillance of all realms of life, a Gesamtkunstwerk of necropol-
itics.”126
In the face of such conditions, it is hard to define a corresponding counter-
visuality of resistance. According to Mirzoeff, the counterinsurgency’s striv-
ing for a “totalizing vision” has the effect that “no countervisualization can
damage its claim to totality”.127 Furthermore, the objective upheld by the ter-
121 SeeRolandBarthes,Mythologies (NewYork 2012), 225ff. French:Mythologies (Paris 1957).
122 Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 19.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., 18.
125 Ibid., 20.
126 Ibid., 34.
127 Ibid., 296.
7. Seeing as a Political Resource in Visual Culture Studies 195
ror against which this neovisuality is directed is hardly the kind of power-
free society dreamed of by Mirzoeff with his metaphor of the “right to look”.
On the contrary, both sides, insurgency and counterinsurgency, continually
rearm their respective “necropolitics”, meaning they are inseparably inter-
twined. But, Mirzoeff hopes, precisely this intensifying of visuality will lead
to its crisis. For him, the Arab Spring – unfolding as he was finishing his book
– is a sign of this; and one year later, he supported the Occupymovement with
a daily blog on his website.
What doesMirzoeff ’s concept of visuality involve? Two poles can be named
to which this visuality obviously refers: firstly, representation (of power, of the
hero, of history) for the purpose of legitimating power, and secondly the kind
of practices, technologies and cultures of power discussed by Foucault un-
der the heading of bio-power (surveillance, violence, segregation, legislation,
classification). Countervisuality responds to the representation of those in
power with strategies of self-empowerment via representations that may also
appropriate the patterns used by those in power. One example of this is the
hero of the Haitian revolution, Toussaint L’Ouverture, represented as a mil-
itary commander on horseback modelled after Jacques-Louis David’s eques-
trian portrait of Napoleon.128 Mirzoeff also sees the responses of resistance to
practices of power that constitute countervisuality (general strike, May Day,
forms of self-organization, liberation struggle) as forms of representation in
the sense of visibility. But if visibility is ultimately equated with the political in
the broadest sense, then (in the light of the all-explaining claim of Mirzoeff ’s
project) this begs the question of whether and why the concept of visuality
is supposed to be able to deliver this, and whether we might not be dealing,
conversely, with a piece of sophistry or circular reasoning (the visual is always
political, ergo the political is always visual) that reduces the political to the
visual.
Mirzoeff ’s approach to visual objects also manifests his fixation on repre-
sentation in a double sense: of portrayal and of political representation. The
former is most obvious in the “Visual Guide” that opens the book and that
is intended to promote a systematic overview. It contains examples of the
categories and practices of visuality and countervisuality. An engraving from
the 17th century shows the layout of a plantation with the work routines and
the overseer at his raised post; he represents surveillance and a command-
ing position. A battle plan from Waterloo shows the central role of visuality
128 See illustration in ibid., 42.
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for warfare in the form of cartography and overview; a panoramic bird’s eye
view as an example of imperial visuality shows a battle zone region during the
American Civil War; military-industrial visuality is represented by a technical
diagram on the production of aerial photographs and their use in the prepara-
tion of aerial warfare; and a photograph of soldiers sitting in front of screens
like videogame players, steering surveillance drones on the US-Mexico border,
stands for post-panoptic visuality. The examples of countervisuality show the
revolutionary hero: the Haitian revolutionary leader on horseback and a pam-
phlet with a sans-culotte toppling despots; a photograph of slaves gathering
stands for the general strike against slavery in South Carolina; Emilio Lon-
goni’s painting L’Oratore dello Sciopero from 1891, that shows a speaker stirring
up demonstrating workers, stands for general strikes in major cities.
This image material does not go beyond the function of evidence, being
essentially self-explanatory. Mirzoeff writes: “I have used images – or some-
times even the knowledge that there were images which have been lost – as
a form of evidence.” He thus deals with images as a historian would; they are
sources that he takes from the “visual archive”.129 And he treats them indis-
criminately; the important thing is what they show, regardless of medium or
genre, regardless of whether or not they are art. They are summoned as wit-
nesses whoMirzoeff, like an attorney, presents as part of his case. In method-
ological terms, this hardly matches up to a conventional political iconography.
When, in his call for a “right to look”, Mirzoeff says that “my right to look
depends on your recognition of me, and vice versa”,130 one might think that
his political agenda would be a goodmatch for the ethics of a dialogical seeing
formulated by Margaret Olin with regard to art history. But Mirzoeff formu-
lates it as an appeal against a ban on seeing, imposed by visuality and mani-
fested by the policeman who sends us on our way: “Move on, there’s nothing
to see here.”131 This seeing is a metaphor for another right – “the right to the
real” – in an “attempt to shape an autonomous realism that is not only out-
side authority’s process but antagonistic to it”.This right to perceive the real is
meant to prevent the dominant authority from legitimizing and naturalizing
its interpretation of the world via visuality. It thus has less to do with dialog-
ical-communicative seeing and more with recognizing the reality of power
which, in Marxist terminology (not used by Mirzoeff), is veiled by ideology –
129 Ibid., XV.
130 Ibid., 25.
131 Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 1.
7. Seeing as a Political Resource in Visual Culture Studies 197
a realization on the part of those being ruled that is meant to be prevented
by the visuality of those in power. The question of the relationship between
object and interpreter/viewer plays no part here. And nor does the question
of the Ones recognizing the discriminated identities of the Others that was
(and still is?) central to visual culture studies, because for Mirzoeff the Ones
are the abstraction of power (of the imperial or military-industrial complex).
They are not able to recognize those they rule over without losing this very
power. It is thus a matter of struggle, not dialogue. Representations are tools
in this struggle – instruments of power or rebellion.
Mirzoeff ’s is a radical departure from the political theories of the 1990s
that espoused the approach of a dialogical seeing by discussing societal pro-
cesses of negotiating difference as part of the conflict between universalism
and particularism – I am thinking above all of Ernesto Laclau.132 Ultimately,
he revives the binary structure of class struggle, clad in the terminologies of
Foucault, Rancière and Negri/Hardt, in updated, decolonial guise. For him,
today’s revolutions are the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement. In his at-
tempt to draw up a genealogy of modernity, Mirzoeff has taken the current
eminence of visual media in the dissemination of the political as his bench-
mark, and projected this back onto the last three centuries. But he does so,
and I see this as another “birth defect” of his model, through the lens (to stick
with the optical metaphors) of the visuality of Carlyle, a 19th-century anti-
revolutionary racist. In this way, Carlyle’s friend/foe dynamic structures the
genealogical model. Or, put differently: not only is the view of the past de-
termined by today (a basic theoretical assumption now taken for granted in
historiography) but a conservative perspective from the 19th century deter-
mines the view of today. Mirzoeff elevates Carlyle’s visuality to the status of
an episteme of modernity, then writes against it with a ‘Counterhistory of
Visuality’.
For Terry Smith,Mirzoeff ’s book marks “a coming of age that has brought
cultural studies past the variability and the enchantments of its postmodern
moment. It highlights the need for responsibility toward actual pasts, and
the actual demand of contemporary realities.”133 I do not share this view. To
me, invoking political responsibility as a rejection of postmodern arbitrari-
ness seems too heavily indebted to a theoretical cluelessness in the face of the
132 See for example Ernesto Laclau, “Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of
Identity” in October 61 (1992), 83-90.
133 Smith, “If Looks Could Kill Empires”.
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ideological rearmament of the West in the wake of 9/11, resulting in a hasty
retreat to an interpretative framework of the present that is no less totalizing
than Hegel’s vision of history. The result is an actual dedifferentiation in the
sense of a loss of difference. One example is the way Mirzoeff deals with fas-
cism: “The work of genocide was to make the Other permanently invisible.”134
Visuality in this account becomes the key to understanding – even to under-
standing the Shoah.What new knowledge does this bring? Tome it seems too
rash, too reductive, too in love with its own model. As a result, antifascism
is no more than an antifascist countervisuality that demands a place “from
which there is a right to look, not just behold the leader”.135 And that, to my
European-German ears at least, sounds naïve. For me, the idea that such a
one-dimensional model should be able to capture historical and political re-
ality at the same time as formulating the utopia of a non-hegemonic space
(that of the right to look) does not add up.
I have no answer to the question of what the benefits of such an extensive
definition of visuality might be. Overstretching the concept in this way does
not strike me as a valid strategy against the postmodern “every which way” of
visual culture studies; on the contrary, it looks like a symptom of a crisis in
the field rather than a remedy. This totalization of visuality can also be read
as a symptom of a paradox that seems to have accompanied seeing from the
outset: the belief in the visual as an anthropologically founding force, and its
opposite, demonization: “The evil eye emerged from the realm of superstition
to become the ruling metaphor of social control and political oppression at
its most insidious.”136
134 Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 231. See also 229f.
135 Ibid., 232.
136 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 378. This sentence of Jay’s pointedly sums up the critique of “occu-
larcentrism” by Lacan, Foucault and Debord.
Part Three: Towards an Ethics for the Act
of Seeing

8. Questions of Ethics
Seeing as an Act of Scholarly Research
The central task resulting from my readings was to inquire into the ethical
dimensions of seeing that can be negotiated between the fields of art history
and visual culture studies. In other words,my focus on seeing led not to a con-
frontation along the lines of “who does it better” in terms of method, scope
and object, but to an attempt to link the question of the relevance of each dis-
cipline with the fundamentals of its engagement with its object.These funda-
mentals, which I read as each discipline’s immanent scopic regime, emerged
quite clearly from my readings, with their various advantages and pitfalls.
The ethics I am referring to here might also be called stance or responsi-
bility – responsibility for the Other of one’s research activity, or one’s seeing
as researcher. My readings made me more keenly aware that the seeing of art
historians, with regard to discrete objects, is often hidden behind the classi-
fying procedures of art-historical objectification. These procedures mask the
reputation of seeing as unpredictable, unquantifiable and subjective, and thus
reputedly unscientific. Art history clearly has surprisingly little confidence in
the objective reliability of its key form of data collection; either that or it
wishes to avoid being infected with this reputation. Art history pursues an
ethics of objectivity; what this overlooks is seeing’s subjective side, which is
also authorial: the subjectivity of the interpreting viewer.
For visual culture studies, the opposite applies. The discipline’s scholarly
activity centres not on the object but on the subject – a subject that must
fight for recognition, in turn measured in terms of the subject’s visibility in
a society and its visual culture. The ethical dimension here is rooted in the
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political agenda that determines the relevance of the discipline.1 The presup-
position of visual culture studies that modernity is visual, making visibility
a key precondition for the representation of identity, alters the dynamic of
the three-way relationship between visual object, producer and viewer, with
consequences that only became clear to me in the course of my readings. My
interest in engaging with visual culture studies grew out of my critique of
hegemonic and pseudo-objective discourses in art history. I saw in it a chance
both to find approaches allowing the viewpoints of “Others” to be introduced
into art history and to reflect on the discrepancy between the questionable
objectivity and the masked subjectivity of the art-historical viewer position. I
was all the more surprised, then, by what my readings revealed: the “Other”,
the recognition of which is supposedly the focus of visual culture studies, sur-
reptitiously became a huge I (the I of the interpreting viewer) in an interpre-
tative manoeuvre I refer to as the narcissistic circle. The slippery surface on
which this circular movement takes place is the model of the gaze after Sartre
and Lacan: out of the model of a scopic regime that highlights the fragility of
ego constructions, and which was thus also a critique of the illusory quality
of identities per se, visual culture studies made a strategy affirming positively
framed identities.
Of central methodological importance here, I propose, is the question of
the relationship between historicity, alterity and models of seeing in art his-
tory and visual culture studies.This question necessarily arises from the dou-
ble critique of objectivist seeing in art history and of narcissistic seeing in
visual culture studies. Historicity and alterity have one thing in common:
they constitute the unfamiliarity of the object and Other in the eyes of the
viewing, interpreting subject.They show this subject its limits, the ultimately
uncrossable threshold that lies between the I and what lies outside it. Inmany
respects, how this threshold is negotiated is the biggest problem between art
history, with its focus on objects, and visual culture studies, which has been
dedicated from the outset to rendering the subject visible. It is the approach
to this threshold that I call a stance in the sense of an ethics of scholarly re-
search; it is of importance to both art history and visual culture studies.
1 SeeMieke Bal, “The Commitment to Look” in Journal of Visual Culture, 4 (2005), 145-162,
who speaks in this context of an ethics of seeing. She also comments on the conflicts
between art history and visual culture studies from the viewpoint of the latter.
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Historical unfamiliarity in art historical seeing
Let us briefly recap on approaches to the unfamiliarity of the art historical ob-
ject (which I refer to, by analogy with cultural alterity, as historical alterity),
with respect to the gazes exchanged between the viewing, interpreting sub-
ject and its object.The readings in this book have shown two basic forms, both
of which implicitly aim to overcome this unfamiliarity of the object. Firstly,
an objectification of the subjective factor in interpretative acts via analytical
categories, trying to neutralize the subjective dimension of dealing with the
object with the aim of attaining verifiability or something approaching a sup-
posed historical truth. And secondly, an approach involving the hermeneutic
circle. Panofsky andGombrich stand for the first position,Wolfgang Kemp for
the second. All three more or less ignore the seeing of the interpreting viewer,
going to great lengths to develop approaches and procedures that integrate
this seeing back into the object.
Gombrich tries to achieve this by framing perception as an activity that
compares pictures with reality on a trial and error basis, placing it on a ver-
ifiable basis that is only marginally impacted by historical change and that
applies to producer and viewer in equal measure. Panofsky does it by assum-
ing that historical periods have distinct underlying intellectual dispositions
that are expressed in the symbolic form of perspective as a necessary concre-
tion of worldview. His characterization of perspective as a model of seeing
that is distancing and objectifying, but also distance-denying, also prompts
him tomake a political critique that I will now apply to thosemodels of seeing
that centre on the position of the viewer. To the distance-denying model of
perspective, Panofsky attributes aims he finds politically suspect and which
today would be referred to as narcissistic – the striving for power and an ex-
pansion of the sphere of the I. What would a dialogue between Panofsky and
Bryson or Bal on the relationship of viewer and object look like? It is likely that
Panofsky would firmly reject Bryson’s and Bal’s appeal for the viewer’s right
to interpret the object from his/her own subjective viewpoint, dissolving the
historical and cultural unfamiliarity and thus the tension between viewer and
object, in favour of the interpreting subject. I, too, do not see this form of
power over object and interpretation, that finally puts the interpreter in the
place of the author stripped of power by poststructuralism, as a viable alter-
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native to the objectification of the interpreting subject in analytical categories
or holistic concepts of truth (a charge levelled at Panofsky).2
Kemp, on the other hand, short circuits the hermeneutic circle of un-
derstanding by locating the viewer as an implied viewer within the picture.
He works with the paradox of not locating reception with the recipient but
putting it back into the picture, whose internal structure always already de-
termines the viewer’s perception. In this way, the picture retains its autonomy
with regard to interpretations imposed from outside.The interpreting viewer
has no place. One could go so far as to say that this model allows no interpre-
tation whatsoever in the sense of a subjectively motivated difference between
the picture and its reading. Here, good interpretation consists in the abil-
ity to identify and read the picture’s narratological cues. This could be called
the extreme opposite of Bryson’s model of the dominance of the interpret-
ing viewer – and this even though Kemp’s focus is on the reception of the
artwork. In this constellation, what becomes of the unfamiliarity or alterity
of the object? It dissolves, so to speak, as the viewer follows the reception-
guiding prompts of the artwork; the viewer is “obedient”, submitting to the
authority of the work, in turn meaning that his/her subjectivity is not taken
into account, necessarily remaining latent.While Bryson and Bal make a rad-
ical appeal for the recognition of the viewer’s interpretation, thus negating
the picture’s alterity, in Kemp’s model the act of interpretation is reduced to
following instructions communicated by the picture.
Baxandall, Pächt and Alpers pursue different strategies with regard to the
historicity of their object. They want to understand the historical unfamiliar-
ity of the picture, thus facilitating something for which one might use the
metaphor of empathy (of the interpreting viewer with the object in its alter-
ity). In different ways, all three put seeing centre stage. Baxandall goes in
search of the “period eye” of the 15th century by reconstructing the knowledge
of a typical Florentine businessman derived from the practice of everyday see-
ing. He is interested not in the seeing of the interpreting viewer but in the
mode of seeing that was common to both artists and their clients, forming the
basis for the formal qualities of their pictures. Within the bounds of what is
pragmatically feasible, Baxandall wishes to overcome the alterity of visual ex-
perience at the time the pictures were painted. In relation to the historicism
of art history, this is the most radical position because it tries to neutralize
the subjective input of the interpreting viewer.Consequently, onemight speak
2 Especially by Christopher Wood, see chapter 1 of this book.
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here more of reconstruction than of interpretation, not so much of art but,
through art, of the historical culture from which the art emerged – artworks
understood as “lenses bearing on their own circumstances”.3
Alpers, too, has a historicizing position. Her focus is on the visual activity
of a time and place in which obtaining knowledge via observation had great
cultural importance – the Netherlands in the 17th-century. She embeds her
interest in observation as a historically specific cultural practice in art history
by studying art that shows this practice in action. In this way, she too takes
art as a cue to reconstruct something else – in this case 17th-century Dutch
visual culture. She thus interprets art as evidence, similar to the way histo-
rians interpret sources. In The Art of Describing, art provides evidence of the
visual culture of observation that was held in high esteem within society as a
practice of knowledge acquisition.
Pächt is the only one to focus attention on the seeing of the interpreting
viewer, treating it as a problem of art-historical method in the face of the
historical alterity of the discipline’s object. For Pächt, art historical practice
must be based on “getting one’s eye in”with artworks.4 This includes the visual
habits of the period in question, which he says can be accessed via extensive
experience of looking at artworks from that period. Although Pächt is aiming
for verifiability, it should be derived from this seeing, which he conceives of as
a relation between the unfamiliar object and the viewing art historian, a rela-
tion in which the tension between the viewer’s background and visual habits
and the unfamiliarity of the object are not neutralized in holistic or objectify-
ing basic assumptions. While “getting their eye in”, Pächt calls on viewers to
begin by suppressing their own wishes, such as the search for iconographic
meaning, in favour of a mode of looking geared towards describing the art-
work’s material and formal structure. Such precise observation is intended
to weaken the dominant normative aesthetic that influences the way art his-
torians see, achieving openness with regard to aspects of the work that may
be unfamiliar to the interpreting viewer. While Pächt’s call to maintain an
awareness of the difference between the seeing of the viewer and the histor-
ical artwork in the process of art-historical analysis accepts the situatedness
of the interpreting viewer, it also looks towards methods of overcoming this
situatedness. For Pächt, obtaining verifiable insights depends on the visual,
3 Baxandall, The Limewood Sculptors, vii. Cf. chapter one, 5.
4 Pächt, The Practice of Art History, foreword.
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dialogical interplay between the interpreting viewer and the object in its ma-
terial and formal qualities.
All of these positions share a focus on the historicity of their object. One
might conclude from this that historical alterity necessarily implies a greater
orientation towards the object than towards the interpreting subject, accom-
panied by models for objectifying the resulting historical knowledge. One
might add that this object does not always have to be an artwork: for Baxan-
dall and Alpers, the gaze leads through the artwork to its context as the pri-
mary focus of interest – and their positions are also the ones with the greatest
affinity to visual culture studies.
Cultural unfamiliarity – the “Other” in the gaze
of visual culture studies
Unlike in art history, in visual culture studies the Other is a key concept both
politically and in terms of legitimizing the discipline – the Other here always
being a person, it should be noted, rather than an object. Attention is focused
on the recognition of such Others in their identity as Others; in other words,
the object of visual culture studies is not the art object, as in art history, but
subjects. In visual culture studies, objects usually feature as evidence of the
representation of negatively or positively shaped and connoted identities of
such Others, or of power constellations within the socially dominant scopic
regime in which both the “Ones” and “Others” have their place. The range of
objects examined by visual culture studies goes beyond that usually classified
as art.
However much this political agenda seems to imply a dialogical approach
(between the Ones and the Others), the theoreticalmodel of visuality onwhich
the relationship between One and Other is based surprisingly leads, as my
readings of what can now be called “classic” texts from visual culture studies
have shown, to processes of mirroring that I have described as narcissistic.
I am not claiming that art history practises the dialogical gaze while visual
culture studies remains locked in a narcissistic loop.My readings of texts from
art history have shown that the dialogical gaze leads a marginal existence in
the methodological thinking of the discipline (Riegl, Pächt, Olin). For visual
culture studies, on the other hand, my readings show the problematic recep-
tion of the Lacanian model of the gaze. Whereas the Lacanian gaze demon-
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strates the illusionary character of self-identity, visual culture studies basi-
cally turns it into its opposite, the theoretical affirmation of identity-politics.
The narcissistic circle – a critique
This rewriting of Lacan is a central conclusion frommy readings, and it is cer-
tainly not something I was expecting when I began work on this book. Orig-
inally I was seeking to understand the way visual culture studies succeeded
in introducing new, political subjects and subject-matter into the investiga-
tion of visual culture. My intention was similar to Stuart Hall’s: a “raid”5 on
another discipline in order to widen the possibilities of art history.
Driven by its political agenda, visual culture studies extracts positive-af-
firmative identities from the critical negativity6 of the Lacanian approach –
making it possible to transform the interpretative act of seeing into a nar-
cissist circle. Unlike language, seeing has always been considered as intrin-
sically narcissistic, beginning with the myth from which narcissism takes its
name. In 1859, Baudelaire linked portrait photography with the myth of Nar-
cissus, equating it with the mirror.7 Not only psychoanalysis connects seeing
and narcissism, but also the phenomenology ofMerleau-Ponty when he states
that “there is a fundamental narcissism of all vision”, a statement for which
he in turn drew on psychoanalysis.8
The reception of Lacanian models of the gaze by visual culture studies has
methodological consequences for its interpretative practice. In the model of
the mirror stage, it is only the transition to language that enables the narcis-
sism of the infant mirror stage to give way to an I capable of dialogue.The use
of this model within visual culture studies as a model of visuality means that
the interpreting viewer is assumed, in the act of seeing, to be caught in the
infant stage.This in turn means that language/speech and seeing as activities
5 Stuart Hall, “The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis of the Humanities”, in
October 53 (1990), 16. See also chapter 4, first section, in this book.
6 A concept from critical theory that can be applied here.
7 “À partir de cemoment, la société immonde se rua, comme un seul Narcisse, pour con-
templer sa triviale image sur lemétal.” Charles Baudelaire, “Le Salon de 1859” in Baude-
laire, Curiosités esthétiques, (Paris 1890).
8 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston 1968), 139. Original
French: “il y a un narcissisme fondamental de toute vision”, in Le visible et l’invisible (Paris
1964), 183.
208 Beyond the Mirror
of the subject, with their consequences for the I, are assumed to be separate
and unconnected – a problematic assumption.
A strange paradox arises here: when the Lacanian model of the gaze is
used to analyse visuality, and when this analysis sticks to and generalizes the
pre-linguistic infant model of the mirror stage, then language, of all things,
is omitted from the construction of the seeing and interpreting subject – as
if the subject automatically regressed to infancy in the act of seeing.This the-
oretical separation of seeing and speaking reflects something that could be
described, in the term used by Bal, as visual essentialism:9 the isolation of vi-
suality from language and from the other senses. In the specific focus of this
reading, infant narcissism becomes a necessary aspect of seeing. According to
another reading, only the child’s entry into language makes “mutual recogni-
tion beyond personal narcissism” possible.10 This would mean that seeing and
speaking, which I discuss here as media between the subject and the world,
structure this relationship in fundamentally different ways: seeing as solipsis-
tic, speaking as dialogical – a conclusion that is contradicted, for example, by
Olin’s dialogical model of seeing. For art history and visual culture studies,
it should be noted at this point that increased attention and self-reflection
needs to be devoted to the relationship between interpretative seeing and its
articulation as or transformation into language and text.
The discourse of visual culture studies also adopted Lacan’s later model of
the gaze. This deals with looking on a metaphorical level; the gaze here is a
metaphor or parable, a simile for the being-in-the-world-and-always-already-
looked-at of the Lacanian subject.Whereas the mirror phase describes a typi-
cal experience of actual children, for which Lacan provides evidence, I see his
model of the gaze with the diagram of the gaze and the screen as being more
figurative in character, meaning it cannot be transferred literally to real pic-
tures and situations of visual reception. And here lies another fundamental
problem in the reception of the Lacanian model within visual culture studies.
Due to their metaphorical links with seeing itself and with the visual ma-
terial focused on by visual culture studies, such a literal application of Lacan’s
models of the gaze within the discipline strikes me as dangerous: language as
symbolic takes second place to the imaginary, which in turn is duplicated or
linguistically mirrored in metaphors of the visual, and then transferred back
9 See Bal, “Visual Essentialism”.
10 Gerda Pagel, Lacan zur Einführung (Hamburg 1989), 34.
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into a language that revolves around recognition of the self that must set it-
self apart against the threat emanating from the gaze of the Other. When the
Lacanian models are adopted like this as a metatheory of visuality, interpre-
tation becomes a narcissistic “event” in its own right.
There is another paradox here: such oversimplification reduces the psy-
choanalytical theory in question to seeing, which is used by Lacan himself,
with its implications of optics and scopic regimes, as a metaphor, a figure
of speech and/or simile for structures of the unconscious and the “illusion
of consciousness”.11 As a result, those who interpret visual objects fall once
more into the “presence trap” of this “medium”, and the subjects of their in-
terpretation (including, specifically, themselves) run the risk of being reduced
to infant narcissism. The only theoretical way out of this trap is to construct
seeing as reading; otherwise, seeing rather than reading would be the central
heuristic concept for the cultural production of meaning. In cultural studies,
as in visual culture studies (for which it prepared the ground), the production
of meaning is the activity that defines culture.12 As yet, however, no models
exist for howmeaning is produced via seeing/the image/the visual that might
match the abstract rigor of themodels put forth for language by semiotics and
linguistics. Finally, seeing is not merely an activity of decoding.13
Other questions are also raised. If, following Bal, meaning is understood
as the production of narrative in the act of reception, then applied to art it
would mean that much of what has been addressed by art history, such as
style, and other questions of the aesthetic qualities of the object, would fall
outside the realm of reception. Conversely the residue in the object that can-
not be subsumed within a narrative could be defined as the remit of its aes-
thetic properties – drawing a line between narrative and aesthetics in the-
oretical discussions of reception. In such a model, then, the production of
meaning is conceived of as distinct from the aesthetic dimension; elements
11 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 83. See also Georg Christoph Tholen, “Auge, Blick und
Bild. Zur Intermedialität der Blickregime” in Bohrer, Sieber, Tholen, Blickregime und
Dispositive, 19-30.
12 “To put it simply: Culture is about ‘shared meanings’.” Stuart Hall, “Introduction” in
Stuart Hall (ed.), Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices (London,
Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 1997), 1.
13 The same applies, I suspect, to the act of reading, but this comment is only a weak
articulation of my scepticism towards the gesture of controllability on the part of lin-
guistics.
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of form and materiality can then be registered only as non-aesthetic. Accord-
ing to this logic, these elements can only be perceived within a narratological
straightjacket, as is the case with Bal’s reading of Rembrandt.14
Attention and recognition
In this light, the classificatory approach of classical art history takes on a dif-
ferent relevance: it has brought forth an attention to and observation of those
elements (commonly referred to in art history as style, facture, etc.) that are
not subject to such a constraint. But are they not subject, instead, to other
constraints, such as those imposed by the museum and other administrative
institutions? Yes, they are. However, if one is to believe the arguments used
by visual culture studies to set itself apart from and legitimate itself in the
face of its Other, art history, this also happens, if one assumes the autonomy
of art or, to put it another way, if one assumes an aesthetics of art that can-
not be functionalized.The attention of art history is thus not limited to those
elements that can be used to construct a narrative which derives its coher-
ence from the perspective of the interpreting subject. Art historical practices
of seeing, then, insofar as they are not geared exclusively towards the read-
ing/construction of meaning and narrative, are more broad-based.
At this point one must ask how, in methodological terms, might it be
possible to conceive of and practise an ethics of seeing that can lead to the
recognition of the visually Other – a recognition of what may be historically
or culturally ‘other’ that is not focused on an interpretative identification with
the mirror image? Could this attentiveness as a practice of dialogical seeing
beyond the limited cognitive objectives of classifying art history (as outlined,
for example, in my reading of Otto Pächt) be of significance to such an ethics?
And what might be the contribution of visual culture studies to this project?
After all, the discipline pursues a social and political agenda. In contrast to
art history, ethics seems to be inscribed in the project of visual culture studies
from the outset, as part of its program. As I see it, the problem of ethics as it
poses itself here lies in the methodological consequences of this program and
thus in the position of the interpreting subject with respect to what is being
looked at.
14 See chapter 6 of this book.
8. Questions of Ethics 211
Visual spaces of the subject: Narration and observation
In the course of my readings two main focuses of interpretative activity have
emerged: the search for a narrative and observation. In the former, what
the interpreting viewer does with the object is usually referred to as read-
ing; drawing on literary criticism, this approach is referred to as narratology.
Mieke Bal and Wolfgang Kemp explicitly base their models on this approach,
and it is also implied in the work of other authors discussed. In most cases,
it manifests itself in focussing more attention on content (or, in film studies,
plot) than on the conditions/media of production or the forms of the object.
In this, it resembles the method of iconography: narratology largely ignores
the aesthetic specificity of the object, focussing instead on its representation
of content, as well as analysing its formal elements in terms of this crite-
rion. This interpretative technique has a major subjective component, which
is rarely acknowledged or highlighted.The second focus, observation, is com-
monly understood as a procedure of distancing the subject from the object,
but it can slip into the opposite, a state referred to by Michael Fried as ab-
sorption – as I have pointed out above in my reading of Alpers.
Both of these positions, which I describe as stances towards the object,
make possible, by categorizing the corresponding procedures as a method,
the objectification of the subject, thus rendering it invisible, so to speak. In
extreme cases, both also facilitate narcissistic coupling of the object to the
interpreting viewer, projections of a narratological interpretation (as we have
seen in the case of Bryson), and absorption in the object. This absorption
depends on the aesthetic quality that consists in the viewer becoming drawn
into the act of perception, “forgetting” him/herself, which is also a type of
narcissistic circle, less in the form of incorporating the Other and more of
expanding the I to include the Other via an experience of merging.15
In art history, on the other hand, observation as a rule is linked to a non-
identificatory distance with regard to the object that permits no such experi-
ence ofmerging – since it is a practice of acquiring knowledge about the object
15 This absorptive experience is the benchmark of quality required of art byMichael Fried;
it cannot be identified in any of the positions under discussion here, however, because
it cannot be pinneddown in scientific terms. It is not a theoretical position but a subjec-
tive experience of perception that depends on the aesthetic autonomy of the artwork
and that seeks neither representations nor narratological coherence. See Fried, “Art
and Objecthood”.
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(Pächt) or its surrounding historical culture (Alpers). In visual culture stud-
ies, such distancing has a bad reputation that is articulated via metaphors of
seeing: seeing as an objectifying and distancing sense that claims to provide
evidence of truths it constructs itself, as epitomized by one-point perspective.
Against this backdrop, I thought it important, in my reading of Panofsky’s
essay on perspective, to highlight the political implications of distance and
closeness that he identifies in this symbolic form.
From what we have said so far, one might deduce an irreconcilable oppo-
sition between two interpretative procedures: narratology and observation.
It is tempting to assign them to the extreme poles of the relationship be-
tween interpreting subject and object – distance and closeness. Within the
discursive framework of this polarity, distance belongs with objectivity and
the masking of subjective elements in interpretation, while closeness is cou-
pled with presentism, immersion and subjectivity through to the narcissistic
circle. But narratology and observation cannot be clearly assigned to these
poles. Kemp’s version of narratology, for example, is ultimately an objectify-
ing procedure from art history like any other. In the approaches of Bal and
Bryson, however, it is accompanied by an empowerment of the interpreting
viewer over the object, coupled with anti-historical presentism and a high de-
gree of narcissistic projection.Observation, on the other hand, cannot be sim-
ply associated with objectifying distance, as shown by absorption as its most
extreme case. But I do think that in visual culture studies, there is a predom-
inance of narratology, or of a desire for narrative and for a form of realism
in the sense of a narrative continuum in the representation of the world. And
I identify the reason for this in the political agenda of visual culture studies:
the desire for narrative is fed by the desire for identity, for a wholeness of the
subject, be it an individual or a collective. In narratology, narrative is viewed
as a social and cultural practice that supports identity-formation; narratives
are considered, in the sense of an anthropological constant, as “distinct bear-
ers of meaning, cognitive tools in the formation of meaning and identity”.16
Mieke Bal has rendered structuralist narratology “productive for the analysis
of cultural phenomena”,17 especially with her work on the concept of focaliza-
16 Ansgar Nünning, “Wie Erzählungen Kulturen erzeugen: Prämissen, Konzepte und
Perspektiven für eine kulturwissenschaftliche Narratologie” in Alexandra Strohmai-
er(ed.), Kultur –Wissen –Narration. Perspektiven transdisziplinärer Erzählforschung für die
Kulturwissenschaften (Bielefeld 2013), 15-33: 18.
17 See ibid., 25.
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tion. Narrative, then, offers a sphere of action for the subject, not just for the
narrating subject but also for the interpreting subject, as both are driven by
a desire for meaning and identity. And when the desire of the subject deter-
mines his/her view of the object to the point where it only reflects this desire
back, then we have the narcissistic circle.
How can such a position deal with objects that do not narrate, that do
not use narrative to produce meaning and thus identity? In art, we know
such objects from the avant-garde of the 20th century. As Pächt’s example
of the illuminations from the Admont Bible show, pictures whose meaning
is unfamiliar to the viewer, too, can fall out of the narrative into the abstract
mode – the forms of an intended but no longer comprehensible narrative
elude the construction of meaning. Conversely, forms that refuse a realistic
mode of representation (or, in more general terms, that do not match the
viewer’s mimetic standards) but that still tell a story, may also be perceived
as abstract – this, too, is seen in the case of the Admont Bible. This denial of
obvious meaning, however, is what calls for precise observation of the object.
What does this mean? Is an observing, attentive focus on an object only pos-
sible when narrative is not possible? Abstract, non-figurative art would then
be opaque in more ways than one: it would be neither a window onto reality,
nor onto a narrative, nor, in the sense of a mirror, onto the viewing subject.
But for all this autonomy, for all this hermetic quality, it remains an Other for
observation and dialogue – a thought that prompts me to make an appeal for
an approach to objects beyond the control of narcissistic desire.
“Self-identity is a bad visual system. Fusion is a bad strategy
of positioning.”18
Visuality and art, the founding concepts of visual culture studies and art his-
tory respectively, can both be conceived of in essentialist terms. For an ethics
of seeing with genuine methodological consequences, however, I would ar-
gue that it is necessary, in both fields, to conceive of these founding concepts
as categories that have been agreed on, and not as anthropological constants.
This is also the basis for thinking about the perennial problem of how to struc-
ture the relationship between the object of research and the researching sub-
ject now that claims to objectivity in this relationship have been debunked as
18 Haraway, “Situated Knowledges”.
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myths and historical constructions by poststructuralist and feminist critiques
of science. In the context of her feminist critique of the “objective” natural sci-
ences, Donna Haraway’s concept of “situated knowledge” proposed a solution
that became very influential, although it made little impact on either art his-
tory or visual culture studies.The title of this section is a quotation taken from
her essay Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege
of Partial Perspective, first published in 1988.
Haraway offers a drastic description of the situation in which feminist
criticism found itself at the time, faced with a radical constructivism that was
“conjugated with semiology and narratology”: “We unmasked the doctrines of
objectivity because they threatened our budding sense of collective historical
subjectivity and agency and our ‘embodied’ accounts of truth, and we ended
up with one more excuse for not learning any post-Newtonian physics and
one more reason to drop the old feminist self-help practices of repairing our
cars.They’re just texts anyway, so let the boys have them back.”19 It was a mat-
ter of finding out “how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical
contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, … and a no-non-
sense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world”.20 She does not see
this divide as unbridgeable. As her linking metaphor, she chooses “a much
maligned sensory system in feminist discourse: vision. Vision can be good to
avoid binary oppositions”.21
This brings together the two factors that interest me as scholarly positions
with regard to the object: a critique of the concept of objectivity, as it applies
in one form or another to art historical positions, and the use of seeing as
the founding metaphor for the positions of visual culture studies. How does
Haraway use seeing as a metaphor? And what does she need it for?
She begins with the discursive figure of the “disembodied gaze” that we
know in its symbolic form as one-point perspective: a gaze that promises ob-
jective, hegemonic knowledge about the world without disclosing its stand-
point: “The eyes have been used to signify a perverse capacity – honed to per-
fection in the history of science tied to militarism, capitalism, colonialism,
and male supremacy – to distance the knowing subject from everybody and
everything in the interests of unfettered power.”This is a good summary of the
feminist critique at the time, to which the discourse of visual culture studies
19 Ibid., 186-187.
20 Ibid., 187.
21 Ibid., 188.
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also refers, right through to Mirzoeff ’s Right to Look in 2011. Haraway counters
this gaze with the “particularity and embodiment of all vision” as the prereq-
uisite for a “doctrine of embodied objectivity”.22 In this way, she does not
separate seeing from objectivity in order to claim it for what she sees as the
obviously partisan feminist critique; but neither does she equate it exclusively
with subjectivity. Instead, she seeks to connect embodied seeing with objec-
tivity. This seeing is embodied because “all eyes, including our own organic
ones, are active perceptual systems, building in translations and specific ways
of seeing, that is, ways of life.”23 The eye functions as amedium that translates
the world for and within its specific context/body. Translation is to be under-
stood here as a metaphor for the fact that seeing can never be immediate,
only mediated. In Haraway’s view, this is just as true of technical optical sys-
tems as it is of natural ones. In her view, this situatedness of embodied seeing
must be linked with the demands of an objectivity based on a viewpoint that
is partial rather than total, because “only partial perspective promises objec-
tive vision.This is an objective vision that initiates, rather than closes off, the
problem of responsibility for the generativity of all visual practices.”24
This responsibility for the generativity of visual practices is an important
cue for an ethics of seeing. And it is only logical that Haraway demands the
same responsibility for feminist theory, criticizing a modus operandi that
adopts the viewpoint of the repressed in a manner that is uncritical and ro-
manticizing. Haraway has no time for “innocent ‘identity’ politics … as strate-
gies for seeing from the standpoints of the subjugated in order to seewell.One
cannot ‘be’ either a cell or molecule – or a woman, colonized person, labourer,
and so on – if one intends to see and see from these positions critically.”25
Just as it is impossible to identify with the repressed person in order to adopt
their viewpoint, it is impossible to be immediately present unto oneself: “Self-
identity is a bad visual system. Fusion is a bad strategy of positioning.”26 Har-
away insists that identity, including I-identity, does not produce science, but
that “critical positioning does, that is, objectivity”.27
Haraway’s critique of identity positions as perspectives for a knowledge
of the world was first published in 1988, shortly before the founding phase
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 190.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 192.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 193.
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of visual culture studies around 1990. To my knowledge, it met with little re-
sponse during that phase. Clearly, her critique resonated more strongly with
those (natural) sciences that were sure of their store of objective facts and
knowledge. I, too, will deal with just a selection from her thought, as I am
interested in the way she links a critique of identity with visual metaphors in
relation to the problem of the relationship between interpreting viewer and
object.
The reasons for this lack of interest in Haraway are clear: in theoreti-
cal terms, visual culture studies moves between Foucault’s discourse analy-
sis, Lacan’s concepts of the gaze, and a more general basic assumption of
the social and cultural constructedness of knowledge, and hence within the
framework of poststructuralist and postmodern theory that Haraway in turn
recommends to the natural sciences as a way of reflecting critically on their
own constructedness. The critical acuity of this theoretical framework is en-
dangered, however, by the way visual culture studies deals with the concept
of identity. Two specific variants are important here: the political version
of positive amplification of identity often leads to what Haraway describes
and criticizes as identification with the perspective of the “subjugated”; the
other version is the radical subjectivization of interpretation, legitimized via
what I consider to be a literalist misunderstanding of Lacanian models of the
gaze, leading to a radically narcissistic self-empowerment of the interpreting
viewer/subject. For Haraway this results in “self-identity”, which she consid-
ers to be a bad visual system because it allows no distancing, either between
the interpreting self (that is unable to situate itself) and the world, or between
the viewer and the object, which is only seen insofar as it can be integrated
into the viewer’s self-image without threatening it.This object is then, as Har-
away puts it, “a resource for appropriation” to which “any status as agent in
the productions of knowledge” must be denied.28
Haraway’s model of situated knowledge uses metaphors of seeing and
perspective in a way that suggests a link with a model of dialogue between
object and interpreting subject as developed by Margaret Olin with reference
to art-historical precursors like Riegl and as hinted at in Pächt’s thoughts on
interpretative practice. Haraway’s characterization of the object as an “agent”
corresponds with the role played in art history and visual culture studies by
the historical and cultural alterity of the object. This alterity is not something
28 Ibid., 198.
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whose resistance to being incorporated into the construction of the interpret-
ing subject must be overcome (be it via objectification or identification) but
the element that turns the relationship between interpreting viewer and ob-
ject into a dialogical one. And this relationship gives rise to situated knowl-
edge insofar as the object recognized in its unfamiliarity is able to call the
world-view and perspective of the interpreting viewer into question.This con-
stitutes the action of the object understood as agent.
Seeing the Other
While art history focuses its gaze all too rigidly on discrete objects, forget-
ting or denying that this gaze is shaped by subjective factors, visual culture
studies does focus its gaze on the “Other”, but what it sees there is above all
that which can be reconciled, for whatever reason, with the interpreting I.
This gaze is a look in the mirror. The element of the unfamiliar that identifies
the Other as other in the gaze of the One becomes or remains hidden, be-
cause it threatens the identity of the interpreting viewer. The methodological
and theoretical ramifications of these two specific scopic regimes unfold in
the concrete situations where they are applied, where the exchange of looks
within the triad of object, producer and viewer are subjected to a variety of
challenges. They also raise the question of the viewer’s relationship to past
and present: the art-historical interpreting I operates on the assumption that
it is capable of objectivity in dealing with history; and while the interpreting I
of visual culture studies, in its radical form at least, engages with theoretical
critiques of objectivity, the conclusion it draws is that its own subjectivity, and
thus its own present, must form the sole basis for interpretation. In ethical
terms, this form of seeing means a denial of or failure to recognize the Other,
be it a discrete object or a subject. This can only be overcome in the form of a
dialogical seeing that recognizes the unfamiliarity of the Other: such seeing
is aware of its desire to rewrite this unfamiliarity and to reduce it to what can
be integrated into its own identity construction, whereas dialogue keeps the
tension between identity and alterity open.
This position is not identical, however, with the well-known calls for “self-
critique and relativization of one’s own supposedly sovereign and certainly
western, historically determined ethnological way of looking at different, for-
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eign cultures”,29 as formulated especially in the context of postcolonial cri-
tiques of science. As a consequence, the discipline of ethnology developed the
method of participant observation30 in order to remove or at least reduce the
imbalance of power between field researchers and those under study. How-
ever, alterity does not begin with the exoticism of other cultures; the reception
of Lacan’s model of the gaze has brought a more radical position into play
here, based on the subject’s being-other-unto-itself in the gaze of the Other
and the (vain) attempts to resolve this into a narcissistic gaze. By reading it as
a positive affirmation of identity, visual culture studies deprive the Lacanian
model of the gaze of its critical potential. Instead, the emphasis should be
on enduring the unfamiliarity of the Other, be it object or subject, and on
keeping it alive.
Outlook: The digital world and its consequences
Not so long ago, art history focused entirely on historical alterity, with con-
temporary art considered the remit of art criticism. In recent decades, this
has changed fundamentally, as the discipline deals with objects right up to the
immediate present. This has gone so far that teaching staff are increasingly
complaining that their students are losing their awareness of history. They
prefer studying the present, it is claimed, in order to avoid the unfamiliarity
of historical objects and the attendant need to acquire specialist knowledge.
Such complaints are often accompanied by a broader verdict on the times:
the politics and practices of knowledge displayed by the media, especially the
Internet, are geared towards simultaneous retrievability of information re-
gardless of its historical situatedness; attention spans are shorter; the status
of information is arbitrary and it can be combined at random. Historical al-
terity is broken down into individual information units, making it possible
to absorb the past into a puzzlingly structured, ever-changing, ever-present
data network in which the active subject no longer features.31
29 Martin Schulz, Ordnungen der Bilder. Eine Einführung in die Bildwissenschaft (Munich
2005), 121.
30 See James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Authority”, in Representations 1, no. 2 (1983), 118-
146.
31 Superficially (and cynically) speaking, it seems as if this diffusion of the subject into
information networks has now realized on a technical level what poststructuralist cri-
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The texts read in this book do not address this technological change, a de-
velopment that will force art history and visual culture studies to re-examine
their approaches. The fundamentally altered conditions of access to and use
of knowledge brought about by information technology and the culture of the
world wide web have consequences for the categories on which the practice of
visual culture studies and art history are based. They also affect my thinking
about an ethics of seeing in these two fields: for visual culture studies this
category is visibility as the visual representation of identity; for art history,
art as object. Both are exposed to huge forces of change by the conditions of
the digital world, the consequences of which I will in these concluding words
sketch in.
It is questionable, for example, whether the political agenda of visual cul-
ture studies, framed as a matter of visibility within society, which involves in-
tervening in the struggle for the right to identity-based representation of the
“subjugated” (Haraway) or “subalterns” (Gayatry Spivak), is still sustainable in
the face of ever-louder criticism of the endless, uncontrollable circulation of
representations in themedia, from television to surveillance cameras to social
media and mobile phone cameras. For media artist and theorist Hito Steyerl,
the fascination with andmimetic desire for attractive self-images has become
a threat: “As we register at cash tills, ATMs, and other checkpoints – as our
cellphones reveal our slightest movements and our snapshots are tagged with
GPS coordinates – we end up not exactly amused to death but represented to
pieces.”32 She notes a growing tendency towards withdrawal from representa-
tion: “… people have started to actively, and passively, refuse constantly being
monitored, recorded, identified, photographed, scanned, and taped.Within a
fully immersive media landscape, pictorial representation – which was seen
as a prerogative and a political privilege for a long time – feels more like a
threat.”33 Within these structures of image exploitation, the right to symbolic
representation and visual presence in the cultural field has become a danger,
the political resource of visibility has become a further instrument of con-
trol and marketization of both individuals and social groups. The consumer,
for whose rights Mirzoeff was still campaigning in 1999, is now entangled in
tiques of the subject were calling for. But this would imply that this effect was a critical
activity, and not something that must itself be criticized.
32 Hito Steyerl, “The Spamof the Earth:Withdrawal fromRepresentation” in e-flux journal
(eds.: Julieta Aranda, Brian Kuan Wood, Anton Vidokle), #32 (02/2012), http://www.e-
flux.com/journal/the-spam-of-the-earth/ (accessed 26 Sept 2016).
33 Ibid.
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a regime of “(mutual) self-control and visual self-disciplining, which is even
harder to dislocate than earlier regimes of representation”.34
Under these conditions, visual representation can no longer be a political
resource.The hope that symbolic representation of subaltern identities might
lead to enhanced political and economic equality is in crisis; ultimately, hard-
won visual presence based on fixed identities resulted in a situation where
minority groups are now seen, recognized and addressed in precisely these
formats of fixed diversity – as consumers. Instead of political participation,
this regime of representation delivers “gossip, surveillance, evidence, serial
narcissism, as well as occasional uprisings”.35
It is a common theme in the debate surrounding the status of images
in the world of digital media that as signs these images have neither an au-
thor nor a referent. If images in the digital world no longer have a referent,
then visual representations of identity, the currency of visual culture studies,
also have no referent (i.e. no subject). It follows that these representations put
identities into circulation that have no referent. At the very least, these identi-
ties have detached themselves from the subjects who provide the images/data
to look at, in order to float “freely” and uncontrollably in the network where,
reduced to information, they can also just as uncontrollably be “harvested”.
In such a subject-less visual regime, the Lacanian models of the gaze adapted
by visual culture studies are no longer effective, since representation has been
suspended.
As well as the subject, what is also diffused in the world wide web is alter-
ity, the unfamiliarity of the Other that can only come into play as the Other
of a subject. Steyerl’s “serial narcissism” comes to mind: in the world wide
web, technology has led to an effect that can be conceived of by analogy with
the narcissistic circle triggered in the interpretative practice of visual culture
studies by Lacan’s models of the gaze, working against the alterity/unfamil-
iarity of this Other in an attempt to smooth it over or mirror it into the self of
the interpreting viewer – accompanied by a denial of objectifying distance.
Here, the object as an Other, as something in dialogue with the subject,
comes back into play – for example the object of art history, the individual
work of art. In the age of Google, the artwork, too, has altered its character
and status, writes David Joselit in After Art.36 To grasp this development in
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 David Joselit, After Art (Princeton, Oxford 2012).
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theoretical terms, he borrows metaphors from the financial markets and the
Internet – from those fields, then, in which the aggressive capitalism of recent
decades culminates.He does this not from a position of critical negativity, but
because he wishes to refute what he considers to be the underestimated sta-
tus of today’s art. In his view, art needs this support. Against the idealization
of the artwork as a unique au-ratic object – based on simplified readings of
Benjamin37 – Joselit upholds the circulation of digital images, which he ap-
plies to art. He pursues a strategy of positively revaluating something that
seems to be in need of help – an approach that is familiar from visual culture
studies. Joselit tries to rethink the current status of art by dressing its system
of values, its forms of production and its manifestations, in the dynamics of
finance and the Internet. The new values of art in the age of its digitally en-
hanced reproduction are based on the concepts of ‘circulation’ and ‘currency’;
the concept of media is replaced by that of format, the concepts of form and
content by information. The image is “a visual byte”, a form of information,38
whose power Joselit sees not in its ontology but in “a current or currency”
that is activated on contact with the viewer.39 The more points of contact are
established, the greater the power – ametaphor that links the (monetary) cur-
rency of images with the currents and networks of electricity. In Joselit’s view,
there has been a shift from the individual artwork to “populations of images”,
leading to “changing formats of contemporary art”.40 Today, it is saturation
via mass circulation – “the status of being everywhere at once rather than be-
longing to a single place” – that creates value for and through images.41 He
thus contrasts two main aspects with the conventional status of the artwork:
the shift away from individual picture to a “swarm of images” that produce
a “buzz” rather than a Benjaminian aura,42 and uninterrupted global circu-
lation, reproduction and combination in digital media. Here, however, the
digital image does not take the place of the artwork; instead, Joselit sees an
37 For Benjamin’s theory of the loss of aura, associated with art’s mechanical reproduc-
tion, is still being used in art discourse as evidence of art’s loss of value, while prices on
the art market have soared. This limited reception turns Benjamin into a nostalgic fig-
ure yearning for the fixed, auratic artwork of old and forgets the political expectations
that he associated with art’s mechanical reproducibility and with this loss.
38 Joselit, After Art, XV.
39 Ibid. XVI.
40 Ibid., 15.
41 Ibid., 16.
42 Ibid.
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obligation for art to respond to this development. He claims to have observed
that contemporary art is moving away from individual or serial art objects
towards “the disruption or manipulation of populations of images through
various methods of selecting and reframing existing content”. The what be-
comes less important than the relationship between the “discrete images and
their framing network”.43 In his view, art criticismmust adjust to a shift from
an object-based aesthetics towards a “network aesthetics of images premised
on the emergence of form from populations of images”.44 Form and medium
are subsumed under the concept of ‘format’, superseding the individual art-
work as a discrete object: “Formats are dynamic mechanisms for aggregating
content.”45 The economies of this “overproduction of images” can only be un-
derstood and processed via an “epistemology of search”, because they function
via “connectivity”.46
Joselit sees his political project exemplified in Fairytale, Ai Weiwei’s con-
tribution to Documenta 12 in 2007, for which the artist brought 1001 Chinese
to Kassel: rather than criticizing the power of images, he argues, Ai used the
power of art – in this case its (or rather his) prestige and economic power –
to transport people and objects both in space and in the imagination. “This is
our political horizon, after art.”47 In Ai’s elaborate operation he sees proof that
connectivity produces power. “One need not exit the art world or denigrate its
capacities. Instead wemust recognize and exploit its potential power in newly
creative and progressive ways. Our real work begins after art, in the networks
it formats.”48 This closing sentence highlights another of Joselit’s concerns: he
is clearly of the opinion that as a part of aggressive globalized capitalism, art is
in the process of losing its legitimacy as a critical force, especially in the eyes of
radical opponents of capitalism. He thus attempts a difficult volte-face: pre-
cisely this integration into the networks of turbo-capitalism, he argues, gives
art a power that must be exploited. Which raises the well-known question:
Is there such a thing as a critique of capitalism from inside? This question
might also be asked the other way round: is there such a thing as a critique
43 Ibid., 34.
44 Ibid., 43.
45 Ibid., 55.
46 Ibid., 56.
47 Ibid., 94.
48 Ibid., 96.
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from outside the system? Joselit’s essay provoked a range of responses.49 What
interests me here is something else, namely Joselit’s view that art should set
more store by networks than objects. The examples he gives include discrete
objects, like the photographs of Sherrie Levine, Ai’s chair installation at the
2008 Venice Biennale, or Wang Guangyi’s painting Coca Cola (2004). There
are also the usual formats of contemporary art: videos, performances, sculp-
tures, social interventions like those of Rirkrit Tiravanija and Santiago Sierra,
as well as references to the art strategies which since the 1960s replaced high
modernism à la Greenberg.His examples thus come essentially from thewest-
ern canon of neo-avant-garde, conceptual art and post-avant-garde, i.e. those
currents that have an inbuilt reflexive element, be it with regard to their own
art practice or to the art systemwith its institutions and dynamics of exploita-
tion, extended to include formats that are explicitly critical of capitalism such
as Tania Bruguera’s Generic Capitalism (2009). The departure of the discrete
object from art production, then, is a topic that already has a history and a
discourse. Joselit now describes it as an integrative moment of digitally ac-
celerated capitalism; its critical thrust must come from its success within the
system. This may also be the reason why, surprisingly, he does not address
Internet art, since it is not (yet) integrated into the existing value creation
chains of the art market.50
In their analyses, both Steyerl and Joselit presuppose the power of to-
tal media immersion as a fact of conditions today. For Steyerl, however, this
does not immediately lead to a Baudrillardian merging of the real world with
media simulacra; instead, she contrasts the identity simulacra of the world
wide web with the resistance of real people/subjects – their withdrawal from
representation. Joselit’s position is necessarily less clearly defined because a
separation of network images from reality would go against his argument; in
49 For critical reactions to Joselit’s political repositioning of art, see, for example, Todd
Cronan, “Neoliberal Art History” in Radical Philo-sophy 180 (Jul/Aug 2013), 50-53, http://
nonsite.org/review/neoliberal-art-history (accessed 16 Sept 2016).
50 Value creation chains that are (still) strongly shaped by criteria which Internet art does
not (yet) offer or actively seeks to undermine: authorship, object character and the in-
stitutions of display. It should be noted here that this art system has learned to exploit
even such art forms as do not produce objects in the strict sense, like performances and
site-specific actions. In terms of exploitation, Bruguera’s action or Santiago Sierra’sHir-
ing and Arrangement of 30Workers in Relation to Their Skin Colour (shown in 2002 at Kun-
sthalle Wien) could be said to be objects in this sense, even if Joselit describes them
as formats. See Joselit, After Art, 66f.
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his model, the dividing lines between the discrete objects of art and the image
clusters of digital circulation are fluid; the materiality of the art object does
not feature in his argument.
Media technologies, their economies and their usage change so fast as
to make it impossible to propose definitions and recommend paths of action
for the long term on the basis of today’s situation. And there is certainly no
question of formulating strategies on the basis of one-sided descriptions of
the current state of affairs. Many such analyses and declarations of paradigm
shifts have been absolutizing, putting them at odds with the ambivalences of
real developments; one need only think of the “end of history”, the “end of
art”, or “globalization” that was soon joined by its opposite, an insistence on
the local, leading to the portmanteau concept of the “glocal”. Absolutizing talk
of total media immersion also shows a dubious one-sidedness, regardless of
whether it is due to unfettered techno-optimism, a media critique, or a more
general critique of culture, often with a moralizing character.
I would argue in favour of insisting that art, in the broadest imaginable
sense and in ways that constantly reflect changing conditions, contests the
power of the factual.51 For today, this would also mean contesting the power
of “total” media immersion, even and above all when this power is (merely)
imagined, because such imaginings, too, play a part in the transformation of
the factual, as does a critique that speaks of the media, of images, of the In-
ternet as an overwhelming flood to which people are helplessly exposed. The
fact, for example, that Joselit does not elaborate on possible differences be-
tween art and media circulation at least suggests that art is indeed involved
in the corresponding processes of change. Or to put it differently: art’s au-
tonomy can no longer be the basis for its ability to critique or contest; art is
involved and distanced at the same time – as discussed above with regard to
Haraway’s “situated knowledge”.
The ties between art and visual culture are closer today than ever before.
And in contrast to what was implied by the distancing rhetoric of visual cul-
ture studies in the 1990s about art history being an elitist, bourgeois prac-
tice, this does not mean that art no longer has any critical legitimacy. On
the contrary, its critical, contesting voice is necessary – and not so much in
the visual forms of political agitation, as they are known from bygone eras of
clearly drawn political battle lines. These new ties can also act as a meeting
51 For this succinct formulation I am grateful to Bettina Uppenkamp.
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ground between art history and visual culture studies. Art history might prof-
itably depart from its structural fixation on a discrete object – for although art
itself has not abandoned the discrete object, its strategies are more open in
their connectivemobility. Art history should also open its heuristic categories,
categories that belong to an episteme of objectivity, to thinking in relational
terms, and here it can profit from the dialogue with visual culture studies.
Thinking its main activity of seeing as being embedded in the relational could
then also be described in correlation with what Joselit calls connectivity. In
very simple terms, one might say: connectivity is to today’s mobile art what
context is to the art of discrete objects.
The growing resistance to digitally inflated presentations of identity di-
agnosed by Steyerl, on the other hand, will have very real consequences for
the basic assumptions of visual culture studies, since public visibility now
manifests itself as a kind of crazy hall of mirrors. It can be assumed that the
strategy of visibility as a political resource in the struggle for recognition of
subaltern identities is coming to an end, and with it the fixation on identi-
ties that had, in their affirmative function, long become prisons, especially
in times of increased transcultural circulation. This can be beneficial in sev-
eral respects: freedom from narcissism as the driving force behind visibility
in identity politics, accompanied by the possibility for visual culture studies
to focus its gaze beyond an identity-based framework more strongly on its
object, visuality – visual phenomena of cultural production in the broadest
sense, exchanges of gazes and scopic regimes in which relationships between
subjects and media situations manifest themselves, their social and cultural
interplay, their technologies, their social and economic effects, their accompa-
nying cultural practices. And art has a special function in this field: to contest
the power of the factual, be it visual or not, it bundles (in concentrated and,
ideally, surprising form) aesthetic and critical-analytical forces of a kind that
are not to be found in any other cultural production.
I imagine the respective objects of art history and visual culture studies as
being positioned between the relational factors of visuality and the discrete
objects of art. They relate to each other not in the sense of a hierarchy where
art history features as a special case of visual culture studies, but in the in-
terplay outlined above that situates art as a condensation and contestation of
those conditions examined by visual culture studies. This is territory where
art history and visual culture studies canmeet, with attentiveness, in a seeing
that orients itself towards the outside of the subject while remaining aware
of its subjective genesis.
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